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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANGELA BYERS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CREATIVE CORNER, INC. AND LYN 
PELTON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Supreme Court No. 20000782-SC 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
Section 3 of Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, and Utah Code Anno. 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Does an employee state a cause of action for public policy 
wrongful termination when she is terminated because of her sex, 
where the employer has fewer than 15 employees and the employee 
thus has no right to bring his claim before the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division because that agency lacks jurisdiction? 
This issue was resolved on a Motion to Dismiss by the trial 
1 
court. The standard of review is a review for correctness. The 
trial court is affirmed only if the plaintiff could not recover 
under the facts alleged. Straley v. Halliday, 997 P. 2d 336 (Utah 
Ct. A.P.. 2000). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) 
Retherford v. AT&T, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1992) 
Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended) 42USC 2000e 
UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov. Leavitt; 
UT Exec Order June 30, 198 9 - Gov. Bangerter; 
UT Exec Order July 25, 1986 - Gov. Bangerter; 
UT Exec Order May 28, 1985 - Gov. Bangerter; 
UT Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order July 17, 1980 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order May 4, 1979 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order December 6, 1973 - Gov. Rampton; 
UT Exec Order October 1, 1965 - Gov. Rampton. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Angela Byers brought suit after she was fired by 
the appellees. At the time she was fired Defendant Pelton said 
that Byers was terminated because she was pregnant and unable to 
2 
lift. Byers specifically discussed lifting with her doctor and 
was able to lift all items she had been required to lift during 
her employment with Defendant Creative Corner, Inc. Byers was 
terminated because she was pregnant. At the time Byers was 
terminated Appellees employed fewer than 15 employees. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Byers filed her complaint alleging wrongful termination in 
violation of a clear and substantial public policy. Appellees 
filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), Utah R. Civ. 
P., which was granted. Byers filed a Motion for a New Trial 
pursuant to Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P. The trial court denied the 
Rule 59 motion. Byers appealed. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY 
This matter was dismissed by the trial court on a Motion to 
Dismiss. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
This matter was dismissed on a Motion to Dismiss. All the 
complaint's well pled facts are deemed admitted for the purpose 
of such a motion. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). The facts stated in the 
complaint, and thus deemed admitted, include: 
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2. Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah 
Corporation in good standing doing business in Salt Lake 
County. (Record at 1.) 
3. Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant 
Creative Corner, Inc., and the person who made all relevant 
decisions and took all relevant actions alleged herein. 
(Record at 1.) 
4. All actions alleged herein took place in Salt 
Lake County and venue and jurisdiction are appropriate 
in Salt Lake County. (Record at 1-2.) 
5. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant 
Creative Corner, Inc. at a rate of $11.00 per hour plus 
a $200.00 per month car allowance. (Record at 2.) 
6. The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day 
of October, 1999. (Record at 2.) 
7. Defendant Pelt on said that Plaintiff was 
terminated because she was pregnant and unable to lift. 
(Record at 2.) 
8. Plaintiff specifically discussed lifting with her 
doctor and was able to lift all items she had been required 
to lift during her employment with Creative Corner, Inc. 
(Record at 2.) 
9. Plaintiff was terminated because she was pregnant. 
(Record at 2.) 
10. At the time Plaintiff was terminated Defendants 
employed fewer than 15 employees. (Record at 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 
and other federal statutes and regulations and Executive Order of 
Utah Governors provide a clear and substantial public policy 
4 
against termination of an employee in Utah because of sex. The 
trial court also erred in its memorandum decision on Byers's 
motion for a new trial when it held that Byers could not list 
additional legal citations supporting her claims in her 
memoranda. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFF'S TERMINATION VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY 
Appellees do not contest the essential factual allegations 
of Byers's complaint, i.e., Byers was terminated by Lyn Pelton, 
the president of Creative Corner because she was pregnant. At 
all relevant times Creative Corner had fewer than 15 employees. 
The trial court held that these facts do not state a cause of 
action upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b) (6) . 
Byers claim would have been pre-empted and she would have 
been allowed to proceed with her sex discrimination claim under 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, UCA 34A-5-101 et seq. or Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if Creative Corner had 15 or 
more employees. Since Creative Corner had fewer than 15 
employees it is not an "employer" under the UADA.1 Because 
xThe term '"employee1 means any person applying with or 
employed by an employer." Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-102 (6) . The 
term "'employer1 means . . . every . . . person employing 15 or 
more employees within the state . . .." Utah Code Ann. §34a-5-
5 
Creative Corner is not an "employer," Byers is not an "employee" 
under the Act. Because the parties are not "employers" or 
"employees" under the Act, there is no jurisdiction for either to 
seek relief or to be required to respond to claims raised under 
the Act and the UADA does not pre-empt Byers's claims. 
A. 
RETHERFORD DOES NOT PRE-EMPT BYER'S CLAIMS. 
In its memorandum decision the trial court accepted 
appellees argument that the UADA pre-empts Byers's claims and 
relied on the analysis of Retherford v. AT&T, 844 P. 2d 949 (Utah 
1992) . Actually reading Retherford shows why the UADA does not 
pre-empt Byers's claims. To pre-empt a claim, a statute must 
offer alternative relief. The UADA offers no relief to Byers. 
Retherford analyzes both Utah and Federal statutes in its pre-
emption discussion. 
In Retherford, at 968-969, the court analyzed the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA) which pre-empts various labor 
claims because those claims may be addressed under collective 
bargaining agreements. 
The justification for this expansive view of section 
3 01 preemption is the ease with which an aggrieved 
employee otherwise could turn a suit for breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement into a state tort or 
102 (7) . 
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contract claim, thereby obtaining a state law holding 
that might result in an inconsistent interpretation of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. 
That pre-emption is justified because the employee has relief 
available under a collective bargaining agreement. Other Federal 
statutes may pre-empt other types of claims when relief is 
available under those statutes. 
Retherford also addressed pre-emption by Utah state 
statutes. At 965, the court discussed pre-emption under the 
Worker's Compensation Act. The key to whether there was pre-
emption was u. . . that the Workers' Compensation Act provided 
the exclusive remedy . . . " Id. (Emphasis added.) The Workers' 
Compensation Act pre-empts claims of injured workers when it 
provides a remedy for those claims through an administrative 
process. K 
Finally, Retherford discussed pre-emption by the UADA. In 
Retherford, the Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the UADA 
pre-empted all discrimination claims as the trial court suggests. 
Instead it said u. . .we conclude that taken, as a whole, the 
version of the UADA in effect at the time of Retherford's firing 
defined retaliation as discrimination and provided the exclusive 
remedy for this type of discrimination." Id. at 962. (Emphasis 
added.) As with both the LMRA and the Workers' Compensation Act, 
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the UADA pre-empts those claims for which it provides remedies to 
claimants. 
Other courts have used this same analysis in holding that 
statutes like the UADA do not pre-empt discrimination claims 
against small employers. In Kramer v. Windsor P$rk Nursing Home, 
Inc., 943 F. Supp. 844, (S.D. Ohio 1996), the court applied 
Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995) which acknowledged 
the type of cause of action Byers filed. The Kramer court 
responded to the pre-emption argument there, ". . . despite 
O.R.C.S4112, the plaintiff in Collins had no adequate remedy 
since her employer was exempt from coverage by the statute. 
[Citation omitted.] The court did not believe that the 
legislature meant for small business to have a 'license to 
sexually harass/discriminate against their employees with 
impunity.'" 
Because Creative Corner is not an "employer" and because 
Byers is not an "employee" under the UADA, that Act provides 
Byers no remedy. Because the Act provides no remedy, it does not 
pre-empt her wrongful termination claim. 
B. 
THERE EXISTS A CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST 
SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
8 
In Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), this 
Court held that a cause of action exists for wrongful termination 
where an employee has been terminated in violation of a clear and 
substantial public policy. The Trial Court's position would 
appear to limit Peterson v. Browning to its facts and hold that 
the only clear and substantial public policies Utah recognizes 
are those where an employee is fired for refusing to commit a 
felony. 
In Fox v. MCI Communs. Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997), 
this court held: 
An at-will employee may overcome that presumption 
by demonstrating that (1) there is an implied or 
express agreement that the employment may be terminated 
only for cause or upon satisfaction of another 
agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation 
restricts the right of an employer to terminate an 
employee under certain conditions; or (3) the 
termination of employment constitutes a violation of a 
clear and substantial public policy. (Emphasis added.) 
The policy is to prohibit discrimination within the State, 
not merely to prohibit discrimination among employers with more 
than 15 employees. Other states have examined this same issue in 
light of anti-discrimination acts, which also have jurisdictional 
limits based on the number of employees, and held that 
discrimination statutes do describe clear and substantial public 
policy. See Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990); 
Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996); Kerrigan v. 
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Magnum Entertainment Inc., 804 F.Supp. 733 (D.Md. 1992); Collins 
v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995); £o£>erts v. Dudley, 993 
P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000); Williamson v. Greene, 490 S.E.2d 23 (W.Va. 
1997) . 
Retherford provides the analysis for the inquiry as to 
whether a public policy is clear and substantial. Retherford at 
note 9. 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently 
"clear and substantial" to support a cause of action for 
discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine 
the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it 
affects the public as a whole. The very words "clear and 
substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As 
the majority of this court recognized in Peterson, all 
statements made in a statute are not expressions of public 
policy. Many statutes merely regulate conduct between 
private individuals or "'impose requirements whose 
fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy 
concerns.1" [Citations omitted.] 
The following questions are relevant to determining 
whether a statute embodies a clear and substantial public 
policy. First, one must ask whether the policy in question 
is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed 
to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether the 
public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and 
weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach of 
contract, thereby constituting a bar to discharge that 
parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal 
bargaining power. 
These two questions are both answered affirmatively in the case 
of sex discrimination. 
The policy prohibiting sex discrimination is one of 
overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties 
10 
only. The Policy against age discrimination is clear and 
substantial on numbers alone. There are more than 11 million 
people employed by employers with too few employees to be covered 
by the Act, Rivers v. Roadway Express Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 114 
S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, (1994) Note 6. Congress felt so 
strongly about sex discrimination that it directed the Attorney 
General of the United States to file suit to enforce Title VII 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-6. It also imposed punitive damages as a penalty 
against employers who violate that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
The fact that Title VII has jurisdictional requirements 
based on the number of employees does not mean the public policy 
is merely to prohibit discrimination by those employers with 15 
or more employees. That argument was rejected by the court in 
Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 P.2d 608 (Md. 1996). There the court 
examined a wrongful termination claim brought by another woman 
who claimed she was terminated because of her sex by an employer 
with fewer than the required number of employees. The Molesworth 
court noted that the legislative history of Title VII indicated 
that the reason for the 15 employee requirement for cases 
submitted to EEOC was that including all employers would create a 
significant backlog for EEOC, Id. at 614. 
Title VII reflects a clear and substantial public policy 
against discrimination based on sex. 
11 
c 
OTHER FEDERAL LAW ALSO PROVIDES A 
CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY 
Title VII is not alone as a federal statutory basis for the 
clear and substantial public policy against termination because 
of sex. At 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) congress prohibited discrimination 
in compensation based on sex, regardless of the number of 
employees, so long as the employer meets the other requirements 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It goes without saying that if 
an employer may not discriminate in the amount of compensation it 
cannot discriminate in whether to pay any compensation at all, 
i.e., whether to fire on the basis of sex. 
42 U.S.C. §5057 makes it illegal to for an employer, 
regardless of size, to discriminate based on sex among certain 
volunteers, i.e., people who do not get paid. If clear and 
substantial public policy prevents sex discrimination among 
volunteers clearly there is such a policy preventing the 
termination, based on sex, from employment upon which a woman 
relies for her livelihood. 
This Court has analyzed government regulations in 
determining whether a public policy is clear and substantial. 
See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 406 (Utah 
1998). Specific regulations of the federal government show a 
12 
clear and substantial public policy against sex discrimination, 
regardless of the size of the employer. Businesses who contract 
with the Federal Railroad Administration2, the Federal Highway 
Administration3, the Federal Communications Commission4 
specifically, and the government generally5 may not discriminate 
based on sex no matter how few employees they have. In analyzing 
regulations and statutes we must remember that the Peterson v. 
Browning, did not create a cause of action for the violation of 
individual statutes or regulations. It merely held that the 
statutes or regulations must be analyzed to see whether their 
policy is clear and substantial. If there is a clear and 
substantial public policy against sex discrimination for small 
firms who contract with the federal government to perform 
janitorial services the policy remains clear and substantial 
against sex discrimination by small firms who contract with the 
state or a private firm to perform those same janitorial 
services. If there is a clear and substantial public policy 
against sex discrimination by small firms who perform janitorial 
249 CFR §265.7(a)(1)(i) 
323 CFR §230.113 
447 CFR §73.2080 
541 CFR §60-1.4 
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services the policy remains clear and substantial against sex 
discrimination by small firms who do anything else. 
For many years neither congress nor the President of the 
United States were prohibited in any fashion from discriminating 
against their employees on the basis of sex. As of 1996 both of 
these employers are required to treat women employees no 
differently than they treat men, including in firing decisions. 
See 2 U.S.C. §1311, 3 U.S.C. §411. When both of these employers 
who have previously been able to do as they wish are now 
restricted in their ability to fire a woman because of her sex it 
is clear that the national public policy is clearly and 
substantially against allowing an employer, of any size, to fire 
a woman because of her sex. 
D 
PUBLIC POLICY REFLECTED IN UTAH EXECUTIVE ORDERS IS 
CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION 
In addition to the federal law cited above Byers asked the 
trial court to consider related executive orders of Utah's 
governors. These include: UT Exec Order March 17, 1993 - Gov. 
Leavitt; UT Exec Order June 30, 198 9 - Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec 
Order July 25, 1986 - Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order May 28, 1985 
- Gov. Bangerter; UT Exec Order January 12, 1982 - Gov. Matheson; 
UT Exec Order July 17, 198 0 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order May 4, 
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1979 - Gov. Matheson; UT Exec Order October 1, 1977 - Gov. 
Matheson; UT Exec Order December 6, 1973 - Gov. Rampton; UT Exec 
Order October 1, 1965 - Gov. Rampton. In these executive orders 
the then sitting governors of Utah described the rights Byers 
seeks to vindicate here. Those rights were not described in 
terms of government versus private employment or by the number of 
employees an employer has. For example Governor Bangerter's 
Executive Order of July 25, 1986; 
. . . the basic rights of all the people of this nation 
are the rights to seek a livelihood, opportunity for 
advancement and the respect of our society based solely 
on the individual's ability and capacity. To judge an 
individual, expressly or through implication, by 
his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national 
origin, age or handicap, is repugnant to every American 
ideal and a distortion of our standards of human 
freedom and worth. [Emphasis added] 
Clearly Governor Bangerter did not believe that the public policy 
of the state of Utah limited basic employment rights to those 
women employed by large employers. 
In his Executive Order of March 17, 1993 Governor Leavitt 
directed, "by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and 
laws of this state, [I] do hereby prohibit sexual harassment, 
which is a form of sex discrimination, in any and every workplace 
in which state employees and employees of public and higher 
education are required to conduct business." Obviously state 
employees of agencies like the Workers Compensation Division of 
15 
the Utah Labor Commission6, the Utah Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration7, and Work Force Services8, and other 
entities are required to conduct business in every business of 
the state. Appellees' business is covered by the March 17, 1993 
Executive Order. 
As the governors of all citizens of Utah governors Leavitt, 
Bangerter, Matheson and Rampton have issued executive orders 
which delineate a clear and substantial public policy for each of 
those citizens. In doing so they have not drawn artificial lines 
between large and small employers. The clear and substantial 
public policy they describe applies to all employees, and 
employers, these parties included. 
E 
BURTON DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS ACTION 
In Burton v. Exam Center, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2000 UT IS 
(Utah 2000) this court examined the plaintiff's age 
discrimination case under the UADA and determined held that 
statute did not provide a clear and substantial public policy 
against age discrimination. There the court specifically said 
6Utah Code Anno. 34A-2-802 
7Utah Code Anno. 34A-6-104 
8Utah Code Anno. 35A-1-104 
16 
its decision did not preclude an examination of other statutes to 
determine whether there was a clear and substantial public policy 
against sex, race, religious or disability discrimination. 
Burton at 2000 UT 18 Hl7. The court's major emphasis was on the 
UADA's simplified and expedited resolution procedure. 
In this matter Byers asks the court to hold that a clear and 
substantial public policy against termination on the basis of sex 
in Utah is found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as 
amended) as well as in other federal law and Utah Executive 
Orders. The Burton analysis does not apply to this case. While 
sex discrimination claims brought under Title VII are 
investigated by the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division 
(UALD), they, unlike UADA claims, are not heard in the UALD 
venue. If a negotiated resolution is not reached within the UALD 
a Notice of Right to Sue is issued by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the claimant may then become a 
plaintiff in a law suit brought in state or federal court. In 
short, a Title VII sex discrimination claim does not have the 
benefit of the expedited administrative procedures a UADA claim 
does and the Burton analysis does not apply to Title VII claims. 
Further, the legislative history of Title VII shows that the 
purpose for excluding small employers was to reduce the case load 
of the EEOC and not to provide some alternative to litigation as 
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the court found in Burton. In short, the Burton analysis does 
not apply to Title VII and Title VII provides a clear and 
substantial public policy against termination because of sex. 
II 
PELTON IS PERSONALLY LIABLE IN TORT 
In Utah, the wrongful termination of an employee in 
violation of public policy is a tort. Peterson v. Browning, 832 
P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992). Appellees don't dispute that Byers 
was terminated by Pelton. A corporate officer, an agent, is not 
shielded from liability for a tort committed on behalf of her 
principal, the corporation. 
Utah courts have cited with approval the Restatement 
(Second) Agency,9 and American Jurisprudence, Second, on Agency,1 
and Corporations11. Each of these respected treatises describes 
the law which makes Pelton liable for her tortious actions in 
illegally terminating Byers. 
The Restatement: 
343. General Rule 
9Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998) 
10Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996) 
llSII Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp., 
969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998) 
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An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not re-
lieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the 
command of the principal or on account of the prin-
cipal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the 
principal, or a privilege held by him for the 
protection of the principal's interests, or where the 
principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of 
care to the person harmed. Restatement (Second) Agency, 
§343. 
The Restatement, again: 
344. Liability for Directed Conduct or Consequences 
An agent is subject to liability, as he would be for 
his own personal conduct, for the consequences of 
another's conduct which results from his directions if, 
with knowledge of the circumstances, he intends the 
conduct, or its consequences, except where the agent or 
the one acting has a privilege or immunity not 
available to the other. Restatement (Second) Agency, 
§344. 
American Jurisprudence, Second: 
. . . an employee who tortuously causes injury to a 
third person may be held personally liable to that 
person regardless of whether he or she committed the 
tort while acting within the scope of employment, 
because of the employee's liability is based on 
personal wrongdoing independent of the employment 
relationship." 27 Am.Jur. 2d, Employment Relations, 
§488. 
American Jurisprudence, Second, again: 
If . . . a director or officer commits or participates 
in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also 
by or for the corporation, he is liable to third 
persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what 
liability attaches to the corporation for the tort. A 
contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a 
corporation to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape 
liability behind the shield of his representative 
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character, even thought the corporation might be 
insolvent or irresponsible. 18B Am.Jur. 2d, 
Corporations, §1877 
The treatise law is that Pelton is liable for her tort in 
wrongfully firing Byers. 
Other courts have likewise found corporate officers liable 
in situations similar to that before the court. In Dillon v. 
AFBIC Development Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1979) the 
individual was held liable under the Federal Fair Housing Act 
where he made factual misrepresentations while acting in his 
capacity as vice president of the corporate defendant. In Tash 
v. Houston, 74 Mich. App. 566, 524 N.W.2d 579, 581 (1977) summary 
judgment for the individual defendants was denied in a tortious 
interference with contract case where the individual was acting 
on behalf a union. In Fiol v. Doellstedt, 50 Cal.App. 4th 1318, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 315 (1996) the court declined to dismiss 
claims against a corporate representative who personally 
discriminated against an employee under the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED CITED CASES 
In its memorandum decision the trial court declined to 
consider citations to statutes, regulations and executive orders 
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other than those cited in the complaint on the grounds that they 
were uoutside the pleadings." The trial court erred. 
The trial court's theory is evidently based on its 
perception of the principal that a court considering a Rule 
12(b) (6) Utah R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss may only consider the 
well plead facts alleged in the complaint. In this matter the 
facts deal with the employment of the Byers and the appellees' 
termination of the Byers as stated above. The allegation that 
those facts state a claim under Utah law is a legal conclusion as 
are the allegations that various statutes, regulations and/or 
executive orders establish a clear and substantial public policy 
forming the basis for the cause of action. State v. McBride, 94 0 
P. 2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (the interpretation of a statute is 
a question of law.) 
The trial court's interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6) is wrong 
because though a court considering a motion to dismiss is 
required to consider only the facts within the pleadings it may 
look outside the pleadings for matters which may be judicially 
noticed. Moore's Federal Procedure, §12.34 [2]; Lovelace v. 
Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996). 
In Roy Ludlow Inv. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 4 99 P. 2d 283 
(Utah 1972) this court held "the court may take judicial notice 
of the laws of this State, past and present, and this is so 
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regardless of whether they are referred to in the pleadings or 
the pretrial order or not." The trial court could have, and 
should have, taken judicial notice of law cited in the memoranda 
the proposition that the well pled facts state a cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
Angela Byers was fired because of her sex. There is a clear 
and substantial public policy against that firing found in Title 
VII as well as other federal statutes. There is a clear and 
substantial public policy against that firing found in the 
Executive Orders of Utah's governors. This court should allow 
Angela Byers rights to be vindicated by reversing the trial 
court's erroneous decision and sending the matter back for trial 
on the merits. 
DATED this ; day of s<7/i/'C/{c C^^/ , 2001. 
ROBERT H. WILDE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYERS, ANGELA 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CREATIVE CORNER INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
Case No. 990911231 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Date: 08/18/2000 
This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59. 
Having received and considered memoranda in support and opposition to the Motion, the Court 
hereby DENIES the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff, Angela Bryers, was an at-will employee of the Defendant, Creative Comer Inc. 
2. On October 15, 1999, the Plaintiff alleges she was terminated because she was pregnant. 
3. At the time Plaintiff was terminated, the Defendant employed four employees. 
4. On November 5, 1999, the Plaintiff sued her former employer Creative Corner, and its 
President Lyn Pelton, claiming "wrongful termination in violation of public policy" as set forth 
in Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. This was the 
Plaintiffs sole cause of action. 
5. On December 9, 1999, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Plaintiffs 
cause of action was preempted by the exclusive remedy provision found in the Utah 
Discrimination Act (herein UADA)(Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to 8)(1988 as amended 1989). 
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc.. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). Second, that 
even if the claim was not preempted, there was not a viable cause of action because the 
Defendant is are not an "employer" as defined under the UADA. (U.C.A. 34A-5-102(8)(a)(iv)). 
Finally, the Defendants argued that the holding in Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus. 2000 UT 18 
(Utah 2000), which affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant, in a suit where the 
plaintiff alleged that his firing by a small employer violated public policy against age 
discrimination, and gave him rise to a claim for tortious wrongful termination, is dispositive of 
this case. 
6. In response, the Plaintiff argued that her termination violated clear public policy against sex 
discrimination and that wrongful termination of an employee in violation of public policy is a 
tort. The Plaintiff also filed a Supplemental Memorandum providing the court with a list of 156 
federal codes, 5 Utah statutes, and 10 Executive Orders. Although the Plaintiff provided no legal 
analysis of how these statutes and regulations support her claim, she asked the court to consider 
these provisions in finding a public policy exception for her claim. 
8. On February 14, 1999, this court heard Oral Arguments on the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss and took the matter under advisement. 
9. On March 30, 1999 this court signed an Order granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
This court dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint because it was not convinced that the Plaintiff had 
identified a clear and substantial public policy against wrongful termination of employment on 
account of sex by a small employer. 
10. A week later the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59. 
RULING 
a. Rule 59 
This trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of 
the circumstances specified in subdivision (a) of Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Moon Lake Elec. Assn.' v. Ultra Systems W. Constructors, Inc.. 767 P2d 125 (Ut. App. 1988). 
Here the Plaintiff seeks relief under URCP 59 (a)(7), alleging that the trial court committed an 
"error of law" by not considering the federal codes, case statutes and executive orders the 
Plaintiff provided in her Supplemental Memorandum to find a "public policy exception" for the 
Plaintiffs claim. 
In her Memorandum Opposing the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff cited 
Molesworth v. Brandon. 672 A. 2d 608 (1996). In that case the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
had to decide whether a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of a female 
employee based on sex discrimination could be made against an employer with less than 15 
employees. Maryland's Anti-Discrimination Act also exempts employers with less than 15 
employees. However, that court sustained the plaintiffs right to sue her employer on the basis of 
that "section 14 is one of at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and one constitutional 
amendment in Maryland that prohibit discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances." 
Molesworth at 632. 
In an attempt to mirror Molesworth. the Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum 
with an attachment listing 156 federal codes, 5 Utah statutes and 22 Utah regulations which 
prohibit sex discrimination under various circumstances. The Plaintiff stated that the list was 
provided "as additional sources of the public policy against sex discrimination, in addition to the 
UADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act..." Supplemental Memorandum Authority p.2. 
However, the Plaintiff provided no copies of these to the Court, nor any legal analysis which 
explains how the latter provisions provide a clear and substantial public policy against sex 
discrimination in the state of Utah. 
In her Rule 59 Motion the Plaintiff provided additional statutes and executive orders it 
would like this court to "analyze" as well. Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion p.6. However, these latter 
statutes and executive orders are outside the pleadings, could not have been considered by this 
court in its ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and cannot be considered now to find 
an error of law in the previous proceeding. Therefore this Court will not consider the additional 
statutes and executive orders in this decision. 
For the first time, in her Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff also argues that the Burton 
decision does not apply to Title VII actions. However, on page one of her Supplemental 
Memorandum the Plaintiff stated: "Burton addresses virtually all of the issues addressed in this 
matter. The distinguishing factor is that Burton is a case based on age-discrimination, while this 
action is based on sex discrimination." This Court may not consider a legal theory first 
mentioned in a post-trial motion, as a basis for a finding of an "error of law." Estate of Justhein 
824 P.2d 432, 434. Therefore this Court will not address this allegation either. The only issue 
this court will review is whether the court committed an error of law by not finding a clear and 
substantial policy exception for sex discrimination by small employers based on the list of codes, 
statutes and regulations attached by the Plaintiff in her Supplemental Memorandum. 
b. Rule 12 (b)(6) 
When ruling on a Motion to Dismiss under URCP 12 (b)(6), this Court may only consider 
the allegations made in the Complaint. Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P2d 622, 623 
(Utah 1990). In her complaint the Plaintiff only cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis of her 
claim. Under the Colman decision, this Court did not have the burden of finding, reviewing and 
analyzing the numerous list of codes, statutes and regulations attached to the Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Authority to reach a decision on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Furthermore, while analyzing Title VII and the UADA, this court is guided by the rule 
that in absence of an ambiguity, a statute should be construed according to its plain language. 
Johnson v. State Retirement Office, 755 P.2d 161. This is because the best indication of 
legislative intent is the statute's plain language. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 679 
P.2d903,906(Utahl984). 
1. Title Vllofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII considers it an unlawful employment practice for "an employer to fail or refuse 
to hire or discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See 42 U.S.C.S.§ 2000e-2. However, 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce, who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty 
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." See 42 U.S.C.S. §200e et. seq. 
The Defendant, Creative Corners does not meet this definition of "employer;" therefore the 
Defendant is exempted from Title VH. 
2. UADA 
The UADA clearly states that "an employer may not refuse to hire, promote, discharge, 
demote or terminate any person ...because of (D) pregnancy; childbirth, or pregnancy-related 
conditions." See U.C.A. 34A-5-106 (l)(a)(I)(D). However the UADA applies only to 
"employer(s)" as defined under the Act. The UADA defines "employer" as: 
(I) the state; 
(ii) any political subdivision; 
(iii) a board, commission ...or agent of the state; 
(iv) a person employing 15 or more employees within the state for each working day in 
each of 20 calendar weeks or more in the current or preceding calendar year." 
SeeU.CA. 34A-5-102 (8)(a). 
Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, the Defendant also does not fall under the UADA's definitions of 
"employer." Therefore the Defendant is also not regulated by the UADA. Furthermore, the 
UADA also provides that "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination based on...sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, 
or pregnancy related conditions..." See U.C.A. 34A-5-107(15). By its plain language the UADA 
provides the only remedy available for the Plaintiffs claim. Nevertheless, Utah recognizes a 
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine which does not insulate an employer from liability 
where the employee is fired in a manner or for a reason that contravenes clear and substantial 
public policy. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah 1991). Therefore this 
court will provide a historical review of this public policy exception below. 
c. Public Policy Exception 
Generally actions within the public policy exception involve termination of employment 
for 1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, 2) performing a public obligation, or 3) 
exercising a legal right or privilege. Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1992). In 
trying to explain the "public policy exception" the Utah Supreme Court has tried to identify 
proper sources of "public policy." In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., the court said, "public 
policy is most obviously, but not exclusively, embodied in legislative enactments...Not every 
legislative enactment, of course, embodies public policy; only those which protect the public or 
promote public interest qualify." 771 P2d 1033,1043 (Utah 1989). The court in Berube 
explained that the legislature is not the only source of public policy; "judicial decisions can also 
enunciate substantial principles of public policy in areas which the legislature has not treated." 
Id. The court also warned that: 
"actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must involve substantial 
and important public policies. To this end we will construe public policies narrowly 
and will generally utilize those based on prior legislative pronouncements or judicial 
decisions, applying only those principles which are so substantial and fundamental 
that there can be virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the 
public good." IcL 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently clear and substantial to support a 
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the Utah Supreme Court has 
suggested that trial courts examine the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it 
affects the public as a whole. "The following questions are relevant in determining whether a 
statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy: 
1) whether the policy in question is one of overarching importance to the public, as 
opposed to only the parties only; and 
2) whether the public interest is so strong, and the policy so clear and weighty that we 
should place the policy beyond the reach of contract." 
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States. Inc.. 844 P.2d 949, 966 (Utah 1992). 
This court finds that question one can be answered in the affirmative under the circumstances of 
this case. Clearly the wrongful termination of pregnant women by any employer is a question of 
overarching importance to the public, and society as a whole. However, at this time, this court 
cannot answer question two in the affirmative for the reasons set forth below. 
In Peterson v. Browning, the Utah Supreme Court held that when an employee is 
discharged in violation of a public policy exception he has a tort action against the employer. 832 
P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). The court admitted that due to the open-ended nature of the "public 
policy exception" the identification of clear and substantial public policies require case-by-case 
development." Id. at 1282. Again the court reiterated that "to provide a basis for an action under 
the public policy exception, a violation of a state or federal law must contravene the clear and 
substantial public policy of the state of Utah." Id. 1283. But this time the court added that 
"[ajlthough many state and federal laws will reflect Utah public policy, and may in fact, provide 
a source of public policy, a plaintiff must establish the connection between the law violated 
and the public policies of Utah." IcL Here the Plaintiff has not met this burden. 
In her complaint the Plaintiff cites Title VII and the UADA as the basis for her claim of 
"wrongful termination against public policy." The Defendants argued in their Motion to Dismiss 
that the UADA preempts the plaintiffs common law cause of action. This was the same 
argument made by the defendants in Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the Mt. States, Inc., 844 
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). The latter case involved an appeal from a grant of summary judgment 
dismissing the plaintiffs complaint. The plaintiff had sued her employer alleging among other 
things that AT&T fired her in retaliation for complaining of being sexually harassed by her co-
workers, and that such a discharge violated Utah public policy barring reprisals for sexual 
harassment reports. On this issue, the Utah Supreme Court held that the UADA provided the 
exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs claim of discharge in violation of public policy. Retherford 
at 954. 
The Retherford court began its analysis of this issue by looking at the statute itself. 
U.C.A. 34-35-7.1(15) reads, "the procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy 
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy- related conditions, age, relation, national origin, or 
handicap." The court concluded that the plain text of the statute preempted common law causes 
of action for retaliation in complaints of employment discrimination. The court said," as a 
matter of statutory construction, we find that the version of the UADA at the time of 
Retherford's firing was the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation against an employee who 
complained of sexual harassment." Retherford at 962. 
The Utah Supreme Court then reviewed whether Retherford's tort and contract claims also 
came within the scope of the UADA's preemptive effect. The court admitted that "we have yet to 
propound a generic test for determining when a statutory cause of action functions as the 
exclusive remedy for the wrong... [therefore] we have looked to law outside our jurisdiction [and] 
have adopted a test that inquires whether the statutory scheme supplies an indispensable element 
of the tort claim." Id at 962-963. The court went on to explain that "the indispensable element 
test relies neither on timing nor conduct to determine preemption. Instead under this test, 
preemption depends on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim, not the 
nature of the defendant's act which the plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury." 
Id at 965-966. 
Applying this test, the court again looked to the language of the UADA to determine the 
type of injuries the UADA is designed to address. From the plain language of the UADA the 
Retherford court concluded that "the legislature intended the UADA to address all manner of 
employment discrimination against any member of the specified protected groups." Id at 
966. The court also stated that in order for Retherford to prove the tort of wrongful termination 
in violation of public policy, Retherford would need to show that AT&T discharged her in a 
manner or for reason that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy of the state of Utah, a 
public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes." Id at 966. (citing Peterson 832 P.2d at 
1281; Berube 771 P.2d at 1051). The court concluded: 
"the only possible source in Utah's statues or constitution for a clear and substantial 
public policy allegedly violated by Retherford's discharge is the UADA's prohibition 
of retaliation for good faith complaints of employment discrimination...in absence of 
this public policy declaration, Retherford would be unable even to allege an action for 
this tort...it is plain that the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable element in 
Retherford's tort cause of action; therefore the UADA must preempt this claim." Id. 
Here, as in Retherford's case, one of the harms the UADA addresses, pregnancy, is also 
an indispensable element in the Plaintiffs cause of action. This court following the Retherford 
holding ruled that the UADA is also the exclusive remedy for the Plaintiffs cause of action. In 
her Memorandum in Opposition, the Plaintiff argued that the Retherford holding does not apply 
to her case because in Retherford the plaintiff had alternative relief under a collective bargaining 
agreement and was also allowed to proceed with her claims for breach of implied contract, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent employment; while here the Plaintiff 
would not have any alternative relief. However the holding in Retherford does not state that to 
preempt a claim a statute must offer alternative relief; in fact the dismissal of Retherford's claim 
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy was affirmed as discussed above. 
Finally there is the case of Burton v. Exam Cntr. Indus., 2000'UT 18 (Utah 2000). In 
Burton the plaintiff appealed from the grant of summary judgment to defendant employers in a 
suit alleging a common law claim for tortious wrongful termination on the ground that firing the 
plaintiff due to his age violated public policy. The plaintiff in Burton argued that because the 
UADA covers only employers with 15 or more employees, he had no administrative remedy 
through the UADA; therefore that the Utah Supreme Court should recognize a tort cause of action 
for wrongful termination against public policy for small employers. Burton also relied on 
Molesworth v. Brandon. 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996). But the Utah Supreme Court 
declined this argument. It held: 
"we can find no constitutional provision or other statute which declares a clear and 
substantial public policy against age discrimination in employment practices...in 
Molesworth the Maryland court found 'at least 34 statutes..etc' [here] there is no such 
constitutional or statutory declaration of public policy in Utah against discrimination 
on account of age in the termination of employment of employees by small 
employers... We have found no case from other jurisdictions recognizing a public 
policy against age discrimination by small employers in a statute such as our 
UADA which expressly exempts small employers." Burton at 13-14. 
The Burton holding cited some of the reasons why small employers should be exempt. 
For example, "if a small employer were subjected to a tort action in the courts, he would have to 
hire his own attorney, ...and damages could be awarded against him. The action could be 
presumably brought within four years, not limited by the 180-day limitation." Burton at 17. The 
court continued, 
"As stated by the Jennings court 'it would be unreasonable to expect small employers 
who are expressly exempted from the FEHA (California's Anti-Discrimination Act) 
ban on age discrimination to nonetheless realize they that they must comply with the 
law from which they are exempted ...we do not ascribe such a purpose to the 
legislature/" Id. 
Here the Plaintiff has provided an extensive list of codes, statutes and regulations in an 
effort to establish that under Utah law there is a clear and substantial public policy against sex 
discrimination. However the Utah statutes cited by the Plaintiff apply only to entities or 
professions regulated by the state, not to small private employers. In Molesworth, the court also 
recognized that "absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy, there ordinarily is no 
violation of public policy by an employer's discharging an at-will employee." Molesworth v. 
Brandon. 341 Md. 621, 630 (Md. App. 1996) (citinz Watson v. Peoples Ins. Co.. 322 Md. 467, 
478 (1991). However the plaintiff in Molesworth argued that her termination violated the public 
policy announced in §14 of the Fair Employment Act, Maryland Code (1994 Repl. Vol., 1995 
Supp) Art. 49B which states: 
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland, in the exercise 
of its police power for the protection of the public safety...to assure all persons 
equal opportunity in receiving employment...regardless of race, color, religion... 
sex, age...and to that end to prohibit discrimination in employment by any person, 
group, labor organization, organization, or ANY employer or his agents." Id. at 628. 
The defendant, argued that §14 did not apply to employers with less than 15 employees. However 
the Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed. The court explained, 
" by its own language [§14] proscribes discrimination in employment by 'any 
small employer/ If the term 'employer' in §14 were meant to refer only to employers 
as defined in § 15(b), the term 'any' would be unnecessary... the language of the statute 
indicates that the legislature intended to prohibit sex discrimination by 'any employer.'" 
Id at 632. 
Although the codes, statues and regulations provided by the Plaintiff prohibit 
discrimination based on sex in certain circumstances, none indicate that the Utah legislature 
intended to prohibit sex discrimination by "any employer." Without a statute with the express 
language of Maryland's §14, it is difficult for this court to simply conclude that together these 
provisions provide strong evidence of a legislative intent to create a clear and substantial public 
policy against sex discrimination by any employer in Utah. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has failed 
to "establish a connection between the law violated and the public policies of Utah." Peterson at 
1283. In addition, the Retherford holding clearly established that the UADA provides the 
exclusive remedy for a claim for "wrongful termination against public policy." Finally, in Burton 
the Utah Supreme Court clearly declined to create a cause of action for small employers who 
discriminate against employees based upon age, a specified group protected under the UADA. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems odd, repugnant and disheartening to have concluded that the State of Utah is a 
place where a pregnant woman can be terminated from employment by a small employer because 
of her pregnancy, and that she is precluded from maintaining a wrongful termination cause of 
action under a public policy exception. The policy considerations which support the exemption of 
small employers from the reach of the Title VII and the UADA seem'to pale in comparison to the 
harm caused by maintaining discriminatory employment practices which wrongfully deny 
economic opportunities, and reduce the quality of life for all of us. However, this court has its 
limitations; it must follow the plain text of the statutes of this state, and the controlling precedent 
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. Based on the case law and analysis provided above, this 
court concludes that it did not commit an error of law by granting the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. Therefore the Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59 is DENIED. This 
Memorandum Decision shall constitute the final order of this court in resolving the matters 
referenced herein. 
nJl 
Jjddge Tyrone E. Medley /) 
strict Court Judge (^/ 
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ANGELA BYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CREATIVE CORNER, INC., and 
LYN PELTON, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM 
Case No. 990911231 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
-ooOoo-
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.for Failure to State a Claim came before the 
Court on Monday, February 14, 2000 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. Plaintiff Angela 
Byers was represented by her attorney of record, Robert Wilde, Esq. Defendants Creative 
Corner, Inc., and Lyn Pelton were represented by their attorney of record, E. Paul Wood. 
The Court, having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by Plaintiff and Defendants and 
having considered oral argument on the matter herewith enters its Order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
State a Claim is granted. The Complaint and causes of action thereunder are dismissed. 
DATED this day of April, 2000. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 27 day of March, 2000, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Robert H. Wilde 
Blake A. Nakamura 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
935 East South Union Ave., Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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Section 2000e. Definitions 
For the purposes of this subchapter -
(a) The term ''person1' includes one or more individuals, 
governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor| 
unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal 
representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, 
unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under 
title 11, or receivers. 
(b) The term ''employer'' means a person engaged in an industry-
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a 
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a 
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, 
an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of 
Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive 
service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5 ) , or (2) a bona 
fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) 
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, 
except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons 
having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall 
not be considered employers. 
(c) The term ''employment agency'' means any person regularly 
undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for 
an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for 
an employer and includes an agent of such a person. 
(d) The term ''labor organization'' means a labor organization 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such 
an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any 
agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, 
or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of 
pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any 
conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint 
council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or 
international labor organization. 
(e) A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an 
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industry affecting commerce if (1) it maintains or operates a 
hiring hall or hiring office which procures employees for an 
employer or procures for employees opportunities to work for an 
employer, or (2) the number of its members (or, where it is a 
labor organization composed of other labor organizations or their 
representatives, if the aggregate number of the members of such 
other labor organization) is (A) twenty-five or more during the 
first year after March 24, 1972, or (B) fifteen or more 
thereafter, and such labor organization -
(1) is the certified representative of employees under the 
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 
U.S.C. 151 et seq.), or the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45 
U.S.C. 151 et seq.); 
(2) although not certified, is a national or international 
labor organization or a local labor organization recognized or 
acting as the representative of employees of an employer or 
employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce; or 
(3) has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary 
body which is representing or actively seeking to represent 
employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or 
(2); or 
(4) has been chartered by a labor organization representing 
or actively seeking to represent employees within the meaning 
of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or subordinate body 
through which such employees may enjoy membership or become 
affiliated with such labor organization; or 
(5) is a conference, general committee, joint or system 
board, or joint council subordinate to a national or 
international labor organization, which includes a labor 
organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within 
the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this 
subsection. 
(f) The term ''employee'' means an individual employed by an 
employer, except that the term ''employee'1 shall not include any 
person elected to public office in any State or political 
subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any 
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal 
staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate 
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or 
legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the 
preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the 
civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or 
political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign 
country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the 
United States. 
(g) The term ''commerce'' means trade, traffic, commerce, 
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several 
States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or 
within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United 
States; or between points in the same State but through a point 
outside thereof. 
(h) The term ''industry affecting commerce'' means any 
activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor 
dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of 
commerce and includes any activity or industry ''affecting 
commerce'' within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and further 
includes any governmental industry, business, or activity. 
(i) The term ''State'' includes a State of the United States, 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer 
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Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.). 
(j) The term ''religion'' includes all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or 
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's 
business. 
(k) The terms ''because of sex'' or ''on the basis of sex'' 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this 
title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection 
shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance 
benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would 
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where 
medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, 
That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing 
abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in 
regard to abortion. 
(1) The term ''complaining party'' means the Commission, the 
Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or 
proceeding under this subchapter. 
(m) The term ''demonstrates'' means meets the burdens of 
production and persuasion. 
(n) The term ''respondent'' means an employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee 
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining 
program, including an on-the-job training program, or Federal 
entity subject to section 2000e-16 of this title. 
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Section 2000e-l. Applicability to foreign and religious employment 
(a) Inapplicability of subchapter to certain aliens and employees 
of religious entities 
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to 
the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion 
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activities. 
(b) Compliance with statute as violative of foreign law 
It shall not be unlawful under section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this 
title for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer), 
labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management 
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining (including on-the-job training programs) to take any 
action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an 
employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with 
such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such 
organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of 
the foreign country in which such workplace is located. 
(c) Control of corporation incorporated in foreign country 
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of 
incorporation is a foreign country, any practice prohibited by 
section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title engaged in by such 
corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer. 
(2) Sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 of this title shall not apply 
with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a 
foreign person not controlled by an American employer. 
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of whether 
an employer controls a corporation shall be based on -
(A) the interrelation of operations; 
(B) the common management; 
(C) the centralized control of labor relations; and 
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(D) the common ownership or financial control, 
of the employer and the corporation. 
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U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
(a) Employer p r a c t i c e s 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
(b) Employment agency practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment 
agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to 
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
(c) Labor organization practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor 
organization -
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to 
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or 
applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to 
refer for employment any individual, in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an 
applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate 
against an individual in violation of this section. 
(d) Training programs 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, 
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labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling 
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including 
on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual 
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in 
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide 
apprenticeship or other training. 
(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of 
religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions 
with personnel of particular religion 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or 
refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to 
classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any 
individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint 
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other 
training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual 
in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national 
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national 
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice 
for a school, college, university, or other educational institution 
or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a 
particular religion if such school, college, university, or other 
educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or 
in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a 
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, 
association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, 
college, university, or other educational institution or 
institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a 
particular religion. 
(f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or 
Communist-front organizations 
As used in this subchapter, the phrase ''unlawful employment 
practice1' shall not be deemed to include any action or measure 
taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management 
committee, or employment agency with respect to an individual who 
is a member of the Communist Party of the United Staters or of any 
other organization required to register as a Communist:-action or 
Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive 
Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities 
Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 781 et seq.). 
(g) National security 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall 
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or 
refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an 
employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an 
employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for 
employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or 
refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if -
(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises 
in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is 
performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement 
imposed in the interest of the national security of the United 
States under any security program in effect pursuant to or 
administered under any statute of the United States or any 
Executive order of the President; and 
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill 
that requirement. 
(h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; 
1/8/2001 5:12 PM 
i JtJe 42 : Lnapter 11 : buocnapter vi : secuon zvuue-^ i i i l p . / / W U J W 1 U > ) . i£> . i l n u i u > i . w V^A» A. 
ability tests; compensation based on sex and authorized by 
minimum wage provisions 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall 
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply 
different standards of compensation, or different terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in 
different locations, provided that such differences are not the 
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the 
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that 
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not 
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to 
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of 
the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such 
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of 
section 206(d) of title 29. 
(i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to 
Indians 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business 
or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any 
publicly announced employment practice of such business or 
enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any 
individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation, 
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing 
number or percentage imbalance 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to 
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or 
joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to 
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group 
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of 
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist 
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any 
employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment 
agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified 
by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any 
apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the 
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, 
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, 
State, section, or other area, 
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact 
is established under this subchapter only if -
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and 
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice 
is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in 
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment 
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative 
employment practice. 
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment 
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph 
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(A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each 
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate 
impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the 
court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process 
are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking 
process may be analyzed as one employment practice. 
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment 
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall 
not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by 
business necessity. 
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall 
be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with 
respect to the concept of ''alternative employment practice''. 
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by 
business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of 
intentional discrimination under this subchapter. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a 
rule barring the employment of an individual who currently and 
knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in 
schedules I and II of section 102 (6) of the Controlled Substances 
Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a drug 
taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, 
or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or any other provision of 
Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice 
under this subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with 
an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
(1) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in 
connection with the selection or referral of applicants or 
candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, 
use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, 
employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin in employment practices 
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice. 
(n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing 
litigated or consent judgments or orders 
(1) (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, cind except as 
provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that implements 
and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order 
that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the 
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged 
under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B). 
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be 
challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil 
rights laws -
(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or 
order described in subparagraph (A), had -
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order 
sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order 
might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such 
person and that an opportunity was available to present 
objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain; 
and 
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(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such 
judgment or order; or 
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by 
another person who had previously challenged the judgment or 
order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual 
situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or 
fact. 
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to -
(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of 
parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in 
the proceeding in which the parties intervened; 
(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a 
litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members 
of a class represented or sought to be represented in such 
action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was 
sought in such action by the Federal Government; 
(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or 
order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained 
through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was 
entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or 
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due 
process of law required by the Constitution. 
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that 
challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in 
paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before 
the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this 
subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to 
section 1404 of title 28. 
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Section 2000e-3. Other unlawful employment practices 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or 
participating in enforcement proceedings 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management 
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate1 
against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate 
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he 
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
(b) Printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating 
prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or 
discrimination; occupational qualification exception 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, 
labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management 
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or 
publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or 
advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or 
membership in or any classification or referral for employment by 
such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or 
referral for employment by such an employment agency, or relating 
to admission to, or employment in, any program established to 
provide apprenticeship or other training by such a joint 
labor-management committee, indicating any preference, limitation, 
specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement 
may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or 
discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when 
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religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification for employment. 
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° TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(a) Creation; composition; political representation; appointment; 
term; vacancies; Chairman and Vice Chairman; duties of 
Chairman; appointment of personnel; compensation of personnel 
There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, which shall be composed of five 
members, not more than three of whom shall be members of the same 
political party. Members of the Commission shall be appointed by 
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate for 
a term of five years. Any individual chosen to fill a vacancy 
shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom 
he shall succeed, and all members of the Commission shall continue 
to serve until their successors are appointed and qualified, except 
that no such member of the Commission shall continue to serve (1) 
for more than sixty days when the Congress is in session unless a 
nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the 
Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the 
Senate in which such nomination was submitted. The President shall 
designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Commission, and 
one member to serve as Vice Chairman. The Chairman shall be 
responsible on behalf of the Commission for the administrative 
operations of the Commission, and, except as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section, shall appoint, in accordance with the 
provisions of title 5 governing appointments in the competitive 
service, such officers, agents, attorneys, administrative law 
judges, and employees as he deems necessary to assist it in the 
performance of its functions and to fix their compensation in 
accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of 
chapter 53 of title 5, relating to classification and General 
Schedule pay rates: Provided, That assignment, removal, and 
compensation of administrative law judges shall be in accordance 
with sections 3105, 3344, 5372, and 7521 of title 5. 
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(b) General Counsel; appointment; term; duties; representation by 
attorneys and Attorney General 
(1) There shall be a General Counsel of the Commission appointed 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
for a term of four years. The General Counsel shall have 
responsibility for the conduct of litigation as provided in 
sections 2000e-5 and 2000e-6 of this title. The General Counsel 
shall have such other duties as the Commission may prescribe or as 
may be provided by law and shall concur with the Chairman of the 
Commission on the appointment and supervision of regional 
attorneys. The General Counsel of the Commission on the effective 
date of this Act shall continue in such position and perform the 
functions specified in this subsection until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 
(2) Attorneys appointed under this section may, at the direction 
of the Commission, appear for and represent the Commission in any 
case in court, provided that the Attorney General shall conduct all 
litigation to which the Commission is a party in the Supreme Court 
pursuant to this subchapter. 
(c) Exercise of powers during vacancy; quorum 
A vacancy in the Commission shall not impair the right of the 
remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Commission and 
three members thereof shall constitute a quorum. 
(d) Seal; judicial notice 
The Commission shall have an official seal which shall be 
judicially noticed. 
(e) Reports to Congress and the President 
The Commission shall at the close of each fiscal year report to 
the Congress and to the President concerning the action it has 
taken and the moneys it has disbursed. It shall make such further 
reports on the cause of and means of eliminating discrimination and 
such recommendations for further legislation as may appear 
desirable. 
(f) Principal and other offices 
The principal office of the Commission shall be in or near the 
District of Columbia, but it may meet or exercise any or all its 
powers at any other place. The Commission may establish such 
regional or State offices as it deems necessary to accomplish the 
purpose of this subchapter. 
(g) Powers of Commission 
The Commission shall have power -
(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize 
regional, State, local, and other agencies, both public and 
private, and individuals; 
(2) to pay to witnesses whose depositions are taken or who are 
summoned before the Commission or any of its agents the same 
witness and mileage fees as are paid to witnesses in the courts 
of the United States; 
(3) to furnish to persons subject to this subchapter such 
technical assistance as they may request to further their 
compliance with this subchapter or an order issued thereunder; 
(4) upon the request of (i) any employer, whose employees or 
some of them, or (ii) any labor organization, whose members or 
some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in 
effectuating the provisions of this subchapter, to assist in such 
effectuation by conciliation or such other remedial action as is 
provided by this subchapter; 
(5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to 
effectuate the purposes and policies of this subchapter and to 
make the results of such studies available to the public; 
(6) to intervene in a civil action brought under section 
1 n f4 1 /Q/onni c. 1 A rt\A 
1 ltle 42 : Lnapier zi : £>UDcnapier vi : oecuon zuuuc--t 
2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved party against a respondent 
other than a government, governmental agency or political 
subdivision, 
(h) Cooperation with other departments and agencies in performance 
of educational or promotional activities; outreach activities 
(1) The Commission shall, in any of its educational or 
promotional activities, cooperate with other departments and 
agencies in the performance of such educational and promotional 
activities. 
(2) In exercising its powers under this subchapter, the 
Commission shall carry out educational and outreach activities 
(including dissemination of information in languages other than 
English) targeted to -
(A) individuals who historically have been victims of 
employment discrimination and have not been equitably served by 
the Commission; and 
(B) individuals on whose behalf the Commission has authority to 
enforce any other law prohibiting employment discrimination, 
concerning rights and obligations under this subchapter or such 
law, as the case may be. 
(i) Personnel subject to political activity restrictions 
All officers, agents, attorneys, and employees of the Commission 
shall be subject to the provisions of section 7324 (FOOTNOTE 1) of 
title 5, notwithstanding any exemption contained in such section. 
(FOOTNOTE 1) See References in Text note below, 
(j) Technical Assistance Training Institute 
(1) The Commission shall establish a Technical Assistance 
Training Institute, through which the Commission shall provide 
technical assistance and training regarding the laws and 
regulations enforced by the Commission. 
(2)4 An employer or other entity covered under this subchapter 
shall not be excused from compliance with the requirements of this 
subchapter because of any failure to receive technical assistance 
under this subsection. 
(3) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this 
subsection such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1992. 
(k) EEOC Education, Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving 
Fund 
(1) There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United 
States a revolving fund to be known as the ''EEOC Education, 
Technical Assistance, and Training Revolving Fund'' (hereinafter in 
this subsection referred to as the ''Fund'') and to pay the cost 
(including administrative and personnel expenses) of providing 
education, technical assistance, and training relating to laws 
administered by the Commission. Monies in the Fund shall be 
available without fiscal year limitation to the Commission for such 
purposes. 
(2)(A) The Commission shall charge fees in accordance with the 
provisions of this paragraph to offset the costs of education, 
technical assistance, and training provided with monies in the 
Fund. Such fees for any education, technical assistance, or 
training -
(i) shall be imposed on a uniform basis on persons and entities 
receiving such education, assistance, or training, 
(ii) shall not exceed the cost of providing such education, 
assistance, and training, and 
(iii) with respect to each person or entity receiving such 
education, assistance, or training, shall bear a reasonable 
relationship to the cost of providing such education, assistance, 
or training to such person or entity. 
(B) Fees received under subparagraph (A) shall be deposited in 
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the Fund by the Commission. 
(C) The Commission shall include in each report made under 
subsection (e) of this section information with respect to the 
operation of the Fund, including information, presented in the 
aggregate, relating to -
(i) the number of persons and entities to which the Commission 
provided education, technical assistance, or training with monies 
in the Fund, in the fiscal year for which such report is 
prepared, 
(ii) the cost to the Commission to provide such education, 
technical assistance, or training to such persons and entities, 
and 
(iii) the amount of any fees received by the Commission from 
such persons and entities for such education, technical 
assistance, or training. 
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury shall invest the portion of the 
Fund not required to satisfy current expenditures from the Fund, as 
determined by the Commission, in obligations of the United States 
or obligations guaranteed as to principal by the United States. 
Investment proceeds shall be deposited in the Fund. 
(4) There is hereby transferred to the Fund $1,000,000 from the 
Salaries and Expenses appropriation of the Commission. 
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Section 2000e-5. Enforcement provisions 
U.S. Code as of: 0J/05/99 
(a) Power of Commission to prevent unlawful employment practices 
The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent 
any person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set| 
forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title. 
(b) Charges by persons aggrieved or member of Commission of 
unlawful employment practices by employers, etc.; filing; 
allegations; notice to respondent; contents of notice; 
investigation by Commission; contents of charges; prohibition 
on disclosure of charges; determination of reasonable cause; 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion for elimination of 
unlawful practices; prohibition on disclosure of informal 
endeavors to end unlawful practices; use of evidence in 
subsequent proceedings; penalties for disclosure of 
information; time for determination of reasonable cause 
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming 
to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an 
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint 
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other 
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, has 
engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall 
serve a notice of the charge (including the date, place and 
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) on such 
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint 
labor-management committee (hereinafter referred to as the 
''respondent'1) within ten days, and shall make an investigation 
thereof. Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and 
shall contain such information and be in such form as the 
Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the 
Commission. If the Commission determines after such investigation 
that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is 
true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person 
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claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action. In 
determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall 
accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by 
State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or 
local law pursuant to the requirements of subsections (c) and (d) 
of this section. If the Commission determines after such 
investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such 
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done 
during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be made public 
by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence 
in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of the 
persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in 
violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. The Commission 
shall make its determination on reasonable cause as promptly as 
possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and 
twenty days from the filing of the charge or, where applicable 
under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, from the date upon 
which the Commission is authorized to take action with respect to 
the charge. 
(c) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State 
or local authority; time for filing charges with Commission; 
commencement of proceedings 
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring 
in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State 
or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged 
and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant 
or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal 
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no 
charge may be filed under subsection (a) (FOOTNOTE 1) of this 
section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days 
after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, 
unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that 
such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty 
days during the first year after the effective date of such State 
or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such 
proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a 
requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the 
facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be 
deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection 
at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the 
appropriate State or local authority. 
(FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. Probably should be subsection 
• ' (b) » ' . 
(d) State or local enforcement proceedings; notification of State 
or local authority; time for action on charges by Commission 
In the case of any charge filed by a member of the Commission 
alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a State or 
political subdivision of a State which has a State or local law 
prohibiting the practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a 
State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice 
or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon 
receiving notice thereof, the Commission shall, before taking any 
action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or 
local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, 
but not less than sixty days (provided that such sixty-day period 
shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first 
year after the effective day of such State or local l a w ) , unless a 
shorter period is requested, to act under such State or local law 
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to remedy the practice alleged. 
(e) Time for filing charges; time for service of notice of charge 
on respondent; filing of charge by Commission with State or 
local agency; seniority system 
(1) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred 
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and 
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be 
served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten 
days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment 
practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially 
instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority 
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal 
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, 
such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved 
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice 
that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under 
the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such 
charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local 
agency. 
(2) For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice 
occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been adopted 
for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this 
subchapter (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent 
on the face of the seniority provision), when the seniority system 
is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority 
system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of 
the seniority system or provision of the system. 
(f) Civil action by Commission, Attorney General, or person 
aggrieved; preconditions; procedure; appointment of attorney; 
payment of fees, costs, or security; intervention; stay of 
Federal proceedings; action for appropriate temporary or 
preliminary relief pending final disposition of charge; 
jurisdiction and venue of United States courts; designation of 
judge to hear and determine case; assignment of case for 
hearing; expedition of case; appointment of master 
(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the 
Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of 
reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the 
Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a 
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission 
may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, 
governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. 
In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental 
agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable 
to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable 
to the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and 
shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil 
action against such respondent in the appropriate United States 
district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the 
right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or 
the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental 
agency, or political subdivision. If a charge filed with the 
Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed 
by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from 
the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of 
reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is 
later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this 
section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a 
case involving a government, governmental agency, or political 
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subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation 
agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission, 
or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, 
governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the 
person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such 
notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named 
in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if 
such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person 
whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful 
employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in 
such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may 
appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the 
commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or 
security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its 
discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a 
case involving a government, governmental agency, or political 
subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification 
that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the 
court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more 
than sixty days pending the termination of State or local 
proceedings described in subsection (c) or (d) of this section or 
further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance. 
(2) Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the 
Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary investigation 
that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes 
of this Act, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case 
involving a government, governmental agency, or political 
subdivision, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or 
preliminary relief pending final disposition of such charge. Any 
temporary restraining order or other order granting preliminary or 
temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It shall be the duty of a court 
having jurisdiction over proceedings under this section to assign 
cases for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause 
such cases to be in every way expedited. 
(3) Each United States district court and each United States 
court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. 
Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State 
in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been 
committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records 
relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in 
the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have 
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the 
respondent is not found within any such district, such an action 
may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent 
has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 
of title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his 
principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in 
which the action might have been brought. 
(4) It shall be the duty of the chief judge of the district (or 
in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the case is 
pending immediately to designate a judge in such district to hear 
and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the district 
is available to hear and determine the case, the chief judge of the 
district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may be, shall 
certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or in his 
absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a 
district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the 
case. 
(5) It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this 
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subsection to assign the case for hearing at the earliest 
practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way 
expedited. If such judge has not scheduled the case for trial 
within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined, 
that judge may appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief; 
accrual of back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on 
judicial orders 
(1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally 
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment 
practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the 
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and 
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may 
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of 
employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, 
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, 
responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other 
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay 
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to 
the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or 
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons 
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay 
otherwise allowable. 
(2)(A) No order of the court shall require the admission or 
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the 
hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an 
employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual 
was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused 
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any 
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 
2000e-3(a) of this title. 
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under 
section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that 
the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of 
the impermissible motivating factor, the court -
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as 
provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs 
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a 
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any 
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, 
described in subparagraph (A). 
(h) Provisions of chapter 6 of title 29 not applicable to civil 
actions for prevention of unlawful practices 
The provisions of chapter 6 of title 29 shall not apply with 
respect to civil actions brought under this section, 
(i) Proceedings by Commission to compel compliance with judicial 
orders 
In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or labor 
organization fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a 
civil action brought under this section, the Commission may 
commence proceedings to compel compliance with such order, 
(j) Appeals 
Any civil action brought under this section and any proceedings 
brought under subsection (i) of this section shall be subject to 
appeal as provided in sections 1291 and 1292, title 28. 
(k) Attorney's fee; liability of Commission and United States for 
costs 
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in 
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its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee 
(including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission 
and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a 
private person. 
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Section 2000e-6. Civil actions by the Attorney General 
U.S. Code as of: 0J/05/99 
(a) Compla in t 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe 
that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or 
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights 
secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of 
such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the 
rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil 
action in the appropriate district court of the United States by 
filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the 
Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to 
such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including 
an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining 
order or other order against the person or persons responsible for 
such pattern or practice, as he deems necessary to insure the full 
enjoyment of the rights herein described. 
(b) Jurisdiction; three-judge district court for cases of general 
public importance: hearing, determination, expedition of 
action, review by Supreme Court; single judge district court: 
hearing, determination, expedition of action 
The district courts of the United States shall have and shall 
exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this 
section, and in any such proceeding the Attorney General may file 
with the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges 
be convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by the 
Attorney General shall be accompanied by a certificate that, in his 
opinion, the case is of general public importance. A copy of the 
certificate and request for a three-judge court shall be 
immediately furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the 
circuit (or in his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the 
circuit) in which the case is pending. Upon receipt of such 
request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or 
the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate 
immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one 
shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district 
judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear 
and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so 
designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest 
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practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination 
thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An 
appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the 
Supreme Court. 
In the event the Attorney General fails to file such a request in 
any such proceeding, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the 
district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which the 
case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such district 
to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge in the 
district is available to hear and determine the case, the chief 
judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case may 
be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit (or 
in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then designate a 
district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and determine the 
case. 
It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this 
section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable 
date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. 
(c) Transfer of functions, etc., to Commission; effective date; 
prerequisite to transfer; execution of functions by Commission 
Effective two years after March 24, 1972, the functions of the 
Attorney General under this section shall be transferred to the 
Commission, together with such personnel, property, records, and 
unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds 
employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in 
connection with such functions unless the President submits, and 
neither House of Congress vetoes, a reorganization plan pursuant to 
chapter 9 of title 5, inconsistent with the provisions of this 
subsection. The Commission shall carry out such functions in 
accordance with subsections (d) and (e) of this section. 
(d) Transfer of functions, etc., not to affect suits commenced 
pursuant to this section prior to date of transfer 
Upon the transfer of functions provided for in subsection (c) of 
this section, in all suits commenced pursuant to this section prior 
to the date of such transfer, proceedings shall continue without 
abatement, all court orders and decrees shall remain in effect, and 
the Commission shall be substituted as a party for the United 
States of America, the Attorney General, or the Acting Attorney 
General, as appropriate. 
(e) Investigation and action by Commission pursuant to filing of 
charge of discrimination; procedure 
Subsequent to March 24, 1972, the Commission shall have authority 
to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of 
discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming 
to be aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. All such actions 
shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
section 2000e-5 of this title. 
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• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
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U.S. Code as of: 0J/05/99 
Section 2000e-7. Effect on State laws 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve| 
any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment 
provided by any present or future law of any State or political 
subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to| 
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful 
employment practice under this subchapter. 
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Search Title 42 E 
United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
Section 2000e-8. Investigations 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
(a) Examination and copying of evidence related to unlawful 
employment practices 
In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under 
section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commission or its designated 
representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for 
the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of 
any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to 
unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is 
relevant to the charge under investigation. 
(b) Cooperation with State and local agencies administering State 
fair employment practices laws; participation in and 
contribution to research and other projects; utilization of 
services; payment in advance or reimbursement; agreements and 
rescission of agreements 
The Commission may cooperate with State and local agencies 
charged with the administration of State fair employment practices 
laws and, with the consent of such agencies, may, for the purpose 
of carrying out its functions and duties under this subchapter and 
within the limitation of funds appropriated specifically for such 
purpose, engage in and contribute to the cost of research and other 
projects of mutual interest undertaken by such agencies, and 
utilize the services of such agencies and their employees, and, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, pay by advance or 
reimbursement such agencies and their employees for services 
rendered to assist the Commission in carrying out this subchapter. 
In furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may 
enter into written agreements with such State or local agencies and 
such agreements may include provisions under which the Commission 
shall refrain from processing a charge in any cases or class of 
cases specified in such agreements or under which the Commission 
shall relieve any person or class of persons in such State or 
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locality from requirements imposed under this section. The 
Commission shall rescind any such agreement whenever it determines 
that the agreement no longer serves the interest of effective 
enforcement of this subchapter. 
(c) Execution, retention, and preservation of records; reports to 
Commission; training program records; appropriate relief from 
regulation or order for undue hardship; procedure for 
exemption; judicial action to compel compliance 
Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization subject 
to this subchapter shall (1) make and keep such records relevant to 
the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have 
been or are being committed, (2) preserve such records for such 
periods, and (3) make such reports therefrom as the Commission 
shall prescribe by regulation or order, after public hearing, as 
reasonable, necessary, or appropriate for the enforcement of this 
subchapter or the regulations or orders thereunder. The Commission 
shall, by regulation, require each employer, labor organization, 
and joint labor-management committee subject to- this subchapter 
which controls an apprenticeship or other training program to 
maintain such records as are reasonably necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this subchapter, including, but not limited to, a list 
of applicants who wish to participate in such program, including 
the chronological order in which applications were received, and to 
furnish to the Commission upon request, a detailed description of 
the manner in which persons are selected to participate in the 
apprenticeship or other training program. Any employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee 
which believes that the application to it of any regulation or 
order issued under this section would result in undue hardship may 
apply to the Commission for an exemption from the application of 
such regulation or order, and, if such application for an exemption 
is denied, bring a civil action in the United States district court 
for the district where such records are kept. If the Commission or 
the court, as the case may be, finds that the application of the 
regulation or order to the employer, employment agency, or labor 
organization in question would impose an undue hardship, the 
Commission or the court, as the case may be, may grant appropriate 
relief. If any person required to comply with the provisions of 
this subsection fails or refuses to do so, the United States 
district court for the district in which such person is found, 
resides, or transacts business, shall, upon application of the 
Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a 
government, governmental agency or political subdivision, have 
jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring him to 
comply. 
(d) Consultation and coordination between Commission and interested 
State and Federal agencies in prescribing recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements; availability of information furnished 
pursuant to recordkeeping and reporting requirements; 
conditions on availability 
In prescribing requirements pursuant to subsection (c) of this 
section, the Commission shall consult: with other interested State 
and Federal agencies and shall endeavor to coordinate its 
requirements with those adopted by such agencies. The Commission 
shall furnish upon request and without cost to any State or local 
agency charged with the administration of a fair employment 
practice law information obtained pursuant to subsection (c) of 
this section from any employer, employment agency, labor 
organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to the 
jurisdiction of such agency. Such information shall be furnished 
on condition that it not be made public by the recipient agency 
1/8/2001 5:16 PM 
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prior to the institution of a proceeding under State or local law 
involving such information. If this condition is violated by a 
recipient agency, the Commission may decline to honor subsequent 
requests pursuant to this subsection, 
(e) Prohibited disclosures; penalties 
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the 
Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information 
obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this 
section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this 
subchapter involving such information. Any officer or employee of 
the Commission who shall make public in any manner whatever any 
information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty, of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more 
than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year. 
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Search Title 42 E 
• United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-9. Conduct of hearings and investigations pursuant to section 161 
of title 29 
For the purpose of all hearings and investigations conducted b-yi 
the Commission or its duly authorized agents or agencies, section) 
161 of title 29 shall apply. 
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| Search Title 42 E 
• United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-10. Posting of notices; penalties 
(a) Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, asj 
the case may be, shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places 
upon its premises where notices to employees, applicants for 
employment, and members are customarily posted a notice to be 
prepared or approved by the Commission setting forth excerpts, from] 
or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter and 
information pertinent to the filing of a complaint. 
(b) A willful violation of this section shall be punishable by a 
fine of not more than $100 for each separate offense. 
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Search Title 42 E 
• United States Code 
° TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
Section 2000e-ll. Veterans1 special rights or preference 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal) 
or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating 
special rights or preference for veterans. 
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) Search Title 42 E 
• United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 0J/05/99 
Section 2000e-12. Regulations; conformity of regulations with administrative 
procedure provisions; reliance on interpretations and instructions of Commission 
(a) The Commission shall have authority from time to time to 
issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry 
out the provisions of this subchapter. Regulations issued under 
this section shall be in conformity with the standards and 
limitations of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5. 
(b) In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful 
employment practice, no person shall be subject to any liability or 
punishment for or on account of (1) the commission by such person 
of an unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that the 
act or omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity 
with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of 
the Commission, or (2) the failure of such person to publish and 
file any information required by any provision of this subchapter 
if he pleads and proves that he failed to publish and file such 
information in good faith, in conformity with the instructions of 
the Commission issued under this subchapter regarding the filing of 
such information. Such a defense, if established, shall be a bar 
to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that (A) after such 
act or omission, such interpretation or opinion is modified or 
rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be invalid or 
of no legal effect, or (B) after publishing or filing the 
description and annual reports, such publication or filing is 
determined by judicial authority not to be in conformity with the 
requirements of this subchapter. 
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Search Title 42 E 
• United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-13. Application to personnel of Commission of sections 111 and 1114 
of title 18; punishment for violation of section 1114 of title 18 
The provisions of sections 111 and 1114, title 18, shall apply to| 
officers, agents, and employees of the Commission in the 
performance of their official duties. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of sections 111 and 1114 of title 18, whoever in 
violation of the provisions of section 1114 of such title kills a 
person while engaged in or on account of the performance of his 
official functions under this Act shall be punished by imprisonment 
for any term of years or for life. 
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• United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-14. Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council; 
establishment; composition; duties; report to President and Congress 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have the 
responsibility for developing and implementing agreements, policies 
and practices designed to maximize effort, promote efficiency, and 
eliminate conflict, competition, duplication and inconsistency I 
among the operations, functions and jurisdictions of the various 
departments, agencies and branches of the Federal Government 
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of equal 
employment opportunity legislation, orders, and policies. On or 
before October 1 of each year, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission shall transmit to the President and to the Congress a 
report of its activities, together with such recommendations for 
legislative or administrative changes as it concludes are desirable 
to further promote the purposes of this section. 
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Search Title 42 E 
• United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-15. Presidential conferences; acquaintance of leadership with 
provisions for employment rights and obligations; plans for fair administration; 
membership 
The President shall, as soon as feasible after July 2, 1964, 
convene one or more conferences for the purpose of enabling the 
leaders of groups whose members will be affected by this subchapter! 
to become familiar with the rights afforded and obligations imposed) 
by its provisions, and for the purpose of making plans which will 
result in the fair and effective administration of this subchapter 
when all of its provisions become effective. The President shall 
invite the participation in such conference or conferences of (1) 
the members of the President's Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunity, (2) the members of the Commission on Civil Rights, (3) 
representatives of State and local agencies engaged in furthering 
equal employment opportunity, (4) representatives of private 
agencies engaged in furthering equal employment opportunity, and 
(5) representatives of employers, labor organizations, and 
employment agencies who will be subject to this subchapter. 
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Search Title 42 E 
• United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-16. Employment by Federal Government 
(a) Discriminatory practices prohibited; employees or applicants 
for employment subject to coverage 
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for 
employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the 
limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in 
section 102 of title 5, in executive agencies as defined in section) 
105 of title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment 
who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States 
Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of 
the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the 
competitive service, and in those units of the judicial branch of 
the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, 
in the Smithsonian Institution, and in the Government Printing 
Office, the General Accounting Office, and the Library of Congress 
shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
(b) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; enforcement powers; 
issuance of rules, regulations, etc.; annual review and 
approval of national and regional equal employment opportunity 
plans; review and evaluation of equal employment opportunity 
programs and publication of progress reports; consultations 
with interested parties; compliance with rules, regulations, 
etc.; contents of national and regional equal employment 
opportunity plans; authority of Librarian of Congress 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission shall have authority to enforce 
the provisions of subsection (a) of this section through 
appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of 
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies 
of this section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders 
and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out 
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its responsibilities under this section. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission shall -
(1) be responsible for the annual review and approval of a 
national and regional equal employment opportunity plan which 
each department and agency and each appropriate unit referred to 
in subsection (a) of this section shall submit in order to 
maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity 
for all such employees and applicants for employment; 
(2) be responsible for the review and evaluation of the 
operation of all agency equal employment opportunity programs, 
periodically obtaining and publishing (on at least a semiannual 
basis) progress reports from each such department, agency, or 
unit; and 
(3) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested 
individuals, groups, and organizations relating to equal 
employment opportunity. 
The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply with 
such rules, regulations, orders, and instructions which shall 
include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment 
shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of 
discrimination filed by him thereunder. The plan submitted by each 
department, agency, and unit shall include, but not be limited to -
(1) provision for the establishment of training and education 
programs designed to provide a maximum opportunity for employees 
to advance so as to perform at their highest potential; and 
(2) a description of the qualifications in terms of training 
and experience relating to equal employment opportunity for the 
principal and operating officials of each such department, 
agency, or unit responsible for carrying out the equal employment 
opportunity program and of the allocation of personnel and 
resources proposed by such department, agency, or unit to carry 
out its equal employment opportunity program. 
With respect to employment in the Library of Congress, authorities 
granted in this subsection to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission shall be exercised by the Librarian of Congress. 
(c) Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for 
redress of grievances; time for bringing of action; head of 
department, agency, or unit as defendant 
Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a 
department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this 
section, or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon an 
appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit 
on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this 
section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders, 
or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial 
charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission on appeal from a decision or 
order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as final 
action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee 
or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition 
of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his 
complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 
of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, 
agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant. 
(d) Section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title applicable to 
civil actions 
The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, 
as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder, and 
the same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be 
available as in cases involving nonpublic parties.. (FOOTNOTE 1) 
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(FOOTNOTE 1) So in original, 
(e) Government agency or official not relieved of responsibility to 
assure nondiscrimination in employment or equal employment 
opportunity 
Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency 
or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure 
nondiscrimination in employment as required by the Constitution and 
statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive Order 
11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the Federal 
Government. 
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United States Code 
o TITLE 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
• CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS 
• SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
U.S. Code as of: 01/05/99 
Section 2000e-17. Procedure for denial, withholding, termination, or suspension of 
Government contract subsequent to acceptance by Government of affirmative 
action plan of employer; time of acceptance of plan 
No Government contract, or portion thereof, with any employer, 
shall be denied, withheld, terminated, or suspended, by any agency 
or officer of the United States under any equal employment 
opportunity law or order, where such employer has an affirmative 
action plan which has previously been accepted by the Government 
for the same facility within the past twelve months without first 
according such employer full hearing and adjudication under the 
provisions of section 554 of title 5, and the following pertinent 
sections: Provided, That if such employer has deviated 
substantially from such previously agreed to affirmative action 
plan, this section shall not apply: Provided further, That for the 
purposes of this section an affirmative action plan shall be deemed 
to have been accepted by the Government at the time the appropriate 
compliance agency has accepted such plan unless within forty-five 
days thereafter the Office of Federal Contract Compliance has 
disapproved such plan. 
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UT Exec Order March 17,1993 - Gov. Leavitt 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, sexual harassment has been defined to be unwanted behavior or 
communication of a sexual nature which adversely affects a person's employment relationships 
and/or creates a hostile working environment; and 
WHEREAS, sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual statements, gestures, or physical 
contacts which are objectionable to the recipient; and 
WHEREAS, sexual harassment may involve intimidation by persons of either sex against 
persons of the opposite or same sex; and 
WHEREAS, the occurrence of sexual harassment undermines the integrity of the 
workplace, destroys morale and offends social and legal standards of acceptable behavior; and 
WHEREAS, this administration is committed to providing a workplace which is free 
from sexual harassment, intimidation and reprisal of any kind; 
NOW THEREFORE, I, Michael O. Leavitt, Governor of the State of Utah, by the 
authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of this state, do hereby prohibit sexual 
harassment, which is a form of sex discrimination, in any and every workplace in which state 
employees and employees of public and higher education are required to conduct business. 
IT IS ORDERED that the Department of Human Resource Management issue rules and 
policies to ensure continued implement option of this order for employees of state government to 
include a provision that sexual harassment awareness training and education be mandatory for all 
directors, managers and supervisors in state government; and vigorously pursue the 
implementation of appropriate rules and policies to include imposition of disciplinary actions; 
education authorities are enjoined to do the same for their organizations. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Director of the Department of Human Resource 
Management shall: provide state agencies with an appropriate education program for all 
employees; provide guidelines on agency policy statements and complaint procedures; and 
provide technical assistance to state and educational authorities when requested. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of each state department or agency, board 
of education or institution of higher education shall: inform all employees of this order 
forbidding sexual harassment in their respective departments; inform employees of their rights; 
assure access to a complaint system for individuals within their departments consistent with rules 
issued by the Department of Human Resource Management and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission guidelines; educate and provide structured training for all managers in 
their responsibility for identifying sexual harassment and appropriately dealing with complaints 
and solving related problems; and provide awareness programs for employees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and cause to be affixed the Great 
Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of 
March, 1993. 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , one ot the LEXIS Publishing™ companies All rights reserved 
ATTEST: 
Olene Walker 
Lieutenant Governor 
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UT Exec Order June 30,1989 - Gov. Bangerter 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, sexual harassment has been defined to be unwanted behavior or 
communication of a sexual nature which adversely affects a person's employment relationships 
and/or working environment; and 
WHEREAS, sexual harassment is unwelcome sexual statements, gestures, or physical 
contacts which are objectionable to the recipient; and 
WHEREAS, sexual harassment may involve intimidation by persons of either sex against 
persons of the opposite or same sex; and 
WHEREAS, the occurrence of sexual harassment undermines the integrity of the 
workplace, destroys morale and offends social and legal standards of acceptable behavior; and 
WHEREAS, this administration is committed to providing a workplace which is free 
from sexual harassment, intimidation and reprisal of any kind; 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Norman H. Bangerter, Governor of the State of Utah, by the 
authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of this state, do hereby prohibit sexual 
harassment, which is a form of sex discrimination, in any and every workplace in which public 
employees and employees of public and higher education are required to conduct business; 
IT IS ORDERED that the Department of Human Resource Management issue rules and 
policies to implement this order for employees of state government to include a provision that 
sexual harassment awareness training and education be mandatory for all directors, managers and 
supervisors in state government; and vigorously pursue the implementation of appropriate rules 
and policies to include imposition of disciplinary actions; education authorities are enjoined to do 
the same for their organizations. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Director of the Department of Human Resource 
Management shall: provide state agencies with an appropriate education program for all 
employees; provide guidelines on agency policy statements and complaint procedures; and 
provide technical assistance to state and educational authorities when requested. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of each state department or agency, board 
of education or institution of high education shall: inform all employees of this order forbidding 
sexual harassment in their respective departments; inform employees of their rights; assure 
access to a complaint system for individuals within their departments consistent with rules issued 
by the Department of Human Resource Management and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission guidelines; educate and provide structured training for all managers in their 
responsibility for identifying sexual harassment and appropriately dealing with complaints and 
solving related problems; and provide awareness programs for employees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and cause to be affixed the Great 
Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th day of June, 
1989. 
Norman H. Bangerter 
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Governor 
ATTEST: 
W. Val Oveson 
Lieutenant Governor 
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UT Exec Order July 25,1986 - Gov. Bangerter 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, among the basic rights of all the people of this nation are the rights to seek a 
livelihood, opportunity for advancement and the respect of our society based solely on the 
individual's ability and capacity. To judge an individual, expressly or through implication, by 
his/her race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age or handicap, is repugnant to every 
American ideal and a distortion of our standards of human freedom and worth; and 
WHEREAS, it is the duty of every American citizen to protect and promote the right of 
all persons to find employment where their individual capacities lead them; and 
WHEREAS, our units of government have a special responsibility of leadership in the 
protection of individual rights and, we are sworn to not only uphold the letter of the laws as set 
down by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Utah, and the statutes, but also 
have an obligation to uphold and foster the guiding spirit of these laws; and 
WHEREAS, the State of Utah recognizes its responsibility to guarantee the right of all 
persons to utilize their abilities to the fullest and thus will take immediate and continuing 
measures to strengthen our efforts in behalf of this objective: 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Norman H. Bangerter, Governor of the State of Utah, by the 
virtue of the power vested in my by the constitution and the laws of the State of Utah, do hereby 
proclaim the following Code of Fair Practices to be the governing policy throughout every 
department of the executive branch of government of the State of Utah: 
Article I - Appointment, Assignment, and Promotion of State Personnel 
No state agencies shall, in the recruitment, promotion and discharge of personnel, 
discriminate against any individual on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, 
age or handicap. No state agency shall have on its employment application forms, for the 
purpose of unfair practices, any inquiry regarding race, color, sex, religious creed, national 
origin, age or handicap, and no interview shall include any question pertaining to the above. 
Article II - Promulgation of Non-Discriminatory Policies 
All state agencies shall promulgate and affirmatively cany out a clear, written policy of 
non-discrimination and fair practices and procedures and correct ctny which may contribute to the 
possibility of discrimination. They shall include, in their continuing programs of orientation and 
training, special emphasis on non-discriminatory practices and services. 
Article HI - Training for Job Opportunities 
All educational programs, vocational guidance counseling services and apprenticeship 
and on-the-job training programs of the state shall be conducted to encourage the fullest 
development of interest and aptitudes, without regard to race, color, sex, religious creed, national 
origin, age, or handicap. 
Article IV - State Services and Facilities 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved. 
2 
Equal treatment of all persons without regard to race, color sex, religious creed, national 
origin, age, or handicap, shall guaranteed by all state agencies in performing their services to the 
public. Discriminatory practices will not be tolerated in any state facility. 
Article V - Employment Services 
All state agencies engaged in employment referral and placement services for private or 
public employees shall fill job orders only on a non-discriminatory basis. They shall refuse any 
job order which would discriminate against any person because of race, color, sex, religious 
creed, national origin, age, or handicap whether such discrimination was either expressed or 
implied by the job order and shall refer such prohibited requests to the Anti-Discrimination 
Division of the Industrial Commission for investigation, conciliation and other appropriate 
action. 
Article VI - State Licensing and Regulatory Agencies 
All state agencies receiving information or complaints of discrimination based on race, 
color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap, shall promptly advice the 
Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission. The Anti-Discrimination Division of 
the Industrial Commission shall notify any state agency which has licensing or regulatory power 
of the pendency of a proceeding. If, therefore, a party is found to have engaged in a 
discriminatory practice, such state agency shall be notified and take appropriate action against 
the respondent. 
Article VII - Public Contracts 
Every state contract for public works or for goods or services shall contain a clause 
barring discrimination on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age or 
handicap, and such contractual provisions shall be fully and effectively enforced. 
Article VIII - State Financial Assistance 
All state agencies engaged in granting financial assistance or in making payment of any 
public funds shall deny the same to any institution or organization engaged in discriminatory 
practices based upon race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap. 
Article IX - Other Governmental Bodies 
All political subdivisions, schools, districts, and other instrumentalities of government are 
requested to cooperate with this endeavor to eliminate any and all acts of discrimination within 
the State of Utah. 
Article X - Cooperation with the Anti-discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission 
All state agencies, in accordance with provisions of the state's laws against 
discrimination, shall cooperate fully with the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial 
Commission and duly comply with its requests and recommendations for effectuating the state's 
policy against discrimination. 
Article XI - Publication and Posting of this Code 
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Copies of this code shall be distributed to all executive branches of the government, 
political subdivision, boards, departments, commissions, school districts, and all other agencies 
of the State of Utah, and shall be posted in prominent locations. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused to be affixed the 
great Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 25th day 
of July, 1986. 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
W. Val Oveson 
Lt. Governor 
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UT Exec Order May 28,1985 - Gov. Bangerter 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
Amended 
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination 
in United States employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin; and 
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States employment; and 
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 
and 1978, prohibits discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an 
individual's age; and 
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974 and 1978, prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and 
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order 
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375, have mandated the establishment of Affirmative 
Action Programs by United States government agencies and their contractors in order to correct 
past injustices and ensure further non-discrimination in employment practices; and 
WHEREAS, Standards for a Merit System of Employment, promulgated by the United 
States Office of Personnel Management stipulates the development of Affirmative Action 
Programs in complying entities; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-discrimination Act) of 1965, 
as amended in 1975 and in 1979, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, 
creed, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry or national origin, handicap; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah State Personnel Management Act of 1979 ensures equal 
employment opportunity for all members of our society through Affirmative Action; and 
WHEREAS, a 1973 Executive Order mandated the formulation and implementation of 
Affirmative Action programs within each agency of state government; and 
WHEREAS, a 1977 and 1980 Executive Order further reinforced this commitment of 
Affirmative Action to ensure that the workforce of Utah State Government represents all 
protected groups at levels found in the labor force of the state; and 
WHEREAS, fair and equal employment practices are inherent in strong merit personnel 
system; and 
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management has developed Fair and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Practices Standards as guidelines for (all) agencies/departments of 
state government; and 
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management Advises and encourages 
agencies/departments of state government to develop and make public supplemental internal 
personnel policies and procedures to ensure fairness, equal opportunity, uniformity and 
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consistency relative to employment practices; 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Norman H, Bangerter, Governor of the State of Utah, by the 
authority vested in me by the laws of this state, do hereby affirm that the State Division of 
Personnel Management be responsible for instituting and maintaining continued affirmative 
action for fair employment practices for the employees and perspective employees of the State of 
Utah; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Director of the Division of Personnel 
Management act affirmatively in the administration of the State Personnel Management System; 
and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Fair Employment Review Committee* shall 
continue to assist the Governor, the Director of the Division of Personnel Management and the 
Fair Employment Practices Coordinator in the development and implementation of an effective 
Fair and Equal Employment Opportunities Practices Program; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: This Executive Order supersede the Executive 
Order issued on the 12th Day of January, 1982 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of 
the State of Utah Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of May, 1985. 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
Created by Executive Order of 1977 
Attest: 
W. Val Oveson 
Lt. Governor 
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UT Exec Order January 12,1982 - Gov. Matheson 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
AMENDED 
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination 
in United States employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; and 
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States employment; and 
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 
and 1978, prohibits discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an 
individual's age; and 
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974 and 1978, prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and 
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order 
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375, have mandated the establishment of Affirmative 
Action Programs by United States government agencies and their contractors in order to correct 
past injustices and ensure further non-discrimination in employment practices; and 
WHEREAS, Standards for a Merit System of Employment, promulgated by the United 
States Office of Personnel Management stipulates the development of Affirmative Action 
Programs in complying entities; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-discrimination Act) of 1965, 
as amended in 1975 and in 1979, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, 
creed, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry, national origin, or handicap; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah State Personnel Management Act of 1979 ensures equal 
employment opportunity for all members of our society through Affirmative Action; and 
WHEREAS, a 1973 Executive Order mandated the formulation and implementation of 
Affirmative Action programs within each agency of state government; and 
WHEREAS, a 1977 and 1980 Executive Order further reinforced this commitment of 
Affirmative Action to ensure that the workforce of Utah State Government represents all 
protected groups at levels found in the labor force of the state; and 
WHEREAS, fair and equal employment practices are inherent in strong merit personnel 
systems; and 
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management has developed Fair and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Practices Standards as guidelines for (all) agencies/departments of 
state government; and 
WHEREAS, the Division of Personnel Management advises and encourages 
agencies/departments of state government to develop and make public supplemental internal 
personnel policies and procedures to ensure fairness, equal opportunity, uniformity, and 
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consistency relative to employment practices; 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah, by the 
authority vested in me by the laws of this state, do hereby affirm that the State Division of 
Personnel Management be responsible for instituting and maintaining continued affirmative 
action for fair employment practices for the employees and prospective employees of the State of 
Utah; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Director of the Division of Personnel 
Management act affirmatively in the administration of the State Personnel Management System; 
and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Affirmative Action Review Committee created 
by my Executive Order of 1977 be changed in name to Fair Employment Review Committee. 
The committee shall continue to assist the Governor, the Director of the Division of Personnel 
Management, and the Fair Employment Practices Coordinator in the development and 
implementation of an effective Fair and Equal Employment Opportunities Practices Program; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: This Executive Order supersede the Executive 
Order issued on the 17th day of July, 1980. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of 
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of January, 
1982. 
Scott M. Matheson 
GOVERNOR 
ATTEST: 
David S. Monson 
LT. GOVERNOR 
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UT Exec Order July 17,1980 - Gov. Matheson 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination 
in United States employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; and 
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963 to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States employment; and 
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended in 1974 
and 1978, prohibits discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an 
individual's age; and 
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974 and 1978, prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and 
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order 
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375, have mandated the establishment of Affirmative 
Action Programs by United States government agencies and their contractors in order to correct 
past injustices and ensure future non-discrimination in employment practices; and 
WHEREAS, Standards for a Merit System of Employment, promulgated by the United 
States Office of Personnel Management stipulates the development of Affirmative Action 
Programs in complying entities; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-discrimination Act) of 1965, 
as amended in 1975 and in 1979, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, 
creed, color, sex, age, religion, ancestry, national origin, or handicap; and 
WHEREAS, the Utah State Personnel Management Act of 1979 ensures equal 
employment opportunity for all members of our society through Affirmative Action; and 
WHEREAS, a 1973 Executive Order mandated the formulation and implementation of 
Affirmative Action programs within each agency of state government; and 
WHEREAS, a 1977 Executive Order further reinforced this commitment of Affirmative 
Action to ensure that the work force of Utah state government represents all protected groups at 
levels found in the labor force of the state; 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah, by the 
authority vested in me by the laws of this state, do hereby affirm that the State Office of 
Personnel Management be responsible for instituting and maintaining a continued policy of 
Affirmative Action for the employees and prospective employees of the State of Utah; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management act affirmatively in the administration of the State Personnel Management System; 
and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: The Affirmative Action Review Committee created 
by my Executive Order of 1977 continue to assist the Governor, the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management, and the Affirmative Action Coordinator in the development of an 
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effective Equal Employment Opportunity Affirmative Action Program; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: This Executive Order supersede the Executive 
Order issued on the first day of October, 1977. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of 
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of July, 1980. 
Scott M. Matheson 
GOVERNOR 
ATTEST: 
David S. Monson 
LT. GOVERNOR/SECRETARY OF STATE 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved. 
1 
UT Exec Order May 4,1979 - Gov. Matheson 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, among the basic rights of all the people of this state are the rights to seek a 
livelihood, opportunity for advancement, and the respect of our society based solely on the 
individual's ability to accomplish work assignments, to judge an individual, expressly or through 
implication, by his race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap is repugnant 
to every American ideal and a distortion of our standards of human freedom and worth, 
WHEREAS, it is the duty of every Utah citizen to protect and promote the right of all 
persons to find employment where their individual capacities lead them, for, when freedom of 
any kind is lost to one citizen, freedom will soon be lost for all citizens, 
WHEREAS, our units of government must assume their citizen-granted role of leadership 
in the protection of freedom for all citizens, for we are sworn to not only uphold the letter of the 
law as set down by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Utah, and the 
statutes, but also to uphold and foster the guiding spirit of these laws, 
WHEREAS, the State of Utah recognizes its responsibility to guarantee the right of all 
persons to utilize their abilities to the fullest and thus will take immediate and continuing 
measures to strengthen our efforts in behalf of this objective, 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Scott M. Matheson, Governor of the State of Utah, by virtue of 
the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the State of Utah, do hereby 
proclaim the following Code of Fair Practices to be the governing policy throughout every 
department of the executive branch of government of the State of Utah: 
ARTICLE I. APPOINTMENT, ASSIGNMENT, AND PROMOTION OF STATE 
PERSONNEL 
No state agency shall, in the recruitment, promotion, and discharge of personnel, 
discriminate against any individual on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, 
age, or handicap. 
ARTICLE II. PROMULGATION OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES 
All state agencies shall promulgate and affirmatively carry out a clear written policy of 
nondiscrimination and fair practices. They shall regularly review their personnel practices and 
procedures and correct any which may contribute to the possibility of discrimination. They shall 
include in their continuing programs of orientation and training special emphasis on 
nondiscriminatory practices and services. 
ARTICLE III. TRAINING FOR JOB OPPORTUNITIES 
All educational programs, vocational guidance counseling services, and all apprenticeship 
and on-the-job training programs of the state shall be conducted to encourage the fullest 
development of interest and aptitudes, without regard to race, color, sex, religious creed, national 
origin, age, or handicap. 
ARTICLE IV. STATE SERVICES AND FACILITIES 
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Equal treatment of all persons without regard to race, color, sex, religious creed, national 
origin, age, or handicap shall be guaranteed by all state agencies in performing their services to 
the public. Discriminatory practices will not be tolerated in any state facility. 
ARTICLE V. EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
All state agencies engaged in employment referral and placement services for private or 
public employees shall fill job orders only on a nondiscriminatory basis. They shall refuse any 
job order which would discriminate against any person because of race, color, sex, religious 
creed, national origin, age, or handicap, whether such discrimination was either expressed or 
implied by the job order. 
ARTICLE VI. STATE LICENSING AND REGULATORY AGENCIES 
All state agencies receiving information or complaints of discrimination based on race, 
color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap shall promptly advise the 
Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission. The Anti-Discrimination Division of 
the Industrial Commission shall notify any of the state agencies which have licensing or 
regulatory power of the pendency of a proceeding. If, therefore, a party is found to have engaged 
in a discriminatory practice, such state agency shall be notified and take appropriate action 
against the respondent. 
ARTICLE VII. PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Every state contract for public works or for goods or services shall contain a clause 
barring discrimination on account of race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or 
handicap; and such contractual provisions shall be fully and effectively enforced. 
ARTICLE VIII. STATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
All state agencies engaged in granting financial assistance or in making payment of any 
public funds shall deny the same to any institution or organization engaged in discriminatory 
practices based upon race, color, sex, religious creed, national origin, age, or handicap. 
ARTICLE IX. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL BODIES 
All political subdivisions, schools, districts, and other instrumentalities of government are 
requested to cooperate with this endeavor to eliminate any and all acts of discrimination within 
the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE X. COOPERATION WITH THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
All state agencies, in accordance with the provisions of the state's law against 
discrimination, shall cooperate fully with the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial 
Commission and duly comply with its requests and recommendations for effectuating the state's 
policy against discrimination. 
ARTICLE XI. PUBLICATION AND POSTING OF THIS CODE 
Copies of this code shall be distributed to all executive branches of government, political 
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subdivision, boards, departments, commissions, school districts, and all other agencies of the 
State of Utah, and shall be posted in prominent locations. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused to be affixed the 
Great Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of 
May, 1979. 
Scott M. Matheson 
GOVERNOR 
ATTEST: 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
David S. Monson 
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UT Exec Order October 1,1977 - Gov. Matheson 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits discrimination 
in the United States employment in the public sector on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin; and 
WHEREAS, the Equal Pay Amendment of 1963, to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, guaranteed equal pay for equal work for persons of both sexes in United States 
employment; and, 
WHEREAS, the Age Discrimination Act of 1967, as amended in 1974, prohibits 
discrimination in employment in the United States on the basis of an individual's age; and, 
WHEREAS, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974, prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of one's handicapped status; and, 
WHEREAS, Presidential Executive Orders since 1964, especially Executive Order 
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375 have mandated the establishment of Affirmative 
Action Programs with United States Government agencies and their contractors in order to 
correct past injustices and insure future non-discrimination in employment practices; and, 
WHEREAS, the United States Civil Service Commission requires that Affirmative 
Action Plans be a part of the State Merit System; and, 
WHEREAS, the Utah Fair Employment Practices Act (Anti-Discrimination Act) of 1965, 
as amended in 1975, in Utah prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, creed, 
color, sex, age, religion, ancestry or national origin; and, 
WHEREAS, in 1973, the past administration set forth an Executive Order which 
mandated the formulation and implementation of Affirmative Action Programs within each 
agency of state government, and established within the Department of Finance, State Personnel 
Office, the Division of Equal Employment Opportunity; 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, BY THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS GOVERNOR OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That the State Equal Employment 
Opportunity Coordinator be responsible for instituting a continued policy of Affirmative Action 
for the employees and perspective employees of the State of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That the State Personnel Director maintain Affirmative 
Action in the administration of the State Merit System. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That each agency and department of state government 
formulate an ongoing policy of nondiscrimination through continued efforts to implement 
Affirmative Action Plans to achieve equal employment in state government for all citizens of 
Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: That an Affirmative Action Review Committee be created 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All rights reserved. 
2 
to assist the Coordinator of Equal Employment Opportunity, the State Personnel Director, and 
the Governor in the development of an effective Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative 
Action Program. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of 
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah this 1st day of October, 1977. 
Scott M. Matheson 
Governor 
ATTEST: 
David S. Monson 
Secretary of State 
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UT Exec Order December 6,1973 - Gov. Rampton 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
WHEREAS, Article I of the Governor's Code of Fair Practices, October 1, 1965, provides 
in part as follows: 
"No state agency shall, in the recruitment, appointment, assignment, promotion, and 
discharge of personnel, discriminate against any individual on account of race, color, 
religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex; and 
WHEREAS, it has long been the policy of the State of Utah to provide equal opportunity 
in its employment on the basis of merit; and 
WHEREAS, it is recognized that it is the responsibility of the government of the State to 
bring all segments of the population to full participation in the processes of government and to a 
full share in the services of government; and 
WHEREAS, it is recognized that it is in the interest of efficiency and effectiveness of the 
operations of government that all citizens be allowed to make the greatest contributions of which 
they are capable to their government: 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Calvin L. Rampton, Governor of the State of Utah by virtue of 
the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the State of Utah do hereby direct: 
1. Each agency and department of state government to formulate and implement an 
acceptable plan of Affirmative Action to achieve Equal Employment Opportunity in the State 
Government for all citizens of Utah. Each agency plan shall cover recruitment, selection, 
appointment, promotion, and other personnel procedures; agency functions in relation to job 
structuring; and training plans to insure opportunities to improve skills needed at current job 
levels and to develop potential for promotion. 
2. There will be created in the State Personnel Division of the Department of Finance an 
office of Equal Employment Opportunity that shall coordinate the State Equal 
Employment Opportunity program and each agency shall furnish to that office for 
approval in accordance with standards provided to the agencies, a copy of the agency's 
plan of Affirmative Action, as well as such reports as shall be required. The State Office 
of Equal Employment Opportunity shall issue to the agencies such regulations, standards, 
and other guidance as may be necessary concerning the composition and implementation 
of the Equal Employment Opportunity plans of Affirmative Action. 
3. There will be created an advisory council to that office that shall monitor the State 
Equal Employment Opportunity program and submit a report thereon to the Governor by 
December 31st of each year. This council shall consist of seven members and shall draw 
1 member from the Black Community, 1 member from the Chicano Community, 1 
member from the Asian American Community, 1 member from the American Indian 
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Community, 1 member from a women's organization, 1 member from the Public 
Employee's Association, and a representative from or designee of a State Agency. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great Seal of 
the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of December, 
1973. 
Calvin L. Rampton 
Governor 
ATTEST: 
Clyde L. Miller 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
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UT Exec Order October 1,1965 - Gov. Rampton 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 
GOVERNOR'S CODE OF FAIR PRACTICES 
PREAMBLE 
Among the basic rights of all the people of this nation are the rights to seek a livelihood, 
opportunity for advancement and the respect of our society based solely on the individual's 
ability and capacity. To judge an individual, expressly or through implication, by his race, 
religion or national origin, is repugnant to every American ideal and a distortion of our standards 
of human freedom and worth. 
It is the duty of every American citizen to protect and promote the right of all persons to 
find employment where their individual capacities lead them. For, when freedom of any kind is 
lost for one citizen, all freedom will soon be lost for all citizens. 
Our units of government must assume their citizen-granted role of leadership in the 
protection of freedom for all citizens, for we are sworn to not only uphold the letter of the laws as 
set down by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Utah, and the statutes, but 
also uphold and foster the guiding spirit of these laws. 
The State of Utah recognizes its responsibility to guarantee the right of all persons to 
utilize their abilities to the fullest and thus will take immediate and continuing measures to 
strengthen our efforts in behalf of this objective. 
As Governor of the State of Utah, I, Calvin L. Ramptou, now proclaim the following 
Code of Fair Practices to be the governing policy throughout every department of the executive 
branch of government of the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE I -- APPOINTMENT, ASSIGNMENT AND PROMOTION OF STATE 
PERSONNEL 
No state agency shall, in the recruitment, appointment assignment, promotion and discharge 
of personnel, discriminate against any individual on account of race, color, religious creed, 
ancestry, national origin or sex. No state agency shall have on its employment application forms 
any inquiry regarding race, color, religious creed, ancestry or national origin and no interview 
shall include any question pertaining to the above. 
ARTICLE II - PROMULGATION OF NON-DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES 
All state agencies shall promulgate and affirmatively carry out a clear, written policy of 
non-discrimination and fair practices. They shall regularly review their personnel practices and 
procedures and correct any which may contribute to the possibility of discrimination. They shall 
include, in their continuing programs of orientation and training, special emphasis on 
non-discriminatory practices and services 
ARTICLE III - TRAINING FOR JOB OPPORTUNITIES 
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All educational programs, vocational guidance counseling services, and all apprenticeship and 
on-the-job training programs of the state shall be conducted to encourage the fullest development 
of interests and aptitudes, without regard to race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin 
or sex. 
ARTICLE IV -STATE SERVICES AND FACILITIES 
Equal treatment of all persons without regard to race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national 
origin or sex, shall be guaranteed by all state agencies in performing their services to the public. 
Discriminatory practices will not be tolerated in any state facility. 
ARTICLE V - EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
All state agencies engaged in employment referral and placement services for private or 
public employers shall fill job orders only on a non-discriminatory basis. They shall refuse any 
job order which would discriminate against any person because of race, color, religious creed, 
ancestry, national origin or sex-whether such discrimination was either expressed or implied by 
the job order—and shall refer such prohibited requests to the Anti-Discrimination Division of the 
Industrial Commission for investigation, conciliation, and other appropriate action. 
ARTICLE VI - COOPERATION WITH THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
All state agencies, in accordance with the provisions of the state's laws against discrimination, 
shall cooperate fully with the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial Commission and 
duly comply with its requests and recommendations for effectuating the state's policy against 
discrimination. 
ARTICLE VII -- STATE LICENSING AND REGULATORY AGENCIES 
All state agencies receiving information or complaints of discrimination based on race, color, 
religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex, shall promptly advise the Anti-Discrimination 
Division of the Industrial Commission. The Anti-Discrimination Division of the Industrial 
Commission shall notify any state agency which has licensing or regulatory power of the 
pendency of a proceeding. If, thereafter, a party is found to have engaged in a discriminatory 
practice, such state agency shall be notified and take appropriate action against the respondent. 
ARTICLE VIII - PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Every state contract for public works or for goods or services shall contain a clause barring 
discrimination on account of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex, and 
such contractual provisions shall be fully and effectively enforced. 
ARTICLE IX - STATE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
All state agencies engaged in granting financial assistance or in making payment of any 
public funds shall deny the same to any institution or organization engaged in discriminatory 
practices based upon race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national origin or sex. 
ARTICLE X - OTHER GOVERNMENTAL BODIES 
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All political subdivisions, schools, districts and other instrumentalities of government are 
requested to cooperate with this endeavor to the end that any and all discrimination within the 
State of Utah be eliminated. 
ARTICLE XI - PUBLICATION AND POSTING OF THIS CODE 
Copies of this code shall be distributed to all executive branches of the government, political 
subdivisions, boards, departments, commissions, school districts and all other agencies of the 
State of Utah, and shall be posted in prominent locations. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have set my hand and caused to be affixed the Great 
Seal of the State of Utah. Done at the State Capitol in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 1st day of 
October, 1965. 
Calvin L. Rampton 
Governor 
Attest: 
Clyde L. Miller 
Secretary of State 
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Vern L. PETERSON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
BROWNING, a Utah corporation, and 
David W. Rich, Defendants. 
No. 900401. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 13, 1992. 
Question was certified by the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Utah as to whether action for termination 
of employment based upon public policy 
exception to at-will employment doctrine 
sounds in tort or contract. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) public 
policy exception is recognized in state, and 
(2) exception sounds in tort rather than 
contract. 
Question answered. 
Howe, Associate CJ., filed a concur-
ring opinion. 
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring and 
dissenting opinion in which Hall, CJ., 
joined. 
1. Master and Servant e=»30(1.10) 
Under public policy exception to at-will 
employment doctrine, at-will doctrine will 
not insulate employer from liability where 
employee is fired in a manner or for a 
reason that contravenes clear and substan-
tial public policy. U.C.A.1953, 67-21-1 to 
67-21-9. 
2. Master and Servant $»30(1.10) 
It is not purpose of public policy excep-
tion to at-will employment doctrine to elimi-
nate employer discretion in discharging at-
will employees or to impose requirement of 
"good cause" for discharge of every em-
ployee. 
3. Master and Servant <s=»30(1.10) 
Public policy exception to at-will em-
ployment doctrine applies when statutory 
language expressing public conscience is 
clear and when affected interests of society 
are substantial. 
4. Master and Servant <s=»30(L10) 
For purposes of public policy exception 
to at-will employment doctrine, identifica-
tion of clear and substantial public policies 
will require case-by-case development 
5. Master and Servant e=>30(1.10) 
Violation of any federal or other 
state's law does not automatically provide 
basis for wrongful termination action 
based on public policy exception to at-will 
employment doctrine; rather, violation of 
state or federal law must contravene clear 
and substantial public policy of the state. 
U.C.A.1953, 67-21-1 to 67-21-9. 
6. Master and Servant <3=»30(1.10) 
Falsifying tax and customs documents 
contravened state public policy, for pur-
poses of public policy exception to at-will 
employment doctrine. 
7. Master and Servant e=»35 
Public policy exception to at-will em-
ployment doctrine sounds in tort rather 
than contract; employer's obligation to re-
frain from discharging employee who re-
fuses to commit criminal act does not de-
pend upon any express or implied promise 
arising from employment contract 
David B. Havas, Michelle E. Heward, 
Ogden, for Peterson. 
William B. Bohling, David R. Money, Mi-
chael Patrick O'Brien, Sharon E. Sonnen-
reich, Salt Lake City, for Browning and 
Rich. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
In 1987, Vern Peterson filed a complaint 
in federal court against his former employ-
er, Browning, and its personnel director, 
alleging, among other things, constructive 
termination in violation of Utah public poli-
cy. Peterson was a customs officer with 
Browning. In support of his public policy 
claim, Peterson alleges that he was termi-
nated because of his refusal to falsify tax 
documents in violation of Utah and Mis-
souri law and customs documents in viola-
tion of federal law. 
This matter has been certified from the 
United States District Court for the Dis-
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trict of Utah pursuant to rule 41 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
question of law certified to this court for 
consideration is: 
Does an action for termination of em-
ployment based upon the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doc-
trine for violation of or refusal to violate 
federal, other state, or Utah law sound in 
tort or contract? 
On its face, the certified question appears 
to be singular, but in effect it has two 
parts: (1) Does the public policy exception 
to Utah's employment-at-will doctrine en-
compass violations of federal law and the 
laws of other states as well as violations of 
Utah law? (2) Does that exception sound 
in tort or contract? l 
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
GENERALLY 
[1] The public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine restricts an 
employer's right to terminate an employee 
for any reason. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 
770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla.1989) (public policy 
exception attempts to balance competing 
interests of society, employee, and employ-
er). Under the exception, the at-will doc-
trine will not insulate an employer from 
liability where an employee is fired in a 
manner or for a reason that contravenes a 
clear and substantial public policy. Utah 
recognizes the public policy exception to 
the at-will doctrine. Hodges v. Gibson 
Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 165 (Utah 
1991); Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 
P.2d 1096, 1097 (Utah 1989).2 
1. In its brief to this court, Browning raises two 
additional issues: (1) whether Peterson's public 
policy claim is preempted by the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001 to 1461 (1985), and (2) whether there 
are sufficient facts to put the claim within the 
public policy exception. Peterson argues that 
these issues were not raised by the federal judge 
in his request for certification and that they are 
issues properly decided by the trial court, not by 
this court. We agree with Peterson. To address 
these questions without a request to do so 
would intrude upon the province of the federal 
court. 
2. The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986 & Supp. 
Actions falling within the public policy 
exception typically involve termination of 
employment for (1) refusing to commit an 
illegal or wrongful act, (2) performing a 
public obligation, or (3) exercising a legal 
right or privilege. Jill S. Goldsmith, Note, 
Employmen t-a t- Will—Employers May 
Not Discharge At-Will Employees for 
Reasons that Violate Public Policy—Wag-
enseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 
1986 Ariz.St.LJ. 161, 166-67. Here, Peter-
son alleges that he was terminated for 
refusing to commit an unlawful act. In a 
number of cases, other courts have found 
that the public policy exception applies in 
similar circumstances. See, e.g., Tameny 
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 
164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) 
(employee discharged for refusing to en-
gage in illegal price fixing); Petermann v. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am. 
Local 396, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 
(1959) (employee terminated for refusing to 
commit perjury); Trombetta v. Detroit, To-
ledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich.App. 489, 265 
N.W.2d 385 (1978) (employee discharged 
for declining to illegally manipulate state-
mandated pollution sampling results); 
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 NJ.Super. 416, 
390 A.2d 149 (1978) (employee terminated 
for refusing to perform medical procedure 
for which she was not licensed); Harless v. 
First NaVl Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 246 
S.E.2d 270 (1978) (employee discharged for 
refusing to violate consumer protection 
law); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 
739 (9th Cir.1984), cert, dismissed, 469 U.S. 
1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 309 (1985) 
1991), protects public employees from discharge 
for reporting "a violation of a law, or rule 
promulgated under the law of this state, a politi-
cal subdivision of this state, or any recognized 
entity of the United Stales," id. § 67-21-3(1), or 
for participating "in an investigation, heanng, 
inquiry, or other form of administrative review 
held by [a] public body," id. § 67-21-3(2). 
While the statute does not specifically limit the 
rights of private employers or address the em-
ployer who directs an employee to engage in 
unlawful conduct, it does reflect legislative ap-
proval of the basic proposition that it is against 
the public policy of the state for employers to 
discharge employees who seek to act within the 
law. 
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(employee discharged for refusing to par-
ticipate in conspiracy to violate Sherman 
Antitrust Act). 
How a court defines "public policy" is a 
determining factor in whether it will invoke 
the public policy exception. Wagenseller v. 
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 
377, 710 P.2d 1025, 1032 (1985); Note, Pro-
tecting Employees At Will Against 
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy 
Exception, 96 Harv.L.Rev.1931,1947 (1983) 
[hereinafter Protecting Employees]. We 
acknowledge that the term "public policy" 
is open-ended, Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165, and 
varies from court to court and from case to 
case. See generally Protecting Employ-
ees at 1947-50 (discussing arbitrariness 
with which courts define public policy). 
We will not attempt here to define the full 
scope of the term "public policy" for pur-
poses of the exception to the at-will doc-
trine. At this point, it is sufficient to say 
that declarations of public policy can be 
found in our statutes and constitutions. 
Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165-66; Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 
(Utah 1989). This does not mean that all 
statements made in a statute are expres-
sions of public policy. "[M]any statutes 
simply regulate conduct between private 
individuals, or impose requirements whose 
fulfillment does not implicate fundamental 
public policy concerns." Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal. 
Rptr. 211, 217, 765 P.2d 373, 379 (1988). A 
number of courts have refused to recognize 
a cause of action unless the public policy 
allegedly violated is clear or substantial, 
see, e.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 
Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) (refusing to 
recognize public policy action where em-
ployees terminated for refusing to consent 
to take psychological stress evaluation 
test); Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 41 
Colo.App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (re-
fusing to recognize public policy action 
based on broad, general language of nurs-
ing statute); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt 562, 
409 A.2d 581 (1979) (refusing to recognize 
action where employee was discharged 
over leave time dispute); Ward v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 95 Wis.2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 
(1980) (refusing to recognize public policy 
violation where employee was fired be-
cause relationship with co-worker was 
causing dissension in work place), or clear-
ly mandated, see Wagenseller, 147 Ariz, at 
377, 710 P.2d at 1032; Parnar v. America-
na Hotels, 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 631 
(1982); Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 15-
16, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981); Boyle v. 
Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 
(Mo.Ct.App. 1985); Geary v. United States 
Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174, 180 
(1974); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 
102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 
(1984). 
[2-4] This court has indicated that it 
will narrowly construe the public policies 
on which a wrongful termination action 
may be based. Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & 
Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 
1989); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043. It is not 
the purpose of the exception to eliminate 
employer discretion in discharging at-will 
employees, Hodges, 811 P.2d at 165, or to 
impose a requirement of "good cause" for 
the discharge of every employee. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the public policy excep-
tion applies in this state when the statutory 
language expressing the public conscience 
is clear and when the affected interests of 
society are substantial. The identification 
of clear and substantial public policies will 
require case-by-case development. 
SCOPE OF EXCEPTION: VIOLATIONS 
OF FEDERAL LAW AND LAWS 
OF OTHER STATES 
We turn first to the question of whether 
the public policy exception as recognized in 
this state includes violations of federal law 
and the laws of other states in addition to 
violations of Utah law. In Adler v. Ameri-
can Standard Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572 
(D.Md.1982), a discharged employee al-
leged, among other things, that he was 
terminated from his employment after he 
threatened to expose violations of federal 
tax laws. He claimed that the tendency of 
the firing was to prevent disclosure of il-
legalities in contravention of federal policy. 
In response, the employer argued that in 
an action raising a state's public policy 
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exception, an employee could not rely on 
federal law as the source of the public 
policy contravened. In concluding that fed-
eral law can be incorporated as the public 
policy of a state, the court stated: 
It is in no way offensive to state sover-
eignty to engraft federal public policy 
within the civil law. If [the employer's] 
arguments were to be adopted, this 
Court would accept the proposition that 
the [state], as a matter of public policy of 
its own, should not be concerned with 
serious violations of federal law 
This Court cannot agree that the [state] 
should close its eyes and, as a matter of 
policy, not be concerned with violations 
of federal law. 
Id. at 578-79. A number of state courts 
likewise have recognized that certain feder-
al laws may properly form the basis for a 
wrongful termination action under a state's 
public policy exception. See Tameny v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 
Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (state 
action based on violation of federal price 
fixing laws); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 
700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (state ac-
tion based on violation of federal Food and 
Drug Administration regulations); Sabine 
Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 
733 (Tex. 1985) (state action based on viola-
tion of federal water pollution laws). 
[5,6] We are not prepared to hold, how-
ever, that a violation of any federal or 
other state's law automatically provides the 
basis for a wrongful termination action 
based on the Utah public policy exception. 
Many ancient, anachronistic, and unen-
forced criminal sanctions remain on the 
books of local, state, and national govern-
ments. Violations of such laws would not 
necessarily violate Utah public policy. To 
provide the basis for an action under the 
public policy exception, a violation of a 
state or federal law must contravene the 
3. We note that discerning the public policy im-
plications of federal law or the law of another 
state may on occasion be difficult for Utah 
courts. Application of the "clear and substan-
tial" criteria defined above should, however, 
minimize this problem. 
4. By including violations of "a law, or rule 
promulgated under the law of this state, a politi-
clear and substantial public policy of the 
state of Utah. Although many state and 
federal laws will reflect Utah public policy, 
and may, in fact, provide a source of Utah 
public policy, a plaintiff must establish the 
connection between the law violated and 
the public policies of Utah. That has been 
done here. 
In the present case, it is alleged that the 
employer discharged the employee because 
he would not falsify tax and customs doc-
uments. Such falsification involves serious 
misconduct and is in all likelihood a felony. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1988); Mo.Rev.Stat. 
§ 150.260 (1986). "To hold that one's con-
tinued employment could be made contin-
gent upon his commission of a felonious act 
at the instance of his employer would be to 
encourage criminal conduct upon the part 
of both the employee and employer and 
would serve to contaminate the honest ad-
ministration of public affairs." Peter-
mann, 344 P.2d at 27. Based on the infor-
mation available to us, it appears that the 
Utah public policy at issue is both clear and 
substantial. 
Persons who are terminated from their 
employment because they refuse to engage 
in illegal activities that implicate clear and 
substantial Utah public policy considera-
tions should be protected regardless of 
whether the applicable law is that of Utah, 
the federal government, or another state.3 
The effect on the employee of having to 
choose between keeping his job or follow-
ing the law that governs him is the same 
regardless of the origin of the law. Ac-
cordingly, we hold that an attempt to 
coerce an employee to violate the state tax 
law and federal customs statute at issue 
contravenes the clear and substantial pub-
lic policies of the state of Utah. Thus, a 
discharge resulting from an employee's re-
fusal to violate such laws is actionable un-
der the public policy limitation.4 
cal subdivision of this state or any recognized 
entity of the United States," the Utah Protection 
of Public Employees Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-
21-3(1) (emphasis added), discussed supra note 
2, reflects legislative approval of the basic prop-
osition that the public policy of this state em-
braces the laws of other jurisdictions as well as 
Utah law. 
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CONTRACT VS TORT 
CHARACTERIZATION 
[7] The second issue before this court is 
whether the public policy exception sounds 
in tort or in contract Characterizing a 
case as tort or contract orients the parties 
to the requisite elements of proof, permits 
anticipation of potential defenses, and de-
fines the remedies available See William 
L Mauk, Wrongful Discharge The Ero-
sion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 
21 Idaho L Rev 201, 208 (1985) [hereinafter 
Mauk] Essentially, the standard of orien-
tation m addressing this problem focuses 
on the duty which has allegedly been 
breached, asking whether that duty arises 
from a promise set forth in the contract or 
is one imposed by law, independent of con-
tract Id at 209 
Of those courts recognizing the public 
policy exception to the at will doctrine, the 
overwhelming majority adopt the tort theo-
ry 5 We agree with the majority and hold 
that the exception sounds in tort6 An 
employer's obligation to refrain from dis 
charging an employee who refuses to com-
mit a criminal act does not depend upon 
any express or implied promise ansmg 
from the employment contract Instead, 
the tort cause of action arises out of the 
contractual relationship See DCR Inc v 
Peak Alarm Co, 663 P2d 433, 437 (Utah 
1983) (burglar alarm company which 
breached duty of due care liable in tort 
even though relationship giving rise to 
duty originated m service contract between 
parties), see also Tameny, 164 Cal Rptr at 
843-44, 610 P 2d at 1334, Malone v Uni-
versity of Kansas Medical Ctr, 220 Kan 
371, 552 P 2d 885, 888 (Kan 1976), Burk v 
K-Mart Corp, 770 P 2d 24, 28 (Okla 1989) 
5. Only two states, Wisconsin and Arkansas, have 
adopted the contract theory The Wisconsin 
court was influenced largely by the fact that the 
legislature in that state had prescribed contract 
damages for other instances of wrongful termi 
nation Brockmeyer v Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis 2d 561 335 N W 2d 834 (1983) Arkansas 
adopted the contract theory but recognized that 
in a proper case, the employee would have a 
cause of action for the tort of "outrage " Ster 
ling Drug, Inc v Oxford, 294 Ark 239, 743 
SW2d 380 rehg denied, 294 Ark 239, 747 
SW2d 579 (1988) 
The employer's liability is based on "viola-
tion of a legal duty independently imposed 
as a result of what the defendant under-
took to do with relation to the [employee's] 
interests" DCR Inc, 663 P2d at 437 
(quoting Carl S Hawkins, Retaining Tra-
ditional Tort Liability in the Nonmedical 
Professions, 1981 B Y U L Rev 33, 36) 
Our holding that tort theory applies to 
the public policy exception is not inconsist-
ent with our decision in Beck v Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P2d 795 (Utah 
1985) In Beck, we held that a claim based 
on a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing gives rise to a claim 
for breach of contract Id at 798 Tort 
damages m such a case can be obtained 
only upon a showing of independently ac-
tionable tortious conduct See id at 800 n 
3 Because the public policy exception is 
imposed by law, the employment agree-
ment is involved only because it forms the 
basis of the relationship, the agreement is 
tangential to the reason for discharge 
This is not the case with regard to the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealmg 
"The covenant of good faith is read into 
contracts in order to protect the express 
covenants or promises of the contract, not 
to protect some general public policy inter-
est not directly tied to the contract's pur-
pose " Foley v Interactive Data Corp, 
47 Cal 3d 654, 254 Cal Rptr 211, 232, 765 
P 2d 373, 394 (1988) The very nature of 
the public policy exception, therefore, dis-
tinguishes it from the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing discussed in 
Beck 
Further, our holding that the public poli-
cy exception sounds m tort is consistent 
with our adoption of the tort of intentional 
6. The application of tort concepts in discharge 
and other employment contexts is not revolu 
tionary Tort theories have been applied, for 
example, to actions raised by aggrieved employ 
ees based on negligence, interference with con 
tract, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress invasion of privacy and defamation 
Mauk at 225 Similarly, employers have been 
found liable in tort for failing to furnish a safe 
work place or proper tools W Page Kceton, et 
al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92, 
at 663 (5th ed 1984) [hereinafter Keeton] 
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economic relations in might otherwise subject their employees to interference with 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). Under Leigh 
Furniture, to recover damages for that 
tort, "the plaintiff must prove (1) that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the 
plaintiffs existing or potential economic re-
lations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 
improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff/' Id. at 304. The improper-pur-
pose alternative of the second part of the 
test "is satisfied where the means used to 
interfere with a party's economic relations 
are contrary to law, such as violations of 
statutes, regulations, or recognized com-
mon law rules. Such acts are illegal or 
tortious in themselves and hence are clear-
ly 'improper' means of interference." Id. 
at 308. The discharge of an employee be-
cause of his failure to violate a clear and 
substantial public policy is an "improper 
purpose" under this definition. The imposi-
tion of tort damages is therefore entirely 
appropriate and consistent. Accord W. 
Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts § 130, at 1029-30 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
As discussed above, the duty at issue in 
actions for wrongful termination in viola-
tion of public policy does not arise out of 
the employment contract It is imposed by 
law, and thus is properly conceptualized as 
a tort. Significant consequences flow from 
this conceptual approach, one of which is 
the type of damages available. When a 
contract theory is applied, compensation 
may be limited to economic losses such as 
back pay. Keeton § 130, at 1029 (citing 
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 
Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983)). More-
over, concepts of foreseeability and mitiga-
tion apply. Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 
841. In contrast, "[a] tort theory will per-
mit the recovery to transcend these limits 
and may also serve to avoid limitations on 
recovery that may be imposed by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement or other con-
tract." Keeton § 130, at 1029. Most nota-
bly, a plaintiff may recover punitive dam-
ages under tort law. 
In the case of the public policy exception, 
potential punitive damages will exert a 
valuable deterrent effect on employers who 
a choice between violating the law or losing 
their jobs. The employment-at-will doc-
trine does not grant an employer the privi-
lege of subjecting its employees to the 
risks of criminal liability. Boyle v. Vista 
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 872 (Mo.Ct 
App.1985). The potential for the imposition 
of punitive damages under the public policy 
exception will, we believe, provide an incen-
tive for employers to refrain from using 
their unique economic position to coerce 
employee conduct that contravenes clear 
and substantial public policies. Moreover, 
it will encourage employees to engage in 
lawful conduct and report violations of the 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the two-part question cer-
tified to this court, we hold that (1) the 
public policy exception to Utah's employ-
ment-at-will doctrine encompasses viola-
tions of federal law and the laws of other 
states as well as violations of Utah law if 
those violations contravene the clear and 
substantial public policies of Utah, and (2) 
the exception sounds in tort. 
STEWART, J., concurs. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
(concurring). 
I concur. I write to underscore that the 
public policy exception is to be applied nar-
rowly and only when there exists a viola-
tion of a clear and substantial public policy. 
Accordingly, I do not contemplate that the 
exception will be frequently invoked or that 
it should be of concern to employers who 
are guided by honesty in their employment 
relations. 
To employers in this state who fear the 
risk of being subjected to punitive damages 
for a discharge in contravention of public 
policy, I commend the following statement 
in the opinion of the court in Boyle v. Vista 
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 878 (Mo.Ct. 
App.1985): 
The public policy exception is narrow 
enough in its scope and application to be 
no threat to employers who operate with-
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in the mandates of the law and clearly 
established public policy as set out in the 
duly adopted laws. Such employers will 
never be troubled by the public policy 
exception because their operations and 
practices will not violate public policy. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur with the majority's holding that 
discharges in contravention of public policy 
are actionable under Utah law and that 
firing one for a refusal to violate state tax 
and federal customs laws, if that is what 
occurred here, would amount to such an 
actionable discharge. However, I cannot 
join without several reservations Justice 
Durham's explanation of what may consti-
tute public policy for the purposes of this 
cause of action. I also dissent from the 
majority's holding that discharge in the 
violation-of-public-policy cause of action lies 
in tort rather than contract. 
I do not intend to disparage the ends 
sought by the majority: to provide compen-
sation for employees discharged in viola-
tion of public policy and to deter employers 
from such firings. If the public policy of 
this state is fixed firmly against conduct an 
employer requires of an employee upon 
pain of discharge for breach of contract, 
the law should sanction neither the con-
tract provision nor the discharge. How-
ever, while I agree with the majority's end, 
I cannot agree with the means chosen to 
achieve it. 
The court today adopts a rather formless 
tort cause of action as a means to separate 
from the general body of contractual rela-
tions between employer and employee 
those areas where public policy will not 
permit contract law to operate. To me, this 
tumor. The tool is capable of excising the 
offending part, but it poses a considerable 
risk of unpredictable collateral damage to 
surrounding healthy tissue and a conse-
quent impairment of the entire organ. 
1. In this regard, I note that the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
has recently proposed a model Employment 
Termination Act governing wrongful discharge. 
It enlarges on an employer's traditional liability 
The threat of this unintended injury is 
particularly unfortunate because it is un-
necessary. Recasting discharge in viola-
tion of public policy as a contract instead of 
a tort cause of action would accomplish all 
the positive consequences the majority de-
sires—compensation of injured employees 
and deterrence of employer misconduct— 
without the risk of negative effects the 
majority surely cannot intend but none-
theless invites. Indeed, returning to my 
earlier analogy, while the tort action is a 
cleaver, the contract action is a scalpel. I 
favor the scalpel, with the knowledge that 
the larger knife of tort will always be 
available in cases where an egregiously 
injured employee can prove an independent 
tort, such as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. When selecting from avail-
able tools to craft new rules that will affect 
the relationship between every Utah em-
ployer and every Utah employee, we should 
proceed with special delicacy lest we dem-
onstrate that the fashioning of these rules 
is a task too subtle for our skills and one 
better performed by others.1 
Before discussing the merits, a brief 
overview of the discharge-in-violation-of-
public-policy area is appropriate. The wa-
tershed Utah employment-at-will decision is 
Befube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1989). In Berube, we held that 
the employment-at-will doctrine in Utah 
amounts only to a rebuttable presumption 
that the contractual relationship between 
the parties contemplates that the employer 
may discharge the employee at any time. 
Id. at 1044 (opinion of Durham, J., joined 
by Stewart, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); id. at 1050 
(Howe, J,, concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.). 
The lead opinion in Berube, written by Jus-
tice D\yrt*Wfc ^ral y*radl w&ty by SusAkg. 
Stewart, assayed the three categories of 
so-called "exceptions'1 to the employment-
at-will doctrine that courts around the 
country have fashioned. We adopted only 
the "implied-in-fact" exception. Id. at 1049 
bat limits available remedies. James N. Dertou-
zos & Lynn A. Karoly, Labor-Market Responses 
to Employer Liability ix n. 2 (The RAND Insti-
tute for Civil Justice 1992). 
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(opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart, 
J.); id at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring in the result); id at 1050 (Howe, J., 
concurring, joined by Hall, C.J.). Since 
then, we have decided a number of cases 
under that exception, attempting to flesh 
out some of its contours. See, e.g., Arnold 
v. B.J. Titan Servs. Co., 783 P.2d 541 (Utah 
1989); Lowe v. Sorensen Research Co., 779 
P.2d 668 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford, 
Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483 
(Utah 1989). 
In addition to the implied-in-fact excep-
tion applied in Berube and its progeny, a 
majority of the Berube court indicated in 
dictum that it would also recognize a "pub-
lic policy" exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine, although a majority of the 
members of the court did not agree on the 
precise scope of that exception. Compare 
Berube, 111 P.2d at 1042-43 (Durham, J , 
joined by Stewart, J.) with 111 P.2d at 1051 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). 
Two years after Berube, we again had 
the opportunity to determine the contours 
of the public policy exception. See Hodges 
v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 
1991). However, a majority of the court 
again did not address the question. In 
Hodges, the jury based its verdict for the 
plaintiff alternatively on a finding of mali-
cious prosecution and a finding of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. Jus-
tice Stewart, writing the lead opinion and 
joined only by Justice Durham, discussed in 
dictum some aspects of the public policy 
exception to the at-will presumption, includ-
ing the sources of relevant public policy. 
His views followed generally those Justice 
Durham expressed in Berube. Id. at 165-
66. However, a majority of the court 
joined only the portion of the lead opinion 
2. For the sake of clarity, I note that although 
this rule has been called one of the exceptions to 
the employment-at-will doctrine, it is in reality a 
public policy limitation on all discharges. As a 
majority of the court in Berube viewed it, and as 
I presume the majority in this case would agree, 
the doctrine barring discharges in violation of 
public policy does not depend analytically on 
whether the at will presumption would other-
wise apply to the specific facts of the case, i.e., 
whether there was an express or implied con-
tract limiting the employer's discretion to dis-
that affirmed the malicious prosecution 
verdict, finding that ground sufficient to 
support the judgment without recourse to 
the theory of discharge in violation of pub-
lic policy. Id. at 168 (Howe, J., concur-
ring), at 168 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in 
the result, joined by Hall, C.J.). 
The case before us today requires that 
we finally decide several issues regarding 
the public policy limitation on discharge.2 
First, we must determine whether the 
sources of the relevant actionable public 
policies encompass those relied on by plain-
tiff. Second, we must fix the character of 
the cause of action. 1 generally agree with 
Justice Durham's treatment of the sources 
issue and will dispense quickly with my 
suggestions for a more exact and helpful 
definition. I will then address her charac-
terization of the action as a tort, a course 
with which I profoundly disagree, and elab-
orate on my arguments for the equally 
effective, less hazardous, and more precise 
remedy of contract. 
The first issue Justice Durham discusses 
is the source of the relevant public policies 
for the "public policy" limitation on dis-
charge. Although she declines to attempt 
"to define the full scope of the term 'public 
policy/ " she does state that "declarations 
of public policy can be found in our stat-
utes and constitutions." Acknowledging 
that we have said that the public policy 
limitation on discharge should be construed 
narrowly, her opinion holds that the requi-
site public policy is present when "the stat-
utory language expressing the public con-
science is clear and when the interests of 
society which are at stake are substantial." 
She concludes that falsifying tax and cus-
toms documents would amount to a viola-
charge. Rather, the public policy limitation 
should apply to all employment contracts and 
should preclude the employer from discharging 
any employee in a manner or for reasons that 
directly contravene public policy. The employ-
ee operating under an express contract should 
not be in a less advantageous position than the 
employee who is at will. Berube, 771 P.2d at 
1043 n. 10 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); 
id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the 
result). 
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tion of a "clear" and "substantial" public 
policy. 
I agree with Justice Durham's require-
ment that any public policy that limits dis-
charge for breach of the employment con-
tract must be clear and substantial. I also 
agree that Peterson may have alleged such 
a policy here. However, for the guidance 
of the bench and bar in future cases, 1 
would expand on what "substantial" 
means, and I would explain why we con-
clude that the policies here meet that test. 
Both the cases Justice Durham cites and 
many others she does not cite state in 
rather conclusory terms, mirrored in Jus-
tice Durham's opinion, that for a violation 
of public policy to be actionable, that policy 
must be "substantial" or "fundamental." 
For analytic purposes, I find that the fol-
lowing statement of the California Su-
preme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data 
Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 
P.2d 373 (1988), gives some texture to the 
elusive concept of "substantiality": 
Even where, as here, a statutory touch-
stone has been asserted, we must still 
inquire whether the discharge is against 
public policy and affects a duty which 
inures to the benefit of the public at 
large rather than to a particular employ-
er or employee. For example, many stat-
utes simply regulate conduct between 
private individuals, or impose require-
ments whose fulfillment does not impli-
cate fundamental public policy concerns. 
Regardless of whether the existence of a 
statutory or constitutional link is re-
quired under Tameny [v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 
164 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980) ], disparagement 
of a basic public policy must be al-
leged 
47 Cal.3d at 669, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 217, 765 
P.2d at 379 (emphasis in original). 
In other words, one must ask: Is the 
policy in question one that is of sufficient 
importance to the public, as opposed to the 
parties only, that it should constitute an 
uncompromising bar to discharge? Is it a 
policy that a court would not permit the 
parties to derogate by express contract? 
These are the effects of making a policy 
one that qualifies for the public policy limi-
tation on discharge, and therefore, these 
are the factors that should determine the 
substantiality of any policy violated by a 
discharge. See Foley, 47 Cal.3d at 670 n. 
12, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 218 n. 12, 765 P.2d at 
380 n. 12. 
Following the Foley mode of analysis, I 
conclude that we would not permit an em-
ployer to contract expressly with an em-
ployee to falsify state tax documentation or 
evade customs restrictions. Deliberate fal-
sification of information to avoid taxes 
strikes at the core of the public revenue-
raising function and offends our basic pub-
lic policy notions of fairness in taxation— 
that all persons similarly situated with re-
spect to the tax laws should pay their 
share. It is a clear violation of Utah law to 
falsify a tax return or supporting records. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) (1990). I 
therefore have no trouble finding that a 
violation of Missouri's analogous tax law 
would offend a substantial Utah public poli-
cy. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 150.260 (1986). 
Similarly, it is a clear violation of federal 
law to evade customs restrictions through 
false statements. 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1988). 
I am therefore equally comfortable with 
the majority's holding that an evasion of 
federal customs laws would also violate a 
substantial Utah public policy. 
Having dispensed with my clarification 
of the sources of actionable public policies, 
I turn to my major and fundamental point 
of disagreement with Justice Durham's 
opinion. The certified question asks us to 
decide whether the cause of action for of-
fending the public policy limitation on dis-
charge should sound in tort or in contract. 
She opts for tort. I would opt for contract. 
She favors tort because it invokes the spec-
tre of punitive damages to deter employers 
from discharges in contravention of public 
policy. I see contract damages as suffi-
cient to make an employee whole in the 
ordinary case, but would permit the dis-
charged employee to seek any of the tradi-
tional tort remedies if he or she could prove 
an independent tort. This two-layered 
course of recovery would preserve the de-
terrent effects of tort while limiting its 
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potential for unintended harm. It would 
guarantee contract damages to all employ-
ees discharged in violation of public policy, 
regardless of the mental state of their em-
ployers, something a tort cause of action 
cannot provide. For those discharged em-
ployees who can prove an independent, in-
tentional tort, such as infliction of emotion-
al distress, this two-layered remedy would 
protect their access to tort damages, in-
cluding punitives if warranted. We 
thought this two-layered remedy sufficient 
to compensate and to deter the injured and 
the injurer, respectively, in Beck v. Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 
& n. 3 (Utah 1985). See also Hodges v. 
Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163-64 
(Utah 1991) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined 
by Durham, J.); id. at 168 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); Berube v. Fash-
ion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d at 1033, 1046 
(opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stewart, 
J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring 
in the result). Absent a showing that this 
two-layered approach has proven inade-
quate, I would apply it here. 
I now address in order Justice Durham's 
several arguments for adopting the tort 
approach. First, she observes that a ma-
jority of courts have taken the tort route. 
I see little persuasive weight in the band-
wagon argument. In fact, we rejected it in 
Beck. There, we adopted a contract ap-
proach to the problem of an insurer's not 
fulfilling the nonwaivable public policy obli-
gation that we read into a first-party insur-
ance contract. In so doing, we recognized 
that the majority of courts considering the 
issue had couched the cause of action in 
tort Beck, 701 P.2d at 798-99. However, 
we thought that approach analytically 
flawed and the resulting remedy too crude. 
Id. at 799-801. We noted that despite 
some rather wooden platitudes to the con-
trary, in appropriate cases the contract 
damages could include foreseeable conse-
quential harms and should result in both 
compensation and deterrence. Id. at 799, 
3. I note that the Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C.") disallows any contract provision that 
is found "unconscionable." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-302 (1990). Certainly, any such provi-
sion is made unenforceable because it violates 
public policy. I find no reasoned distinction 
801-02. We kept tort in reserve for those 
cases where the plaintiff could prove an 
independent cause of action arising out of 
the same facts upon which the breach of 
contract claim was grounded. Id. at 800 n. 
3. Nothing to date has shown this two-
layered approach to be inadequate or has 
challenged its superiority to the tort-only 
remedy available in other jurisdictions. 
Absent such a showing, I would adopt a 
two-layered remedy here, regardless of 
what other courts have done in the public 
policy area. 
Justice Durham next points to the fact 
that in several cases this court has relied 
on tort to remedy public policy violations. 
E.g., DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 
P.2d 433, 437 (Utah 1983); Leigh Furni-
ture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
304 (Utah 1982). She notes that in both 
cases, the parties' underlying relationship 
arose from contract, as did the relationship 
in Beck. My response is that those cases 
provide little guidance in deciding the issue 
before us. Neither addressed in any detail 
the policy issues for choosing between tort 
and contract, and both were decided before 
Beck made clear that plaintiffs could obtain 
a more generous remedy for breach of 
certain contractual provisions than might 
appear available upon first thought. 
Without criticizing those particular deci-
sions, I note that in recent years, courts 
have lacked clear guiding principles by 
which to determine whether a new cause of 
action should lie in tort or contract3 In my 
view, the remedy for a breach of a contract 
provision, whether express or implied, ordi-
narily should be in contract, unless there is 
a sound reason for providing otherwise. 
And in deciding whether such a sound rea-
son exists, we should be guided by prag-
matic consideration of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the respective remedies in 
light of the environment in which they are 
to operate. Viewed in this light, our deci-
between the public policy which underlies the 
covenant Beck implied in a first-party insurance 
contract or the unconscionability provision in 
the U.C.C.—both of which are vindicated by 
only contract remedies—and that which under-
lies DCR and Leigh Furniture. 
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sions in DCR and Leigh Furniture may or 
may not have been correct in adopting tort 
as the primary remedy for breach of an 
implied limitation on the conduct of a party 
to a contract. The propriety of choosing a 
tort remedy over contract depends on prac-
tical factors. This determination should fo-
cus on such variables as the frequency of 
the conduct in question in the relevant com-
munity, the likelihood of the actions' being 
done without malice, and the scope and 
variety of economic arrangements affected 
by the resulting law. To whatever conclu-
sion such an analysis would lead in the 
cases of DCR and Leigh Furniture, it 
would tell little about the issue that con-
fronts us today. We must analyze this 
case in its own context. 
Justice Durham's final reason for adopt-
ing the tort approach seems to be the one 
on which she places the most weight. She 
states, "The principal reason for the appli-
cation of a tort theory to the public policy 
exception is the availability of damages." 
The issue of damages has two aspects. 
First, Justice Durham expresses concern 
that contract damages might be limited to 
back pay and might be further restricted 
by contractual provisions. Second, she 
states: 
The potential for the imposition of puni-
tive damages under the public policy ex-
ception will, we believe, provide an incen-
tive for employers to refrain from using 
their unique economic position with re-
gard to an employee to coerce conduct 
which contravenes clear and substantial 
public policies. Moreover, it will encour-
age employees to engage in lawful con-
duct and report violations of the law. 
The first of these justifications—concern 
about the limited damages available for 
breach of an employment agreement and 
about possible contractual restrictions on 
damages—has little weight in Utah after 
Beck and Berube. 
In Beck, we noted that other states have 
selected tort as the remedy for breaches of 
covenants implied into first-party insurance 
contracts as a matter of public policy, in 
part because they believed that contract 
remedies were inadequate to make the in-
jured party whole. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798. 
Another justification was that, because the 
insurer could predict the amount of dam-
ages, there was little disincentive to wilful 
breach of the covenant. Id. at 799. These 
are essentially the same arguments to 
which Justice Durham alludes. 
Our response in Beck was not to make 
such an action lie in tort, but to make it 
clear that consequential damages could be 
available for a breach of that particular 
type of contractual provision and that inde-
pendent tort actions were not barred. As 
to consequential damages, we stated that 
whether they were foreseeable depended 
on the nature of the contract and the ex-
pectations of the parties. But we suggest-
ed that in the first-party insurance context, 
traditional notions of limited contractual 
damages were inappropriate and that "a 
broad range of recoverable damages was 
conceivable," including attorney fees and 
mental anguish. Id. at 802. On the deter-
rence point, we observed that our ruling 
did not bar tort recovery, including punitive 
damages in appropriate cases. We noted 
that the acts constituting a breach of con-
tract "may also result in breaches of duty 
that are independent of the contract and 
may give rise to causes of action in tort." 
Id. at 800 n. 3. 
Beck 's two-layered remedy already has 
entered the wrongful discharge arena. In 
Berube, we held that a claim of wrongful 
discharge in violation of the express or 
implied terms of an employment agreement 
did not sound in tort, as some courts have 
held, but in contract However, lest it be 
argued that the remedy available to the 
employee would be inadequate, and also 
because of the unique nature of the rela-
tionship between employers and employees, 
we adopted the Beck damage standard. 
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1050. 
In Beck, we also addressed the concern 
that future insurers might attempt to draft 
contractual provisions that would deprive 
the insured of the benefit of the covenant 
we there implied into the agreement as a 
matter of law. This parallels Justice Dur-
ham's concern here that employers might 
contractually limit the employees' remedies 
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for discharges in violation of public policy. 
Our response in Beck was to state, "The 
duty to perform the contract in good faith 
cannot, by definition, be waived by either 
party to the agreement." Beck, 701 P2d 
at 801 n 4. A similar observation plainly 
would be appropriate with respect to the 
public policy limitation on discharge. 
In conclusion, concerns about inadequate 
recovery and contractual limitations on the 
right of action are answerable without re-
sort to a tort cause of action. 
The second reason Justice Durham ad-
vances for preferring tort damages to con-
tract is that punitive damages are available 
in tort and will deter employers from coerc-
ing employees into conduct "which contra-
venes clear and substantial public policies." 
I think that in routine cases, the less dras-
tic Beck remedy, which expands on tradi-
tional notions of available contract dam-
ages, will achieve deterrence similar to that 
achieved in the first-party insurance area 
governed by Beck and in the implied-m-fact 
contract area governed by Berube. In ex-
treme cases, we can achieve further deter-
rence by not denying employees general 
damages and punitive damages where the 
employer has committed an independent 
tort. 
We have two recent examples of Utah 
cases where tort actions were joined with 
Beck -type contract claims and resulted in 
awards of general and punitive damages 
In Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 
4. Although here we deal only with a certified 
question and therefore make no factual determi 
nations. I note that on the present state of the 
pleadings and the record, this case does not 
appear to be one where an action for an mde 
pendent tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress would lie Peterson's is not a 
classic example of wrongful discharge in viola 
tion of public policy He does not claim that 
his employer forced him to choose between 
violating the customs laws and losing his job 
Indeed, Peterson admits that his employer was 
"a stickler for adherence to customs practices " 
His theory of recovery is more attenuated 
He contends that his punctilious adherence to 
the customs laws alienated his underlings and 
superiors because of the extra time and effort 
required to comply with import regulations 
He alleges further that his refusal to falsify 
Missouri tax documents angered at least one of 
his peers at Browning's home office in Morgan, 
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991), a fired employee 
brought both wrongful discharge and mali-
cious prosecution claims. She recovered on 
both claims, and we affirmed the tort judg-
ment, including the punitive damage 
award Id. at 163. In Crookston v Ftre 
Insurance Exchange, 817 P 2d 789 (Utah 
1991), the plaintiffs claimed a breach of a 
Beck covenant in their first-party insurance 
contract. They recovered under both the 
covenant theory and a fraud theory. 
Again, we affirmed the judgment on the 
tort claim 
Based on our experience to date, then, 
there is no ground for the suggestion that 
Beck's and Berube 's two-layered con-
tract/tort approach will fail to deter em-
ployer misconduct. In fact, where an em-
ployer discharges an employee for refusing 
to violate a statute and the employer 
knows the conduct demanded is unlawful, 
it should not be difficult to craft a tort 
complaint that can withstand a motion to 
dismiss.4 Cf Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156-61 
Consequently, the two-layered approach I 
propose would be just as effective as the 
majority's tort remedy in compensating in-
jured employees and deterring egregious 
misconduct on the part of their employers 
My two-layered contract/tort remedy 
would also avoid many of the inevitable 
negative consequences that the majority 
cannot intend but unfortunately invites I 
particularly fear the consequences of a 
vague, ill-defmed tort remedy because the 
Utah, giving rise to the perception that Peterson 
was uncooperative and something less than a 
team player The combined result was a wide 
spread belief that Peterson was a difficult per 
son and an inflexible and unpopular manager, 
who was incapable of raising employee morale 
It is Peterson's argument that this perception, 
fueled either in whole or in part by his adher 
ence to the law, led to his constructive termi 
nation Without more, this pleading falls short 
of demonstrating intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, which requires that the defen 
dant intended to inflict distress through out 
rageous and intolerable conduct that offends 
the generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality Samms v Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 
293, 358 P2d 344, 347 (1961) 
Of course, all this is not to say that Peterson 
may not be able to amend his pleadings to state 
an independent tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress 
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employment relationship is one of the most 
common contractual relationships in socie-
ty, and certainly one central to the working 
of the economy This court has never sug-
gested that in its recent forays into limiting 
the 19th-century doctrine of employment 
at will, it is attempting to bar contract law 
from providing the norms that govern the 
employment relationship Specifically, m 
adopting the public policy limitation on dis-
charge, we intend to limit the scope of 
permissible contracting only where it 
trenches on a "clear and substantial" pub-
lic policy, a policy so crucial that we will 
not permit parties to contract for its viola 
tion Because we do not wish to chill per-
missible contracting between employers 
and employees, we should hone the legal 
rules we adopt so that the consequences 
worked by the resulting cause of action are 
the consequences we anticipate and desire 5 
Our need for caution is heightened when 
we consider that even our clearest and 
best-crafted rules often have results we do 
not expect We write our decisions m the 
abstract, using a supposed set of facts m 
our attempt to draw a careful line between 
the permissible and the impermissible 
Once they leave our chambers, however, 
our rules operate m the real world of inex-
actitude and compromise, where judges and 
juries are not always consistent on ques-
tions of either liability or damages, where 
only a small percentage of cases actually 
go to trial, where parties settle cases on 
evaluations of relative degrees of risk, and 
where people and institutions attempt to 
predict risk and often plan their actions so 
as to avoid any substantial possibility of 
suit As a consequence, the fine, bright 
5 A just released study by The RAND Institute 
for Civil Justice documents the collateral conse 
quences of recent nationwide changes in the 
employment at will doctrine These conse 
quences include a decline in the aggregate em 
ployment level in states adopting modifications 
in the employment at will doctrine The seven 
ty of this decline appears to vary depending on 
the type of damages available for various 
wrongful discharge causes of action For exam 
pie, when tort damages are available, the de 
cline in the equilibrium employment level is 
much greater than when only contract remedies 
are used While this study does not settle defin 
ltively the collateral consequences of judicial 
line we think we have drawn between the 
good and the bad becomes, in practice, a 
broad, unclear swath, encompassing both 
conduct that clearly runs afoul of the stan-
dard we intended and conduct that we had 
no intention of prohibiting and might, in 
fact, want to encourage 
Such is the danger here A candid ap-
praisal of the likely effects of the majon 
ty's tort rule suggests that its collateral 
negative consequences are far greater than 
necessary to accomplish our objective 
These negative consequences flow from 
both the definition of the prohibited con 
duct and the open-ended damages available 
in tort We may not be able to prevent 
entirely these consequences at this stage in 
the law's development, but we can limit 
them by adopting a two-layered con 
tract/tort approach as we did in Beck and 
Berube 
First, some negative collateral conse-
quences flowing from the definition of dis 
charges in violation of public policy are 
attributable to the vagueness of the prohi 
bition The majority offers little help in 
identifying actionable public policies It 
does not even state whether the source of 
such policies must be in criminal or civil 
statutes or the constitution or whether 
such policies may be found in the civil 
common law Similarly, the definitions of 
"clear" and "substantial" are elusive Oth-
er than as suggested earlier in this opinion, 
I am not sure we can give much more 
specificity at this time without imprudently 
limiting our freedom to detail the scope of 
the rule in the context of future cases as 
we become more sophisticated about the 
relevant issues Nonetheless, there can be 
modification of employment at will doctrines or 
whether they are beneficial it does suggest that 
the cost of these collateral consequences "dwarf 
the direct legal expenses associated with this 
new litigation," including costs of jury awards, 
settlements, and attorney fees." James N Der 
touzos & Lynn A Karoly, Labor-Market Re 
sponses to Employer Liability xni, xiv (The 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1992) I do not 
suggest that these collateral consequences are 
bad, but only that they are not intended, much 
less understood, consequences of our changing 
the law For that reason, we should proceed 
cautiously lest we do more harm than good 
PETERSON v. BROWNING 
Cite a* 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) 
no question that the uncertainty caused by remedy." Beck, 
this indeterminate definition of applicable 
public policy will induce the cautious em-
ployer to avoid conduct that is plainly per-
missible. And discharged employees will 
press claims that are outside the scope of 
that which we ultimately will find to be 
prohibited. 
Although such uncertainty is the price 
we pay for the incremental evolution of the 
common law, the indeterminacy inherent in 
a vague prohibition on discharges in viola-
tion of public policy is magnified immeasur-
ably when, as the majority holds here, a 
tort remedy is the sole avenue for redress. 
First, the very nature of the tort is unclear. 
I assume the employer must act intention-
ally, though the majority never says so 
explicitly. But must the employer know 
that the conduct it demands violates public 
policy, or is it enough that the employer 
intentionally but innocently requires con-
duct that turns out to violate such a policy? 
No matter which path the majority takes, 
the result reveals the inadequacy and the 
crudeness of its sole reliance on a tort 
remedy. If the employer must know that 
the conduct it demands violates public poli-
cy, then a discharged employee who cannot 
make that showing is left without any rem-
edy because his or her claim for relief lies 
only in intentional tort. On the other hand, 
if the majority attempts to avoid this flaw 
in the protections offered by its tort reme-
dy by deciding that the employer need not 
be conscious of the fact that the demanded 
act violates public policy, then it would 
impose a far more draconian tort liability 
upon the employer than is necessary to 
achieve its objectives of compensation and 
deterrence. An employer who acts in good 
faith but inadvertently violates public poli-
cy by a discharge should not be exposed to 
a claim for punitive damages. 
In contrast, if the approach I suggest 
were adopted, a contract remedy would be 
available to the employee discharged in vio-
lation of public policy regardless of the 
state of mind of the breaching party. As 
we noted in Beck, "[EJven an inadvertent 
breach of [the implied covenant] can sub-
stantially harm the insured and warrants a 
Utah 1293 
701 P.2d at 800. The 
same can be said of an employee dis-
charged in good faith but in violation of 
some public policy unknown to the employ-
er. On the other hand, the employer who 
acts wilfully, with full knowledge that the 
conduct required violated a clear and sub-
stantial public policy, will almost certainly 
be liable, not only in contract, but also for 
one of the already established torts, as in 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 
151 (Utah 1991). In sum, a two-layered 
contract/tort approach has the virtue of 
better defining the scope of the public poli-
cy limitation. 
The second type of unnecessary negative 
consequences flowing from an exclusively 
tort remedy is a consequence of the open-
ended damages available for tort. The pos-
sibility of both special and general dam-
ages as well as punitives increases the un-
certainty for the employer attempting to 
appraise its risk and adjust its conduct to 
avoid that liability. As noted above, in 
appropriate cases, an employer may be un-
able to estimate readily Beck contract dam-
ages at the time of breach. Beck, 701 P.2d 
at 801. Given the unique nature of the 
particular contractual relationship involved, 
that uncertainty is appropriate. But that 
indeterminacy pales in comparison with an 
attempt to estimate even general tort dam-
ages, much less the likelihood and amount 
of any punitive damages. By following the 
exclusive tort approach, we leave the con-
scientious employer largely at sea, not only 
as to determining the propriety of its fu-
ture conduct, but also as to the conse-
quences of a misstep in its appraisal. As a 
result, we inevitably will discourage a 
broad variety of conduct that we in no way 
have suggested is improper. 
There has been no showing that we need 
to risk this much collateral negative harm 
to accomplish our purpose. The two-lay-
ered contract/tort remedy would increase 
the certainty of the available damages, 
thus decreasing the indeterminacy of the 
law and reducing the breadth of the unin-
tended swath our decision will cut in this 
sensitive area. Such increased certainty 
would mean that the law in operation 
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would conform more closely to the law as 
we intended it 
At the same time, the contract remedy 
has advantages over the tort m that by 
adopting it, we leave fewer unanswered 
questions as to the scope of the prohibited 
conduct and we provide both a better array 
of remedies for the harms suffered by em-
ployees and more specific deterrents for 
the wrongs consciously committed by em 
ployers 
For the reasons stated, and perhaps stat-
ed again, I would reject the tort approach 
of Justice Durham and follow the path 
taken m Berube I would hold that a claim 
for a discharge in violation of public policy 
lies m contract 
HALL, C J , concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J 
NUCOR CORPORATION, NUCOR 
STEEL—UTAH DIVISION, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
No. 900328. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
May 18, 1992 
The Tax Commission upheld deficiency 
assessment against steel manufacturer, 
and denied its request for sales and use tax 
exemptions for purchases of lance pipes, 
stirring lances, and mill rolls used in steel 
production Steel manufacturer petitioned 
for review of order The Supreme Court, 
Hall, C.J , held that the Commission proper-
ly found manufacturer liable for sales and 
use taxes on items used primarily as equip-
ment in manufacturing process 
Affirmed 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>800 
Taxation <s=»493.8 
The Administrative Procedures Act 
governs judicial review of the Tax Commis 
sion's decision interpreting statutory law, 
and correction of error standard governs 
such review, unless the legislature has 
granted agency discretion m interpreting 
and administering statute U C A 1953, 
63~-46b-l to 63-46b-22, 63-46b-16(4)(d), 
(4Xh)(i) 
2 Taxation <S=>1319 
The proper standard of review of Tax 
Commission's decision regarding scope of 
sales and use tax exemption, as a matter of 
policy, was abuse of discretion U C A 
1953, 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) 
3. Taxation <^1245 
Steel manufacturer was liable for sales 
and use taxes on lance pipes, stirring lane 
es, and mill rolls used in steel manufactur-
ing process, where these items were pur-
chased primarily as equipment in manufac-
turing process and only mcidently for use 
as ingredients U C A 1953, 59-12-104(28) 
(now 59-12-104(27)) 
4. Taxation <s=>204(l) 
Tax statutes are to be narrowly con-
strued against one seeking exemption 
Mark K Buchi, Gary R Thorup, Richard 
G Wilkins, Salt Lake City, Murray Ogborn, 
Tim O'Neill, Denver, Colo, for petitioner 
R Paul Van Dam, Bnan Tarbet, Salt 
Lake City, for respondent 
HALL, Chief Justice 
Petitioner Nucor Corporation, Nucor 
Steel—Utah Division ("Nucor") seeks re-
view of the order of the Utah State Tax 
Commission upholding a deficiency assess 
ment against Nucor for sales and use taxes 
for the period October 1, 1984, through 
September 30, 1987, and denying its re-
quest for sales and use tax exemptions for 
its purchases of lance pipes, stirring lances, 
RETHERFORD v. AT&T COMMUNICATIONS Utah 949 
Cite as 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 
court rulings on appeal has little operative 
effect when members of Supreme Court 
cannot define trial court's reasoning be-
cause of cryptic nature of its ruling. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rules 52(a), 56(c). 
Debra S. RETHERFORD, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
AT & T COMMUNICATIONS OF the 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; Cathy 
Bateson; Louise Johnson; Vickie 
Randall; and Doe I through Doe X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 890464. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 9, 1992. 
Former employee brought suit against 
employer, supervisors, and co-workers aris-
ing from alleged sexual harassment and 
retaliation for complaining about sexual 
harassment by co-workers. Summary 
judgment was granted in favor of defen-
dants on all claims by the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Freder-
ick, J., and former employee appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: 
(1) tort action for discharge in violation of 
Utah public policy is not limited to employ-
ees at-will; (2) exclusive remedy for dis-
charge in violation of public policy was the 
Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act; (3) Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA) 
preempted former employee's claims for 
breach of implied contract and malicious 
interference with contractual relations, and 
preempted some of claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; and (4) em-
ployee stated cause of action against co-
workers for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
Howe, Associate C.J., filed opinion con-
curring with reservations. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>934(1) 
Although failure of trial court to issue 
statement of grounds for granting sum-
mary judgment is not reversible error ab-
sent unusual circumstances, presumption 
of correctness ordinarily afforded trial 
2. Appeal and Error <s=*863 
Because summary judgment resolves 
only questions of law, Supreme Court gives 
no deference to trial court's determina-
tions, and affirms only if decision before it 
is correct. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
3. Master and Servant <s=>34 
Tort of discharge in violation of public 
policy is available to all employees, even 
those with employment contract protecting 
them from discharge without just cause. 
4. Master and Servant <£=>30(1.10) 
Not every discharge in violation of con-
tractual just-cause provision rises to level 
of violation of public policy; only those 
policies that are clear and substantial and 
arise from statutes or Constitutions qualify 
for vindication through tort of discharge in 
violation of public policy. 
5. Master and Servant <s=>30(1.10) 
While any employer violating contrac-
tual just-cause standard of dismissal is lia-
ble for breaking its promise to its employ-
ee, employer who violates clear and sub-
stantial public policies, so as to give rise to 
tort of discharge in violation of public poli-
cy, should be liable for more expensive 
penalties of tort, a potentially harsher lia-
bility commensurate with greater wrong 
against society; when employer's act vio-
lates both its own contractual just-cause 
standard and clear and substantial public 
policy, employer is liable for two breaches, 
one in contract and one in tort, and must 
bear consequences of both. 
6. Master and Servant <s=»35 
Under Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act in 
effect at time of employee's firing in 1986, 
Act was exclusive remedy for employer 
retaliation against employee who com-
plained of sexual harassment, preempting 
common-law causes of action for retaliation 
for complaints of employment discrimina-
tion. U.C.A.1953, 34-35-6(l)(a)(i), 34-35-
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7.1(15); U.C.A.1953, 34-35-2(7), 24-25-
7.1(11) (1989). 
7. Statutes e=>l90 
Where statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, Supreme Court will not look 
beyond it to define legislative intent. 
8. Statutes <&=205 
Statute is interpreted as a whole, not 
piecemeal. 
9. Master and Servant <©=>10l/2 
Amendment to Utah Anti-Discriminato-
ry Act to prohibit retaliation was not 
change in substantive law, so as to indicate 
that prior law did not prohibit retaliation, 
but, rather, was only clarification. U.C.A. 
1953, 34-35-6(l)(a)(i), 34-35-7.1(15); U.C.A. 
1953, 34-35-2(7), 34-35-7.1(11) (1989). 
10. Action <s=>35 
"Indispensable element test/' under 
which exclusive statutory cause of action 
preempts common-law claim based on same 
facts when statutory scheme supplies indis-
pensable element of tort claim, is correct 
analytical model for determining whether 
statutory cause of action forecloses com-
mon-law remedy. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
11. Action <3=»35 
"Indispensable element test" for deter-
mining when legislative enactment supplies 
exclusive remedy relies on neither timing 
nor conduct to determine preemption; in-
stead, under such test, preemption depends 
on nature of injury for which plaintiff 
makes claim, not nature of defendant's act 
which plaintiff alleges to have been respon-
sible for that injury. 
12. Workers' Compensation <s=>2093 
Tort suit by employee against fellow 
employee for injury caused by intentional 
tort is not barred by exclusivity provision 
of workers' compensation law. 
13. Damages <s=>50.10 
Master and Servant <3='35 
Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act preempt-
ed state law tort claims by former employ-
ee, who was discharged after she com-
plained about sexual harassment, for dis-
charge in violation of public policy, but did 
not preempt other claims for breach of 
implied contract, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, malicious interference 
with contractual relations, and negligent 
employment of harassers. U.C.A.1953, 34-
35-1 to 34-35-7.1. 
14. Master and Servant <s=>30(1.10) 
In determining whether public policy is 
sufficiently "clear and substantial" to sup-
port cause of action for discharge in viola-
tion of public policy, one must examine 
strength of policy as well as extent to 
which it affects public as whole; words 
"clear and substantial" require lack of am-
biguity on both points, and all statements 
made in statute are not expressions of pub-
lic policy. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
15. Master and Servant <e=>30(1.10) 
Questions relevant to determining 
whether statute embodies "clear and sub-
stantial public policy," so as to support tort 
of discharge in violation of public policy, 
include: whether policy in question is one 
of overarching importance to public, as op-
posed to parties only; and whether public 
interest is so strong and policy so clear and 
weighty that we should place policy beyond 
reach of contract, thereby constituting bar 
to discharge that parties cannot modify, 
even when freely willing and with equal 
bargaining power. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
16. Master and Servant <s=*40(3) 
For employee to prevail on claim of 
breach of implied contract, employee must 
prove existence of implied contract, created 
by mutual assent, and employer's failure to 
comply with its terms. 
17. Damages <s=*50.10 
To prevail on claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress arising from sex-
ual harassment by co-workers, former em-
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ployee was required to prove that her co-
workers either intentionally or recklessly 
engaged in intolerable and outrageous con-
duct that caused her severe emotional dis-
tress. 
18. Master and Servant <s=»341 
To prevail on claim of malicious inter-
ference with contractual relations, former 
employee was required to prove that her 
co-workers, whether separately or in con-
spiracy, intentionally and improperly per-
suaded employer to breach its employment 
contract with employee. 
19. Master and Servant <s=>303 
To prevail on claim of negligent em-
ployment against employer, employee was 
required to prove that employer's negli-
gence in hiring, supervising, or retaining 
its employees proximately caused her 
harm. 
20. Labor Relations <s=*45 
States <s=*18.45 
Preemption provision of the LMRA 
preempts any common-law claim that is 
substantially dependent on analysis of col-
lective bargaining agreement. Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301, 
301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
21. Labor Relations 0=45 
States <3=*18.45 
Even if dispute resolution pursuant to 
collective bargaining agreement, on one 
hand, and state law, on other, would re-
quire addressing precisely same set of 
facts, state law claim is "independent" of 
agreement, and not preempted by LMRA, 
as long as state law claim can be resolved 
without interpreting agreement itself. La-
bor Management Relations Act, 1947, 
§§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
22. Master and Servant ©=34 
Claims by former employee, who al-
leged that she was discharged in retaliation 
for complaining about sexual harassment, 
that discharge breached obligation under 
implied contract and that co-workers mali-
ciously interfered with contractual relation, 
resulting in breach of implied contract, 
were based on implied contract that was 
unenforceable as inconsistent with collec-
tive bargaining agreement; providing any 
remedy under implied contract where no 
remedy was available under collective bar-
gaining agreement, because time for arbi-
tration has passed, would put former em-
ployee in more advantageous position than 
other employees bound by collective bar-
gaining agreement. Labor Management 
Relations Act, 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 185; National Labor Relations Act, 
§ 9(a), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). 
23. Torts <S=>12 
Plaintiff may not maintain cause of 
action for malicious interference with con-
tract if contract was illegal or contrary to 
public policy. 
24. Damages <e=*50.10 
States <3=*18.15 
Intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims against co-workers and super-
visors by former employee, who alleged 
that she was sexually harassed and that 
when she complained other harassment in-
tensified, were preempted by LMRA to ex-
tent that claims were against supervisors 
for reprimanding her, ordering her to re-
port to another city to work within ten 
days, and assigning heir certain tasks, rais-
ing questions about authority under collec-
tive bargaining agreement, but other alle-
gations that co-workers, followed her 
around office and attempted to frighten 
her as she crossed street involved purely 
personal misconduct, and were not 
preempted. Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947, §§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 185, 185(a). 
25. Damages <s=>50.10 
To sustain her claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff 
must show that defendant's conduct was 
outrageous and intolerable and that it of-
fended against generally accepted stan-
dards of decency and morality, that defen-
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dants intended to cause, or acted in reck-
less disregard of likelihood of causing, 
emotional distress, that plaintiff suffered 
severe emotional distress, and that defen-
dants5 conduct proximately caused emotion-
al distress. 
26. Damages <s=>50.10 
States <£»18.15 
In determining whether LMRA 
preempts tort claims alleging intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by supervi-
sor or fellow employee, distinction is made 
between situations in which defendant has 
misused his or her authority under collec-
tive bargaining agreement to torment 
plaintiff and situations in which defendant 
has inflicted distress through conduct that 
is purely personal and does not implicate 
exercise of supervisory authority; the for-
mer is preempted, while the latter is not. 
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 
§§ 301, 301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
27. Master and Servant e=>325 
States <s*18.45 
Tort claim of negligent employment as-
serted by former employee, who claimed 
that she was sexually harassed by co-work-
ers, against employer was not shown by 
employee to have been preempted by the 
LMRA, despite employer's claim that court 
would have to consider collective bargain-
ing agreement's termination and discipline 
provisions; source of obligation by employ-
er and supervisors was public law and pub-
lic policy, not private agreements, and em-
ployer failed to show that trial court would 
be required to resort to bargaining agree-
ment to determine whether employer dealt 
appropriately with co-workers. Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, §§ 301, 
301(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 185, 185(a). 
28. Master and Servant <s=»330(3) 
To prevail on claim of "negligent em-
ployment," employee, who claimed that em-
ployer was negligent in hiring co-workers 
who sexually harassed her, and then retal-
iated when she complained, was required to 
show that employer knew or should have 
known that co-workers posed foreseeable 
risk of retaliatory harassment to third par-
ties, including fellow employees, that co-
workers did inflict such harm, and that 
employer's negYigence in Wiring, supervis-
ing, or retaining employees proximately 
caused injury. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
29. Master and Servant <s=>300 
Employer's duty toward people whom 
its employees place in position of reason-
ably foreseeable risk or injury does not 
stem from its private employment contract, 
but rather stems from duty imposed by 
state common law. 
30. Limitation of Actions @=>55(1) 
Tort cause of action accrues for limita-
tion purposes when all its elements come 
into being and claim is actionable. 
31. Limitation of Actions ®=a55(4) 
Claim by former employee against co-
workers for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as result of alleged harass-
ment and retaliation for complaining about 
sexual harassment "accrued" for limita-
tions purposes when employee, after al-
most 18 months of allegedly retaliatory 
abuse by co-workers, took medical disabili-
ty leave at insistence of her psychiatrist, 
from which she never returned to job. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-1, 78-12-25(3). 
32. Limitation of Actions <5=»55(4) 
Statute of limitations for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress does not be-
gin to run until distress is "actually inflict-
ed," i.e., when plaintiff suffers severe emo-
tional disturbance. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-1, 
78-12-25(3). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
33. Damages <s=*50.10 
While standard for determining wheth-
er plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of 
emotional distress has experienced emo-
tional stress is subjective, standard for de-
termining outrageousness of alleged con-
duct is objective; consequently, plaintiff 
must show both that reasonable person 
would consider alleged conduct to be outra-
geous and that plaintiff actually experi-
enced subjective severe emotional anguish 
because of objectively outrageous conduct. 
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34. Limitation of Actions <s=»55(2) 
Generally, statute of limitations on 
negligent employment claim will not begin 
to run until all elements of employer's tort 
are present. 
35. Damages <e=>50.10 
Allegations by former employee that, 
after she complained about sexual harass-
ment, co-workers shadowed her move-
ments, intimidated her with threatening 
looks and remarks, and manipulated cir-
cumstances at her work in ways that made 
her job more stressful were sufficient to 
satisfy objective conduct requirement of 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress that conduct was "outrageous and 
intolerable." 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
36. Damages <S=>50.10 
Standard for determining whether con-
duct of defendant is sufficiently offensive 
to permit recovery for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress is whether defen-
dant's actions offend against generally ac-
cepted standards of decency and morality. 
37. Damages <s=>50.10 
Conduct generally labeled as sexual 
harassment on job satisfies "outrageous 
and intolerable" requirement for tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and therefore, retaliation for complaining 
of sexual harassment must also be consid-
ered "outrageous and intolerable." 
Richard W. Perkins, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Richard M. Hymas, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellees. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case is before us on appeal from a 
grant of summary judgment dismissing 
plaintiffs complaint. Debra S. Retherford 
sued her former employer, AT & T Commu-
nications, under several theories for harms 
arising from alleged sexual harassment by 
her co-employees. Specifically, she alleged 
that AT & T fired her in retaliation for 
complaining of being sexually harassed by 
her AT & T co-workers. She argued that 
such a discharge violated Utah public poli-
cy barring reprisals for reports of sexual 
harassment. She also contended that the 
discharge breached a term of her implied 
contract with AT & T, which prohibited 
reprisal for reports of sexual harassment 
and was entirely separate from the agree-
ment between her union's collective bar-
gaining unit and AT & T. Retherford fur-
ther asserted that AT & T was liable for 
negligently employing her harassers. Fi-
nally, Retherford sued former co-workers 
Cathy Bateson (aka Cathy Bateson-
Hough), Louise Johnson, and Vickie 
Randall, claiming that their retaliatory con-
duct constituted intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and malicious interfer-
ence with her contractual relations with AT 
& T. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the com-
plaint, claiming, inter alia, that workers 
covered by employment contracts that pro-
hibit discharge other than for just cause 
should not be able to maintain a tort action 
for discharge in violation of public policy; 
that the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act 
("UADA") preempted Retherford's com-
mon law causes of action, see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 (1988) (amended 
1989, 1990 & 1991); that federal labor law 
preempted Retherford's common law 
causes of action, see 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); 
and that Retherford had failed to state tort 
claims against her former co-workers or to 
bring those claims within the period fixed 
by the relevant statute of limitations. 
The district judge considered affidavits 
in support of and in opposition to the mo-
tion to dismiss and granted defendants 
summary judgment on all claims. Rether-
ford appeals. 
To summarize our ruling today, we hold 
as follows: first, that both employees cov-
ered by employment contracts that limit 
the bases for discharge and employees who 
are at-will can maintain a tort action for 
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discharge in violation of Utah public policy; 
second, that the UADA provides the exclu-
sive remedy for Retherford's claim for dis-
charge in violation of public policy but does 
not bar her other causes of action; third, 
that federal labor law preempts Rether-
ford's claims for breach of implied contract 
and malicious interference with contractual 
relations and partially preempts Rether-
ford's claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and fourth, that Reth-
erford brought her claims for emotional 
distress and negligent employment in a 
timely manner and has stated a cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress against her former co-workers. 
We therefore reverse the order granting 
summary judgment and remand this case 
for further proceedings on Retherford's 
claim of negligent employment and the 
nonpreempted portion of her claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judg-
ment, we view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith 
v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992); 
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 
(Utah 1991); Utah State Coalition of Sen-
ior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). We state 
the facts of the instant case—which we 
draw primarily from Retherford's affidavit 
submitted in opposition to AT & T's motion 
to dismiss—accordingly. See Sandy City 
v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215 
(Utah 1992). 
In 1976, Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company hired Retherford to 
work as a telephone operator in Grand 
Junction, Colorado. In 1983, due to the 
nationwide restructuring of AT & T and its 
subsidiary companies, Retherford was 
transferred to AT & T's Wasatch office, 
located in Salt Lake City, where she contin-
ued working as a telephone operator. 
Retherford alleges that two separate 
agreements governed her employment with 
AT & T. As an AT & T employee, Rether-
ford was covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement between AT & T and her union, 
the Communications Workers of America 
("CWA"). Independent of the collective 
bargaining agreement, AT & T also had 
promulgated a code of conduct that out-
lined employees' rights and responsibilities 
and was specifically brought to the atten-
tion of and acknowledged in writing by all 
employees. Retherford argues that the 
code of conduct created an implied employ-
ment contract between AT & T and its 
employees. 
Both the collective bargaining agreement 
and the code of conduct prohibited sexual 
harassment and outlined procedures for ag-
grieved employees to press any complaints. 
The collective bargaining agreement stat-
ed, "[N]either the Company nor the Union 
shall unlawfully discriminate against any 
employee because of such employee's race, 
color, religion, sex, age or national origin 
or because he or she is handicapped, a 
disabled veteran or a veteran of the Viet-
nam era." The collective bargaining agree-
ment required resort to arbitration to re-
solve "[grievances arising out of or result-
ing from the application or interpretation 
of the provisions of this Agreement" and 
"[grievances arising out of or resulting 
from the dismissal, suspension, or demotion 
of a regular employee " 
The code of conduct's provision on sexual 
harassment was more detailed than that in 
the collective bargaining agreement. The 
code of conduct read in relevant part: 
Any sexually harassing conduct in the 
workplace, whether physical or verbal, 
committed by any employee is also pro-
hibited. This includes: repeated offen-
sive sexual flirtations, advances, proposi-
tions; continued or repeated verbal 
abuse of a sexual nature; graphic verbal 
commentaries about an individual's body; 
sexually degrading words used to de-
scribe an individual; and the display in 
the workplace of sexually suggestive ob-
jects, pictures or posters. 
Employees who have complaints of 
sexual harassment should report such 
conduct to their supervisors. If this is 
not appropriate, employees are urged to 
seek the assistance of their EEO coordi-
nator. Where the investigation confirms 
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the allegations, prompt corrective action 
should be taken. 
Any reprisal against an employee be-
cause the employee, in good faith, report-
ed a violation or suspected violation is 
strictly forbidden. 
Soon after Rutherford transferred to 
Salt Lake City, manager Fayonne Johanne-
son required Retherford meet with her to 
discuss the provisions of the conduct code 
and to sign a statement saying that she 
had read and understood them. This proce-
dure was repeated every year during Reth-
erford's tenure at the Wasatch office. In 
an affidavit submitted in opposition to de-
fendants* motion to dismiss, Retherford 
termed this annual procedure "a condition 
of her continued employment" with AT & 
T. 
Among Retherford's co-workers at the 
Wasatch office were Cathy Bateson-
Hough, an AT & T manager, Louise John-
son, a supervisor, Vickie Randall, a fellow 
employee and union steward, and Jolene 
Gailey,1 a fellow telephone operator. Upon 
her arrival in Salt Lake City, she noticed 
the sexually uninhibited atmosphere of the 
Wasatch office. In her affidavit, Rether-
ford testified that during her first day at 
work, Bateson-Hough showed her an ob-
scene Valentine's Day card. Soon Rether-
ford became aware that obscene jokes and 
foul language were commonplace among 
her co-workers. 
After approximately six months, Rether-
ford switched to the night shift. At this 
time, she encountered a more sexually sug-
gestive work environment, one she found 
threatening. As before, she noted that sex 
was a common topic of discussion. For 
example, in her affidavit she described 
Johnson's loud accounts of an alleged sexu-
al relationship with another AT & T em-
ployee. 
For the first time, however, Retherford 
found herself a target of the sexually sug-
1. Retherford originally named Gailey as a de-
fendant in this suit, but dismissed her when 
Gailey declared bankruptcy. 
gestive commentary. Specifically, she al-
leges that Jolene Gailey subjected her to 
unwelcome sexual advances. Retherford's 
affidavit describes these advances as fol-
lows: 
Retherford complains that Gailey 
touched her, made numerous comments re-
garding her appearance, and regularly sug-
gested that Retherford join her "in various 
activities." Gailey's friends, including de-
fendant Johnson, also began to congregate 
around Retherford, conversing frequently 
and explicitly about subjects of a sexual 
nature. As time passed, Gailey became 
more aggressive. When "visibly intoxicat-
ed," Gailey sat next to Retherford, touched 
her affectionately on the arm, and said, 
"I'm going to save you from Dave Todd," a 
male AT & T employee with whom Rether-
ford had been sitting at meals. Gailey 
subsequently asked Retherford to pose 
nude while Gailey painted or sculpted her 
likeness, told Retherford that she was look-
ing for a roommate, and informed Rether-
ford that she hated men and even the 
sound of men's voices on the telephone. 
Retherford also believes that Gailey passed 
a note around the office stating that Reth-
erford was having an affair with a male AT 
& T employee. 
After approximately ten months of such 
treatment, Gailey telephoned Retherford at 
home and asked her if she intended to file 
an EEOC complaint about Gailey's con-
duct.2 Retherford testified in her affidavit 
that she replied that she would file a com-
plaint if Gailey continued to bother her. 
According to Retherford's affidavit, Gailey 
responded, "I'm sorry if I offended you, 
but I feel I shouldn't have to apologize for 
my sexuality." 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that 
after she informed Gailey that she was 
considering filing a complaint of sexual 
harassment, Gailey and other AT & T em-
ployees began to retaliate by staring at 
her, making "threatening facial expres-
sions" at her, walking extremely close to 
2. The EEOC, or Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, is a federal agency charged with 
administering complaints under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b). 
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her, and following her around the office. 
During March of 1984, Retherford twice 
complained to her supervisor and manager 
of the retaliatory harassment from Gailey 
and other co-workers. Two months later, 
she wrote manager Bateson-Hough a let-
ter complaining that Gailey continued to 
harass her despite her requests that Gailey 
leave her alone. The next day, May 10, 
1984, Retherford submitted a written com-
plaint to AT & T's Equal Employment Op-
portunity ("EEO") coordinator. 
About five days later, Richard Salazar, 
an AT & T employee and a CWA union 
steward, called Retherford at home to dis-
cuss the complaint she had submitted. 
Retherford testified that Salazar told her, 
"You're the new kid on the block—you're 
not going to win this. We don't know you 
very well, but we do know Jolene [Gailey], 
she is a respectable person in the communi-
ty and an artist." He added, "Somebody 
could get fired over this." Darlene 
Anderson, a first-level manager of the 
Wasatch office, also cautioned Retherford, 
saying, "Just be careful what you say and 
do; this is a strong and big group that you 
are dealing with." Several weeks after 
Retherford complained to the AT & T EEO 
coordinator, she was attempting to cross 
the street at 1:15 a.m. when Gailey sped 
past her. When Retherford reached her 
own car and drove away, Gailey followed 
her for a few miles. 
During June of 1984, Linda Johnston, an 
AT & T employee who Retherford says is a 
personal friend of Bateson-Hough's, inves-
tigated Retherford's complaint. Rether-
ford said that Johnston's investigation con-
sisted solely of personal interviews with 
and submission of written statements by 
Retherford and Gailey. About one month 
later, Johnston submitted the EEO coordi-
nator's report, which recommended that 
Retherford and Gailey have as little contact 
with each other as possible. Subsequently, 
Retherford received a telephone call from 
Reta Pehrson, an AT & T supervisor and 
CWA vice president, who told her, "You 
have to be satisfied with the [EEO coordi-
nator's] decision If anybody asks you 
about it, don't tell them and don't say any-
thing." Pehrson added, "Cathy [Bateson-
Hough] wanted me to also tell you that if 
you would like a transfer, she will transfer 
you to the Sundance Office." 
Retherford stated in her affidavit that 
the harassment in the Wasatch office did 
not abate following the issuance of the 
EEO coordinator's report and recommenda-
tions. At one point, Retherford overheard 
an AT & T employee say to a group of co-
workers, including defendant Johnson, 
"Debi [Retherford] would make a good 
stripper—she has big boobs." Looking di-
rectly at Retherford, Johnson replied, "My 
bra size is 34B." Retherford said that 
Gailey and other co-workers continued to 
stare at her, walk close to her, follow her, 
and make faces at her. She also said that 
on at least one occasion, Gailey and John-
son accused Retherford of staring at them. 
In late August of 1984, Retherford filed 
a charge letter with the EEOC, alleging 
that some of her co-workers had sexually 
harassed her for a year and that AT & T 
had done nothing to remedy the situation. 
Several months later, Alfred Aros, an 
EEOC investigator, called Retherford at 
home to tell her that of the four witnesses 
he had interviewed while investigating her 
complaint, three had told him there was a 
"lesbian problem" at the Wasatch office. 
He said he intended to issue a warning to 
AT & T management about this situation. 
Around the same time, the AT & T EEO 
coordinator surveyed the workers in the 
Wasatch office about sexual harassment 
and eventually issued a report concluding 
that employees at the Wasatch office en-
gaged in a great deal of sexually oriented 
discussion, including many obscene jokes. 
This report failed to curb the sexual atmo-
sphere in the Wasatch office. Indeed, 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that 
after its issuance, the obscene jokes and 
explicit sexual conversations increased in 
frequency and offensiveness. 
In late December of 1984, Retherford 
again delivered a written complaint to 
Bateson-Hough. Retherford says that 
Bateson-Hough summoned her and told 
her that the AT & T EEO coordinator had 
issued a letter chastising both Retherford 
and Gailey for their continued quarreling. 
RETHERFORD v. AT&T COMMUNICATIONS Utah 957 
Cite as 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 
She refused to show Retherford the letter. 
Bateson-Hough also informed Retherford 
that Retherford was on warning of dismiss-
al and told her that AT & T would fire her 
if she continued to complain about Gailey. 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that 
the abuse by her co-workers continued, ex-
acerbated by the perception that she was 
an informant. In Retherford's presence, 
Johnson and others made various com-
ments lamenting the fact that someone was 
watching them and would report them if 
they broke company rules. Following one 
such comment, Johnson looked at Rether-
ford and said, "Isn't that right, Debi?" 
Retherford also said that Bateson-Hough 
made no effort to protect her from this 
retaliation. In fact, she said, Bateson-
Hough rearranged the seating in the Was-
atch office, placing Retherford next to 
some of her harassers and assigning her to 
"slow" work stations, which hampered her 
productivity. 
To cope with the stress of her work 
place, Retherford began visiting a psychia-
trist and a physician in the summer of 
1985. In September of 1985, Retherford 
says, she took medical disability leave to 
recover from the stress and anxiety caused 
by the harassment. Following her psychia-
trist's instructions that she must not work 
in proximity to "the people who started the 
panic in her," she never returned to the 
Wasatch office. 
Retherford testified in her affidavit that 
on or about March 12, 1986, Douglas Erick-
son, group manager of the Wasatch office, 
and Vickie Randall, an AT & T employee 
and union steward, called Retherford to tell 
her that because she was medically incapa-
ble of returning to the Wasatch office, AT 
& T was transferring her to its office in 
Boise, Idaho. Erickson ordered her to re-
port to her new assignment within ten 
days. When Retherford protested that her 
family obligations and medical treatment in 
Salt Lake City prevented her from moving 
to Boise on such short notice, Randall re-
sponded, "What do you expect us to do, 
build you a new building?" Erickson then 
advised Retherford that if she failed to 
report to the Boise office within ten days, 
AT & T would fire her. 
Retherford did not report to Boise by the 
deadline, and AT & T fired her on March 
26, 1986. She filed a written grievance 
with the CWA, Local 7704, on April 9th. 
On September 29th, the vice president of 
Local 7704 told Retherford that due to an 
oversight on the part of the CWA, the 
union had not submitted her grievance for 
arbitration and that the time for processing 
her grievance, as established by the bar-
gaining agreement, had expired. 
On July 21, 1988, two years and four 
months after she was fired, Retherford 
filed suit in United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, alleging federal 
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3 , and 
section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and pendent 
state UADA and common law claims. On 
March 21, 1989, the court dismissed the 
federal claims with prejudice as being un-
timely and dismissed the state claims with-
out prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdic-
tion. Retherford v. AT & T, No. C-88-
648W, slip op. (D.Utah Mar. 16, 1989) (un-
published). 
On April 7, 1989, Retherford filed suit in 
the Third Judicial District Court, alleging 
the following: first, that AT & T fired her 
in violation of Utah public policy, which 
bars reprisals for reporting sexual harass-
ment; second, that AT & T's discharging 
her in retaliation for complaining of sexual 
harassment violated a term of an employ-
ment contract implied from AT & T's code 
of conduct; third, that AT & T was liable 
for negligently employing Retherford's 
sexual harassers; fourth, that Bateson-
Hough, Johnson, and Randall intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress on Retherford; 
and fifth, that Bateson-Hough, Johnson, 
and Randall maliciously interfered with 
Retherford's contractual relations. 
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing 
first, that Utah does not recognize a com-
mon law cause of action for discharge in 
violation of public policy; second, that even 
if Utah did recognize such a cause of ac-
tion, federal and state anti-discrimination 
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laws would preempt any such claim; third, 
that as a matter of federal labor law, the 
AT & T-CWA collective bargaining agree-
ment barred Retherford's state claims; 
fourth, that Retherford had failed to timely 
assert her state law claims for negligent 
employment, breach of implied contract, 
and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress; and fifth, that Retherford had failed 
to state a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress because the conduct she 
alleged did not "offend against the general-
ly accepted standards of indecency and im-
morality," as required by Utah case law.3 
[1] Relying on affidavits in reaching its 
decision, the trial court treated defendants' 
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment. See Utah R.Civ.P. 12(c), 56(c). 
The court entered judgment in favor of AT 
& T, Bateson-Hough, Johnson, and 
Randall, offering the following explanation 
for the ruling: 
[T]he Court having found that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact; and 
the Court having further determined that 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law . . . [,] Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, which is being treated as a 
motion for summary judgment, is hereby 
granted.4 
Retherford appeals. 
[2] Before addressing the merits, we 
note the applicable standard of review. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c); Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 
217-18; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; Landes 
v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 
3. AT & T also argued that Bateson-Hough could 
not be liable for interference with contractual 
relations between Retherford and AT & T be-
cause she was an agent of one of the contracting 
parties and that Retherford's pleadings failed to 
state a claim that Johnson and Randall had 
interfered with contractual relations. Because 
of the result we reach in this case, we have no 
cause to address these issues. 
4. Such a blanket statement provides us with no 
guidance as to the trial court's reasoning. It 
therefore does not comply with rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires 
(Utah 1990). Because a summary judg-
ment resolves only questions of law, we 
give no deference to the trial court's deter-
minations. We affirm only if the decision 
before us was correct. Sandy City, 827 
P.2d at 218; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159; 
Landes, 795 P.2d at 1129. 
The present appeal requires that we ex-
amine the interplay between statutory 
causes of action and common law tort and 
contract causes of action for discharge in 
retaliation for complaining of sexual 
harassment. We first address the common 
law. In the last decade, state courts have 
shown a growing willingness to increase 
employer exposure to suit for claims relat-
ing to the discharge of employees, a trend 
that has taken a number of different 
forms. James N. Dertouzos & Lynn A. 
Karoly, Labor-Market Responses to Em-
ployer Liability viii (The RAND Institute 
for Civil Justice 1992). In Utah, this court 
has joined the national trend by converting 
into a rebuttable presumption the common 
law rule that absent an express agreement, 
employment was at-will, see Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd,, 111 P.2d 1033, 1044 
(Utah 1989) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, 
J.); id, at 1051-52 (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring in the result), by recognizing implied 
employment contracts, see id. at 1044-46, 
1049 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); 
id. at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring 
in the result), and by adopting the tort of 
discharge in violation of public policy, see 
Peterson v. Brovming, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 
(Utah 1992) (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, 
J.); id. at 1285 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring). 
See generally Janet Hugie Smith & Lisa A. 
Yerkovich, Utah Employment Law Since 
Berube, Utah Bar J., Oct. 1992, at 15. 
trial judges to issue brief written statements of 
their grounds for granting summary judgment 
when multiple grounds are presented. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a). Although failure to issue a state-
ment of grounds is not reversible error absent 
unusual circumstances, we take this opportunity 
to remind trial judges that the presumption of 
correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rul-
ings "has little operative effect when members 
of this court cannot divine the trial court's rea-
soning because of the cryptic nature of its rul-
ing." Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty 
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992). 
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In making these changes to Utah's com-
mon law, we did not address the extent to 
which the availability of preexisting statu-
tory and contractual remedies for employ-
ers' malfeasance against employees would 
affect the availability of these new common 
law contract and tort causes of action. 
Retherford puts this question squarely be-
fore us. She asserts only common law tort 
and contract claims, apparently because the 
statute of limitations has run on any claims 
for relief she might have had under federal 
and state antidiscrimination statutes, see 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Utah Code Ann. § 34-
35-7.1; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 
1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and federal 
labor law, see DelCostello v. International 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72, 
103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). 
Her appeal presents the following novel 
questions: First, when an employee has a 
contractual right to be fired only for just 
cause and therefore has a breach of con-
tract claim if he or she can demonstrate 
discharge on some other ground, such as 
retaliation for exercising a legal right, 
should we allow a common law tort action 
for discharge in violation of public policy 
that is based on the same facts that under-
lie the claim for breach of contract? Sec-
ond, does the Utah Anti-Discriminatory 
Act's exclusive remedy provision preempt 
common law causes of action based on the 
same facts necessary to prove a cause of 
action under the statute, including common 
law causes of action for discharge in viola-
tion of public policy, breach of implied con-
tract, negligent employment, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, or malicious 
interference with contract? Third, does 
federal labor law preempt these same 
claims? Fourth, if neither state nor feder-
al statute preempts her claims against her 
co-workers, is Retherford's assertion of 
these claims timely? Fifth, if neither state 
nor federal statute preempts Retherford's 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, is the conduct Retherford alleges 
sufficiently severe to satisfy the standard 
we have set for this tort? We will discuss 
each issue in turn. 
[3] We begin with defendants' conten-
tion that we should not allow an employee 
with an employment contract that protects 
him or her from discharge without just 
cause—a contract that would prohibit dis-
charge in violation of public policy—to 
maintain a common law tort action for dis-
charge in violation of public policy. Defen-
dants argue that because the facts Rether-
ford alleges constitute a cause of action for 
breach of her collective bargaining agree-
ment's just-cause provision, she is preclud-
ed from seeking tort damages for the same 
conduct. 
The AT & T-CWA collective bargaining 
agreement provides the premise for defen-
dants' argument. It requires arbitration 
for "[grievances arising out of or resulting 
from the dismissal . . . of a regular employ-
ee," and it states that a dismissal "shall 
stand unless it is established that the dis-
missal . . . was effected without just 
cause" (Emphasis added.) Defendants 
contend that the concept of "just cause" 
should exclude all reasons for discharge 
that are inconsistent with public policy. 
They argue that because the contractual 
provision protecting an employee from all 
but a just-cause dismissal protects the 
same interests as a tort cause of action for 
discharge in violation of public policy, no 
purpose is served by permitting a dis-
charged employee to proceed on the tort 
claim when he or she has a contractual 
cause of action. Defendants contend that 
the contractual provision adequately vindi-
cates the public policy underlying the tort 
claim. 
We disagree. Our recent decision in Pe-
terson, which adopted a tort action for 
discharges in violation of public policy and 
was decided after the briefing and argu-
ment of the present case, requires rejection 
of defendants' argument. As adopted in 
Peterson, the tort of discharge in violation 
of public policy differs in both scope and 
sanction from any contractual provision 
that might limit an employer's power to 
discharge an employee for other than just 
cause. See Peterson 832 P.2d at 1282-83, 
1285 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); 
id. at 1285-86 (Howe, A.C.J., concurring). 
Both respect for precedent and sound pub-
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lie policy compel the conclusion that the 
tort of discharge in violation of public poli-
cy should be available to all employees, 
regardless of their contractual status. 
Our reasoning is as follows: First, the 
logic of Peterson and of the earlier Berube 
decision indicates that the cause of action 
for discharge in violation of public policy 
limits the power of all employers to dis-
charge employees, without regard to 
whether the employee is at-will or protect-
ed by an express or implied employment 
contract. See id. at 1287 n. 2 (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring and dissenting, joined by 
Hall, C.J.); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043 n. 10 
(Utah 1989) (opinion of Durham, J., joined 
by Stewart, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result). A primary pur-
pose behind giving employees a right to 
sue for discharges in violation of public 
policy is to protect the vital state interests 
embodied in such policies. We cannot ful-
fill such a purpose if we hinge this cause of 
action on employees' contractual status and 
thus limit its availability to any one class of 
employees. See Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1287 
n. 2 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dis-
senting); see also Petermann v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local 
396, VIA Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 27 
(1959). 
[4] Second, not every discharge in viola-
tion of a contractual just-cause provision 
rises to the level of a violation of public 
policy. As Justice Durham pointed out in 
Peterson, only those public policies that are 
"clear" and ''substantial'' and arise from 
statutes or constitutions qualify for vindi-
cation through the tort of discharge in vio-
lation of public policy. 832 P.2d at 1282. 
Consequently, the overlap of a contractual 
just-cause cause of action and a public poli-
cy tort cause of action is not as great as 
defendants would have us believe. 
[5] Finally, the vindication of public pol-
icy worked by the tort cause of action 
cannot be accomplished by a contractual 
provision that prohibits discharges for any 
but just cause. Even when a contract pro-
hibits conduct that also would violate pub-
lic policy, the remedies for breach of that 
contract would satisfy only the private in-
terests of the parties to the agreement, i.e., 
by restoring a wrongfully discharged em-
ployee to his or her position and making 
him or her whole. There is no reason to 
expect that these remedies would be as 
draconian as those that might be available 
under the tort cause of action, remedies 
that are designed not only to remedy the 
breach and make the employee whole, but 
to deter and punish violations of vital state 
interests. While any employer violating a 
contractual just-cause standard of dismiss-
al should be liable for breaking its promise 
to its employee, Peterson dictates that an 
employer who violates clear and substantial 
public policies should be liable for the more 
expansive penalties of tort, a potentially 
harsher liability commensurate with the 
greater wrong against society. When an 
employer's act violates both its own con-
tractual just-cause standard and a clear 
and substantial public policy, we see no 
reason to dilute the force of the double 
sanction. In such an instance, the employ-
er is liable for two breaches, one in con-
tract and one in tort. It therefore must 
bear the consequences of both. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject de-
fendants' argument. We hold that the tort 
of discharge in violation of public policy is 
a limitation on all discharges, not merely 
an exception to the at-will doctrine. See 
Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1287 n. 2 (Zimmer-
man, J., concurring and dissenting, joined 
by Hall, C.J.); Berube, 111 P.2d at 1043 n. 
10 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Stew-
art, J.); id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring in the result); see also Midgett v. 
Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 I11.2d 143, 85 
Ill.Dec. 475, 478-79, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-
84 (1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 909, 106 
S.Ct. 278, 88 L.Ed.2d 243 (1985); Ewing v. 
Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173, 
1175 (1988); Lepore v. National Tool & 
Mfg. Co., 224 NJ.Super. 463, 540 A.2d 
1296, 1301 (1988), affd, 115 N.J. 226, 557 
A.2d 1371, cert denied, 493 U.S. 954, 110 
S.Ct. 366, 107 L.Ed.2d 353 (1989); cf John-
son v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 149 Cal. 
App.3d 518, 196 Cal.Rptr. 896, 899 (1983); 
RETHERFORD v. AT&T COMMUNICATIONS Utah 961 
Cite as 844 PJZd 949 (Utah 1992) 
KMart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 
P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (1987). 
We next turn to the UADA to determine 
whether it preempts Retherford's common 
law claims for discharge in violation of 
public policy, breach of implied contract, 
malicious interference with contract, negli-
gent employment, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. Retherford argues 
that the UADA has no preemptive effect 
because she hopes to avoid its provisions 
and pursue her common law remedies. 
[6] Our analysis of this question breaks 
down into two subsidiary issues. First, 
does the UADA preempt common law 
causes of action for retaliation against an 
employee for complaints of sexual harass-
ment? Second, if the UADA does have this 
preemptive effect, do the causes of action 
Retherford alleges fall within the UADA's 
preemptive scope? We discuss these ques-
tions in turn. 
The starting place for a determination of 
the preemptive effect of the UADA is the 
statute itself. The legislature enacted the 
UADA in 1969 as part of a comprehensive 
state labor law scheme. See 1969 Utah 
Laws ch. 85, §§ 160-67. As passed, the 
statute neither prohibited employer retalia-
tion against employees complaining of dis-
crimination nor provided that the UADA 
supplied the exclusive remedy for discrimi-
natory or prohibited employment practices. 
In 1985, the legislature added both a provi-
sion barring employer retaliation against 
employees opposing any employment prac-
tices prohibited by the chapter, 1985 Utah 
Laws ch. 189, § 3, and a provision making 
the UADA's remedies exclusive, id. § 4. 
The 1985 exclusivity provision read as foh 
lows: 
The procedures contained in this section 
and Section 34-35-8 are the exclusive 
remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination because of race, color, sex, 
age, religion, national origin, or handi-
cap. 
5. The exclusivity provision now reads, 'The pro-
cedures contained in this section are the exclu-
sive remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, re-
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(11) (1988) 
(amended 1990 & 1991) (current version at 
§ 34-35-7.1(15)).* The 1985 exclusivity 
provision, while listing specific grounds 
that had been theretofore prohibited, did 
not mention expressly the newly added pro-
hibited action: employer retaliation against 
employees who opposed prohibited employ-
ment practices. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 
189, § 4. In 1990, the legislature added 
retaliation to the listed grounds covered by 
the exclusivity provision. See 1990 Utah 
Laws ch. 63, § 2. 
In arguing that the UADA is not the 
exclusive remedy for employer retaliation 
against employees who oppose prohibited 
discrimination, Retherford seizes upon the 
fact that the exclusivity provision in effect 
in 1986, when she was fired, did not ex-
pressly mention retaliation. She claims 
that this omission excepts her common )aw 
claims from the UADA's exclusivity provi-
sion. We disagree. We find that taken as 
a whok, the plain text of the statute then 
in effect preempts common law causes of 
action for retaliation for complaints of em-
ployment discrimination. Furthermore, the 
circumstances surrounding the 1990 
amendment of the statute bolster this con-
struction. We discuss our construction of 
the statute below. 
[7,8] As Retherford correctly notes, 
the word "retaliation" does not appear in 
the exclusivity provision in effect at the 
time she was fired. She also correctly 
notes that where statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous, this court will not 
look beyond it to divine legislative intent. 
See Schurtz v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Allisen v. 
American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 
806, 809 (Utah 1988). However, she ne-
glects to mention that we interpret a stat-
ute as a whole, not piecemeal. See 
Schurtz, 814 P.2d at 1112; Clover v. Snow-
bird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 
1991); Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 
P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990); Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 
taliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-
related conditions, age, relation, national origin, 
or handicap." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) 
(Supp.1992). 
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1988); Peay v. Board of Ed. o/Provo City 
School Dist, 14 Utah 2d 63, 66, 377 P.2d 
490, 492 (1962). Consequently, we begin 
by examining the statute as a whole. 
Although the exclusivity provision itself 
specifies only "discrimination," the statute 
as a whole defines retaliation as "discrimi-
nation," thereby implicitly including retalia-
tion within the exclusivity provision. Sec-
tion 34-35-6(l)(a)(i) defines retaliation as a 
"discriminatory or prohibited" employment 
practice. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
6(l)(a)(i). One could argue that interpret-
ing this provision as defining retaliation as 
discrimination would slight the importance 
of the words "or prohibited" in section 34-
35-6(l)(a)(i). However, this argument fails 
in light of the fact that another section of 
the statute defines "prohibited" employ-
ment practices as nothing more than those 
"specified as discriminatory, and therefore 
unlawful, in Section 34-35-6." Id. § 34-
35-2(7). Because sections 34-35-6(l)(a)(i) 
and 34-35-2(7) together define retaliation 
as nothing more than a form of prohibited 
employment discrimination, retaliation 
must fall within the section 34-35-7.1(11) 
direction that the UADA's procedures "are 
the exclusive remedy under state law for 
employment discrimination." Id. § 34-35-
7.1(11) (1988) (amended 1990 & 1991) (cur-
rent version at § 34-35-7.1(15)). There-
fore, as a matter of statutory construction, 
we find that the version of the UADA in 
effect at the time of Retherford's firing 
was the exclusive remedy for employer re-
taliation against an employee who com-
plained of sexual harassment. We hold 
that the UADA preempts common law 
causes of action for discharge in retaliation 
for complaints of employment discrimina-
tion. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 
F.Supp. 381, 386 (D.Utah 1990); cf. Wolk v. 
Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 223-24 
(3d Cir.1984); Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., 
144 Cal.App.3d 514, 194 Cal.Rptr. 520, 523 
(1983). 
[9] As a final matter, we recognize that 
the legislature's later amendment of the 
exclusivity provision to prohibit retaliation 
explicitly might indicate that the earlier 
exclusivity provision had not included retal-
iation within its scope. However, Rether-
ford has produced no evidence that the 
legislature intended this amendment to 
change the substantive law rather than 
merely to clarify it. Our own research into 
the history of this amendment has been 
similarly unavailing. Absent some evi-
dence to the contrary, we conclude that 
taken as a whole, the version of the UADA 
in effect at the time of Retherford's firing 
defined retaliation as discrimination and 
provided the exclusive remedy for this type 
of discrimination. In reaching this conclu-
sion, we are mindful of our statutory man-
date to construe liberally statutes in dero-
gation of the common law. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-2. 
[10] Having determined that the UADA 
is the exclusive remedy for a claim of em-
ployer retaliation for complaints of employ-
ment discrimination, we turn to the ques-
tion of whether Retherford's tort and con-
tract claims come within the scope of the 
UADA's preemptive effect. This question 
presents us with an apparently novel ques-
tion in Utah: What analytical model should 
determine when an exclusive statutory 
cause of action preempts a common law 
claim based on the same facts? Although 
the Code provides that courts are to con-
strue liberally statutes that are in deroga-
tion of the common law, see id. § 68-3-2, 
and although we have considered that stat-
ute when examining the scope of statutori-
ly created causes of action or duties, see, 
e.g., Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135,1136-
37 (Utah 1988); AAA Fencing Co. v. Rain-
tree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 290-
91 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Niblock v. 
Salt Lake County, 100 Utah 573, 581-82, 
111 P.2d 800, 804 (1941), we have yet to 
propound a generic test for determining 
when a statutory cause of action functions 
as the exclusive remedy for the wrong, 
thereby foreclosing enforcement of either a 
preexisting common law remedy or a com-
mon law remedy recognized after the en-
actment of the statute. 
Because we lack an analytical model to 
answer this question, we have looked to 
law outside our jurisdiction. Our research 
has revealed a diversity of approaches. 
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Courts have described at least three sepa-
rate tests for determining the preemptive 
effect of statutes on the common law. 
First, in examining the very issue that con-
fronts us now, the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah decided that 
the relevant inquiry was whether the com-
mon law cause of action was "based upon 
the very conduct which is necessary to 
prove sexual harassment or sex discrimina-
tion under the [UADA], namely, conduct 
expressly prohibited by the Act " 
Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., No. 87-
C-0659G, slip op. at 12, 1988 WL 217350 
{D.Utah Nov. 23, 1988) (unpublished). 
Second, in similar contexts, other courts 
have articulated a test grounded on what 
can be termed "antecedent existence." 
These courts hold that the statutory action 
is the exclusive remedy if the common law 
cause of action did not exist before the 
statutory cause of action was created. See 
Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 843 
F.2d 359, 365 (9th Cir.1988); Froyd v. 
Cook, 681 F.Supp. 669, 674 (E.D.Cal.1988); 
Guevara v. K-Mart Corp., 629 F.Supp. 
1189, 1191 (S.D.W.Va.1986); Mahoney v. 
Crocker Natl Bank, 571 F.Supp. 287, 293 
(N.D.Cal.1983); Register v. Coleman, 130 
Ariz. 9, 633 P.2d 418, 423 (1981); Valley 
Drive-In Theatre Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 79 Ariz. 396, 291 P.2d 213, 215 
(1955); cf Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels 
Corp., 634 F.Supp. 684, 688 (D.Haw.1986). 
Finally, in determining the preemptive 
scope of workers' compensation statutes, 
courts have established a test that inquires 
whether the statutory scheme supplies an 
indispensable element of the tort claim. 
See Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 
545, 413 N.E.2d 711, 716 (1980); Gambrell 
v. Ka?zsas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 
562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo.Ct.App.1978). We 
have adopted this test in determining 
whether the Utah workers' compensation 
statute supplants common law causes of 
6. In fact, we have employed a similar analysis 
in the area of governmental immunities. See 
Gillman v. Department of Fin. Insts., 782 P.2d 
506, 511-12 (Utah 1989). 
7. The Davis court's analysis of a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress caused by 
sexual harassment highlights this uncertainty. 
action for injuries on the job. See Moun-
teer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 
1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). 
Because we see no reason why the indis-
pensable element test should not apply to 
the area before us as well as to workers' 
compensation6 and because the other two 
approaches appear to be cumbersome and 
indeterminate, we hold that the indispens-
able element test is the correct analytical 
model for determining whether a statutory 
cause of action forecloses a common law 
remedy. To explain this choice, we briefly 
outline our objections to the other two mod-
els courts have followed in this area. 
We begin with the federal district court's 
test in Davis, under which the UADA 
would preempt only "those common law 
causes of action which are based upon the 
very conduct which is necessary to prove [a 
claim under the act]." Slip op. at 12. We 
think that this test is simply too ambigu-
ous. First, the Davis court itself seems 
uncertain as to precisely how the test 
should be applied. In considering whether 
the UADA preempted several different 
claims, the court articulated the standard 
in varying and not wholly consistent ways. 
At one point, the court found that the 
UADA did not preempt a claim for inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress "because the theoretical basis [sic] 
for the two claims are separate and dis-
tinct," id. at 21, while at another, the court 
found that the UADA did not preempt a 
claim for negligent supervision because it 
"may encompass more than acts defined to 
be 'discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practices' under the Utah Act," id, at 
22. Second, we are unconvinced that in-
quiring whether a common Jaw cause of 
action is broader than a statutory cause of 
action will result in defensible distinctions 
between those causes of action that are 
preempted and those that are not.7 Conse-
The court found that the UADA did not preempt 
the claim because it went "beyond the discrimi-
natory conduct prohibited by the Utah Act." 
Davis, slip op. at 17. Apparently, the court 
believed that the extra element of outrage made 
the tort broader than the statutory claim. How-
ever, it could just as well be argued that the 
c*tra element makes the tort narrower than the 
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quently, we decline to adopt the Davis test 
as the standard for determining preemption 
in this state. 
Similarly flawed is the test of antecedent 
existence, which appears most developed in 
California. This test focuses on timing. 
The general rule is that if the common law 
cause of action did not exist before the 
statutory cause of action was created, the 
statutory cause of action preempts the 
common law. See Bernstein, 843 F.2d at 
365; Froyd, 681 F.Supp. at 674; Guevara, 
629 F.Supp. at 1191; Mahoney, 571 F.Supp. 
at 293; Register, 633 P.2d at 423; Valley 
Drive-in Theatre Corp., 291 P.2d at 215; 
Strauss, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 522-23; Gay Law 
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 
24 Cal.3d 458, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 34, 595 
P.2d 592, 612 (1979); Palo Alto-Menlo 
Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara 
County Transit Dist, 65 Cal.App.3d 121, 
135 Cal.Rptr. 192, 197 (1976). 
We reject the test of antecedent exis-
tence for two reasons. First, we are un-
sure of its scope. Despite the apparently 
general statement of the rule, we cannot 
tell whether, in fact, the rule applies to 
anything other than a common law claim 
for discharge in violation of public policy, 
which is the usual context in which the rule 
has been applied. See, e.g., Bernstein, 843 
F.2d at 362-64; Froyd, 681 F.Supp. at 673 
& n. 10; Mahoney, 571 F.Supp. at 292-93; 
Strauss, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 522. The few 
cases in which courts have addressed other 
common law causes of action, ostensibly 
under the antecedent existence test, are so 
cryptic as to appear conclusory. See, e.g., 
Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 627 
F.Supp. 434, 445 (N.D.Cal.1986); Diem v. 
City & County of San Francisco, $8& 
F.Supp. 806, 811-12 (N.D.Cal.1988). Al-
though it is at least arguable that the rule 
should not apply to such common law 
claims as breach of contract, which gener-
ally predate state antidiscrimination stat-
statutory claim, i.e., that the UADA covers all 
sexual harassment, whether or not it is inflicted 
in a particularly egregious manner. Further-
more, recent critical commentary suggests that 
sexual harassment on the job always constitutes 
an intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the 
utes, we have found no reasoned analysis 
of this question. 
This uncertainty contributes to our sec-
ond reason for declining to adopt the test 
of antecedent existence. At its logical ex-
tremes, the theory of antecedent existence 
could infringe upon constitutional and stat-
utory mandates. The United States Consti-
tution protects against state interference 
with contracts, see U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, 
ch 1, and the Utah Constitution's open 
courts provision restricts the extent to 
which the state can limit common law rem-
edies, see Utah Const, art. I, § 11. If the 
test of antecedent existence applies to ven-
erable common law remedies such as 
breach of contract or malicious interference 
with contract, it might trench upon these 
constitutional provisions. Conversely, if 
the test of antecedent existence is limited 
to claims for discharge in violation of pub-
lic policy, as suggested by a case in which 
the court applied the test to a claim of 
discharge in violation of public policy but 
failed to consider the test's possible appli-
cation to the plaintiff's other common law 
claims, see Bernstein, 843 F.2d at 364-66, 
we cannot reconcile it with Utah's statuto-
ry mandate to construe liberally statutes in 
derogation of the common law, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-2. In sum, we are reluc-
tant to adopt a test of uncertain scope 
when it may pose constitutional questions 
git one extreme and statutory questions at 
the other. 
[11] We now turn to what we term the 
indispensable element test, which we adopt 
as the analytical model for determining 
when a legislative enactment supplies the 
exclusive remedy for a certain wrong. We 
will avoid much of the vagueness and un-
certainty that plague the Davis test and 
the test of antecedent existence. The indis-
pensable element test relies on neither tim-
ing nor conduct to determine preemption. 
Law of Torts § 12, at 18 (Supp.1988). If sexual 
harassment is per se outrageous and intolerable, 
it is difficult to see how the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress can survive the 
Davis test. As this example illustrates, the Davis 
test is not a model of predictability or exacti-
tude. 
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this test, preemption de- Workers'Compensation Act did not provide 
the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs 
slander claim. Id. at 1058. Second, we 
determined that the plaintiffs claims for 
intentional and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress did require that the plaintiff 
prove mental injury because " 'mental 
harm is the essence' of [those] tort[s]." Id. 
(quoting Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716); see id. 
at 1059. Because mental injury was 
among those injuries addressed by the stat-
ute and because the plaintiff could not 
prove intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress without proving mental 
injury, we held that the Workers' Compen-
sation Act provided the exclusive remedy 
for the plaintiffs mental distress.8 
Instead, under 
pends on " 'the nature of the injury for 
which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not 
the nature of the defendant's act which the 
plaintiff alleges to have been responsible 
for that injury.' " Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716 
(quoting Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 168). 
[12] An illustration is in order. In 
Mounteer, 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991), in 
which we adopted the indispensable ele-
ment test in the context of workers' com-
pensation, we applied the test as follows: 
Initially, we identified the injury that the 
workers' compensation statute is designed 
to address, i.e., only physical and mental 
injuries on the job. Id. at 1057. Then we 
examined the elements of the plaintiffs 
tort claims against his employer to deter-
mine whether physical or mental injury 
was a necessary element of each cause of 
action. Id. at 1058-59. This inquiry led us 
to the following conclusions. First, we de-
termined that the plaintiff's claim for slan-
der did not require that the plaintiff prove 
physical or mental injury; it required defa-
mation, or injury to reputation, which was 
not an injury the statute addressed. Con-
sequently, we held that the nature of the 
injury was not among those injuries pro-
tected by the statute and therefore the 
8. Defendants have not argued that workers' 
compensation is the exclusive remedy for Reth-
erford's claims of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and negligent employment. 
However, we realize that the preceding discus-
sion may raise questions about the application 
of the Workers' Compensation Act to the present 
case on remand. Therefore, we take this oppor-
tunity to clarify some potential areas of confu-
sion. See Utah R.App.P. 30(a); State v. James, 
819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 
813 P.2d 111, 119 (Utah 1991); Hiltsley v. Ryder, 
738 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring). 
Regarding Retherford's claim against her fel-
low employees for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, we have long held that an em-
ployee injured by the intentional tort of a fellow 
employee may sue the fellow employee person-
ally. See Bryan v. Utah Intl, 533 P.2d 892, 894 
(Utah 1975). Therefore, the Workers' Compen-
sation Act poses no bar to Retherford's suing 
her fellow employees for intentional torts. 
However, the Act's applicability to Rether-
ford's claim against AT & T for negligent em-
ployment is less clear. We have yet to address 
directly whether a plaintiff who is mentally or 
[13] Applying this analysis to the case 
at hand, we begin with the task of deter-
mining what injuries the UADA is designed 
to address. This purpose is revealed on the 
face of the Act itself, which provides that it 
is a discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice 
for an employer to refuse to hire, or 
promote, or to discharge, demote, termi-
nate any person, or to retaliate against, 
or discriminate in matters of compensa-
tion or in terms, privileges, and condi-
physically injured by the intentional torts of a 
fellow employee can sue his or her employer for 
negligent employment or whether workers' 
compensation provides the exclusive remedy for 
the employer's negligence. Neither the Act it-
self nor judicial interpretations of it in Utah or 
elsewhere supply an explicit exception for the 
tort of negligent employment in such an in-
stance. Our ruling in Mounteer, based as it is 
on an injury-oriented analysis rather than on an 
analysis centered on the legal theory of the 
claim, would suggest that workers' compensa-
tion would be an exclusive remedy. However, 
because the parties have neither raised nor 
briefed this issue, we decline to determine 
whether there is nonetheless some reason to 
allow the tort claim to go forward. In the event 
that this issue develops on remand, we do note 
that if Mounteer does not govern and workers' 
compensation does not supply an exclusive rem-
edy, our previous case law may provide some 
guidance in determining AT & Ts liability for 
Bateson-Hough's alleged intentionally tortious 
conduct. We have already determined that a 
managerial employee's tortious intent can be 
imputed to his or her employer under certain 
circumstances. See Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 
811 P.2d 151, 157 (Utah 1991). 
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tions of employment against any person 
otherwise qualified, because of race, col-
or, sex, age, if the individual is 40 years 
of age or older, religion, national origin, 
or handicap. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(l)(a)(i) (amended 
1989). From this language, we infer that 
the legislature intended the UADA to ad-
dress all manner of employment discrimina-
tion against any member of the specified 
protected groups. As discussed above, the 
legislature included employer retaliation 
for complaining of employment discrimina-
tion within its definition of discrimination. 
Thus, the next step in our analysis requires 
us to determine whether employment dis-
crimination, including employer retaliation, 
supplies an indispensable element of any of 
Retherford's causes of action. 
[14,15] We begin with Retherford's 
claim for discharge in violation of public 
policy. In order to prove this tort, Rether-
ford must show that AT & T discharged 
her in a manner or for a reason that contra-
vened a "clear and substantial public poli-
cy" of the State of Utah, a public policy 
rooted in Utah's constitution or statutes.9 
Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1281; see also Be-
rube, 111 P.2d at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result). The only possi-
ble source in Utah's statutes or constitu-
tion for a clear and substantial public poli-
cy allegedly violated by Retherford's dis-
9. In determining whether a public policy is suf-
ficiently "clear and substantial" to support a 
cause of action for discharge in violation of 
public policy, one must examine the strength of 
the policy as well as the extent to which it 
affects the public as a whole. The very words 
"clear and substantial" require a lack of ambigu-
ity on both points. As the majority of this court 
recognized in Peterson, all statements made in a 
statute are not expressions of public policy. 
Many statutes merely regulate conduct between 
private individuals or "'impose requirements 
whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamen-
tal public policy concerns.'" Id. at 1282 (quot-
ing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 
654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 217, 765 P.2d 373, 379 
(1988)). 
The following questions are relevant to deter-
mining whether a statute embodies a clear and 
substantial public policy. First, one must ask 
whether the policy in question is one of over-
arching importance to the public, as opposed to 
the parties only. Second, one must inquire 
charge is the UADA's prohibition of retali-
ation for good faith complaints of employ-
ment discrimination.10 See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-2(15). Without deciding that the 
statute at issue rises to the level of a clear 
and substantial public policy, we find that 
in the absence of this public policy declara-
tion, Retherford would be unable even to 
allege an action for this tort. Simply put, 
if there were no UADA policy against re-
taliation, there could be no tort for dis-
charge in violation of this public policy. 
Applying the Mounteer test, it is plain that 
the harm the UADA addresses is an indis-
pensable element in Retherford's tort cause 
of action; therefore, the UADA must 
preempt this claim. 
Moving to Retherford's other common 
law causes of action, the Mounteer analyt-
ical model leads to the conclusion that the 
UADA does not preempt these other 
causes of action because discrimination is 
not an indispensable element of these 
claims. A more detailed discussion of the 
elements of each of these claims is included 
in the analysis of the federal labor law 
preemption issue discussed below; howev-
er, for the purposes of determining the 
state law preemption question, it is enough 
to lay out the indispensable elements of 
Retherford's remaining claims and to note 
that none of them comprehends an injury 
that is the target of the UADA. 
whether the public interest is so strong and the 
policy so clear and weighty that we should place 
the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby 
constituting a bar to discharge that parties can-
not modify, even when freely willing and of 
equal bargaining power. Since these are the 
consequences of qualifying a policy as a basis 
for the tort action, these considerations should 
inform the evaluation of the policy itself. See 
id. at 1288 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and 
dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.); see also Foley, 
765 P.2d at 379-80 & n. 12. 
10. The UADA defines retaliatory conduct as fol-
lows: 
"Retaliate" means the taking of adverse action 
by an employer . . . against one of its employ-
ees . . . because he [or she] has opposed any 
employment practice prohibited under this 
chapter or because he [or she] has filed 
charges, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any way in any proceeding, investigation, or 
hearing under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-2(15). 
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[16-19] The elements of Retherford's claim of negligent employment, Retherford 
claims are as follows: To prevail on a claim must prove that AT & T's negligence in 
of breach of implied contract, Retherford hiring, supervising, or retaining its employ-
must prove the existence of an implied ees proximately caused her harm. See 
contract, created by mutual assent, and AT Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 
& T's failure to comply with its terms." 51-52, 386 P.2d 910, 911-12 (1963). 
See Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 Noticeably absent from this list of the 
P.2d 668, 670 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. indispensable elements of the four claims is 
Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d an injury that is a target of the UADA: 
483, 485-86 (Utah 1989); Berube, 771 P.2d retaliation for complaints of sexual harass-
at 1044-45; Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area ment. While it is true that all four claims 
Community Action Program, 775 P.2d arise out of defendants' retaliatory con-
940, 942-43 (Utah Ct.App.1989), cert de- duct, preemption depends on the nature of 
nied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). To prevail the injury, not on the nature of the conduct 
on her claim of intentional infliction of emo- allegedly responsible for that harm. See 
tional distress, Retherford must prove that Foley, 413 N.E.2d at 716. The injuries 
her co-workers either intentionally or reck- Retherford alleges—the broken promise, 
lessly engaged in intolerable and outra- the mental anguish, the wrongful interfer-
geous conduct that caused her severe emo- ence with her contract, and the unchecked 
tional distress. See Samms v. Eccles, 11 misconduct of her fellow employees—are 
Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 distinct from the injury of retaliation. Be-
(1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, cause Retherford would be able to maintain 
1317 (Utah CtApp. 1990). To prevail on her these claims without alleging retaliatory 
claim of malicious interference with con- harassment, we hold that under the Moun-
tractual relations, Retherford must prove teer test, the UADA does not preempt 
that her co-workers, whether separately or Retherford's claims for breach of implied 
in conspiracy, intentionally and improperly contract, intentional infliction of emotional 
persuaded AT & T to breach its implied distress, tortious interference with con-
employment contract with Retherford.12 t rac t> an<* negligent employment. 
See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Having determined that the UADA 
Jsom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982); Bun- preempts only Retherford's claim for dis-
nell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d charge in violation of public policy, we next 
597, 602 (1962). And to prevail on her address whether federal labor law 
11. As discussed more fully above, the UADA 
does not preempt Retherford's cause of action 
for breach of implied contract because none of 
the indispensable elements of this claim impli-
cates an injury targeted by the UADA. Howev-
er, even if there were an overlap between the 
indispensable elements of the contract claim 
and the injury addressed by the statute, that 
overlap would not dispose of the question of 
preemption. When dealing with the realm of 
contracts, we must add another step to our 
preemption analysis. First, we must examine, 
as we do with all common law causes of action, 
whether the statute at issue supplies an indis-
pensable element of the breach of contract 
claim. If not, our analysis is at an end. If so, 
we must proceed to the second step, applicable 
only to contract claims. This step is premised 
on the unique nature of contracts. Tort law 
embodies statements of public policy, and there-
fore it is appropriate for a statutory policy to 
preempt a judicially declared policy. Contracts, 
by contrast, involve voluntary private agree-
ments that our society endows with the force of 
law. Before we can interfere with the enforce-
ment of this private agreement, we must find 
that the private agreement offends the public 
policy embodied in the statute, offends it so 
severely that it requires striking the term or 
clause as unenforceable. Consequently, the sec-
ond step for determining preemption of a con-
tract claim is whether public policy forbids par-
ties to contract on such a subject, for such a 
remedy, or in such a manner. 
12. Retherford's complaint does not specify 
whether she is alleging interference with her 
collective bargaining agreement or with her 
contract implied from the code of conduct. Be-
cause the federal Labor Management Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), would preempt any 
claim that defendants interfered with Rether-
ford's collective bargaining agreement, see 
Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild 
of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372. 377-78 
(3d Cir.1981), we interpret her complaint as 
alleging interference with her implied contract 
of employment. 
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preempts any of Retherford's remaining 
causes of action. We recap the substance 
of these remaining claims. Retherford al-
leges that, first, AT & T's failure to pre-
vent retaliation for her complaints of sexu-
al harassment breached a contract implied 
from AT & T's code of conduct; second, 
Gailey, Randall, Johnson, and Bateson-
Hough maliciously interfered with her con-
tractual relations, resulting in AT & T's 
breach of its implied contract prohibiting 
reprisal for good-faith complaints of sexual 
harassment; third, Gailey, Randall, John-
son, and Bateson-Hough intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress on her through 
their retaliatory conduct; and fourth, AT & 
T negligently employed Retherford's haras-
sers, thereby allowing them to inflict emo-
tional distress on her. 
The legislative enactment that deter-
mines the federal preemption question is 
section 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act ("LMRA"), which reads as fol-
lows: 
Suits for violation of contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry 
affecting commerce as defined in this 
Act, or between any such labor organiza-
tions, may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to 
the amount in controversy or without 
regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hart-
ley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) [here-
inafter section 301]. 
On its face, it is not apparent that section 
301 preempts state law. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 
1904, 1909, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (19851 Howev-
er, the United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted section 301 as not only provid-
ing federal jurisdiction over controversies 
involving collective bargaining agreements, 
but also as vesting exclusive power in "fed-
eral courts to fashion a body of federal law 
for the enforcement of these collective bar-
gaining agreements/' Textile Workers 
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala-
bama, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 915, 
1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); accord Allis-Chal-
mers Corp., 471 U.S. at 210, 105 S.Ct. at 
1910; Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lu-
cas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04, 82 S.Ct. 
571, 577, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962); see also 
Sperver v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 
1025, 1027 (Utah 1987). 
The policy underlying this expansive in-
terpretation of section 301 is well-founded. 
If the terms of collective bargaining agree-
ments were subject to differing interpreta-
tions by state and federal courts, it could 
severely disrupt both the negotiation and 
the administration of collective bargaining 
agreements. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 
103, 82 S.Ct. at 576. To avoid this possibili-
ty, the Court held that the meaning to be 
given to the terms of collective bargaining 
agreements must be determined exclusive-
ly by uniform federal law. Id. at 103-04, 
82 S.Ct. at 577; see Allis-Chalmers Corp., 
471 U.S. at 210, 105 S.Ct. at 1910. 
[20] An elaboration on this doctrine of 
federal exclusivity in the interpretation of 
collective bargaining agreements is the Su-
preme Court's conclusion that section 301 
preempts any common law cause of action 
where the trial court, in adjudicating that 
cause of action, must interpret the terms of 
a collective bargaining agreement. See 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 
486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 
100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). In essence, the 
Supreme Court has held that section 301 
preempts any common law claim that is 
" 'substantially dependent on analysis of a 
collective bargaining agreement,'" Cater-
pillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395, 
107 S.Ct. 2425, 2431, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) 
(quoting International Bhd. of Electric 
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 
851, 859 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 2167 n. 3, 95 
L.Ed.2d 791 (1987)), lest the common law 
provide a vehicle for state courts to intrude 
into the exclusive federal preserve that is 
the interpretation of collective bargaining 
agreements. The justification for this ex-
pansive view of section 301 preemption is 
the ease with which an aggrieved employee 
otherwise could turn a suit for breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement into a 
state tort or contract claim, thereby obtain-
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ng a state law holding that might result in 
i inconsistent interpretation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. As the Court 
has explained: 
The interests in interpretive uniformity 
and predictability that require that labor-
contract disputes be resolved by refer-
ence to federal law also require that the 
meaning given a contract phrase or term 
be subject to uniform federal interpreta-
tion. Thus, questions relating to what 
the parties to a labor agreement agreed, 
and what legal consequences were in-
tended to flow from breaches of that 
agreement, must be resolved by refer-
ence to uniform federal law, whether 
such questions arise in the context of a 
suit for breach of contract or in a suit 
alleging liability in tort. Any other re-
sult would elevate form over substance 
and allow parties to evade the require-
ments of § 301 by relabeling their con-
tract claims as claims for tortious breach 
of contract. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211, 105 
S.Ct. at 1911. 
[21] The question before us, then, is 
whether resolution of the state law claim 
depends upon the interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. If it does, 
section 301 preempts the state law cause of 
action. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06, 108 
S.Ct. at 1881. However, "even if dispute 
resolution pursuant to a collective-bargain-
ing agreement, on the one hand, and state 
law, on the other, would require addressing 
precisely the same set of facts, as long as 
the state-law claim can be resolved without 
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim 
is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301 
pre-emption purposes." Id. at 409-10, 108 
S.Ct. at 1883. Under such circumstances, 
there is no section 301 preemption. 
[22] Defendants argue that the Lingle 
test bars Retherford's claims of breach of 
implied contract, tortious interference with 
contract, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and negligent employment be-
cause evaluation of the state claims is "in-
extricably intertwined with consideration of 
the terms of the labor contract." In order 
to determine whether resolution of Rether-
ford's claims indeed depends upon the 
meaning of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, we must examine the discrete ele-
ments of each claim. See Douglas v. 
American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 
F.2d 565, 570 (7th Cir.1989). 
We first address Retherford's claim for 
breach of implied contract. Defendants ar-
gue that section 301 bars Retherford's im-
plied contract claim because the state court 
must interpret the collective bargaining 
agreement in order to determine whether 
the AT & T code of conduct upon which the 
claim is based is separate from or sub-
sumed into the collective bargaining agree-
ment. We hold that Retherford's implied 
contract claim is inactionable, but on some-
what different grounds. See Hill v. Se-
attle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 
(Utah 1992). 
Under federal labor law, only duly autho-
rized union representatives can bargain for 
the terms and conditions of employment 
for those within the bargaining unit. See 
29 U.S.C. § 159(a); cf. Caterpillar Inc., 
482 U.S. at 397, 107 S.Ct. at 2432. The 
Supreme Court has held that although any 
employee or group of employees can reach 
a separate agreement with the employer, 
that separate contract must be consistent 
with the collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated by the union. J.I. Case Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339, 64 S.Ct. 576, 581, 
88 L.Ed. 762 (1944); see also NLRB v. 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 
180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2006, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123, 
reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 892, 88 S.Ct. 13, 19 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1967). Thus, inconsistent sep-
arate agreements are not enforceable. See 
Eitmann v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 
730 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 
469 U.S. 1018,105 S.Ct. 433, 83 L.Ed.2d 359 
(1984). 
In applying this rule, at least two federal 
circuits have found unenforceable separate 
agreements that were more favorable to 
the individual employees than the collective 
bargaining agreement. See Chmiel v. Bev-
erly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 
1285-86 (9th Cir.1989); Eitmann, 730 F.2d 
at 362-63. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that an employee whose collective 
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bargaining agreement defined his tenure as 
at-will could not enforce an implied con-
tract for just-cause dismissal because the 
extra protections would contradict the col-
lective bargaining agreement. See 
Chmiel, 873 F.2d at 1285. 
We think that the policy underlying these 
decisions is sound. Nothing could under-
mine the authority of the collective bar-
gaining unit more thoroughly than allow-
ing individuals or cohorts of employees to 
enforce separate contracts that were more 
advantageous to those employees than was 
the collective bargaining agreement itself. 
Although the interests of individual em-
ployees may be slighted in the process, 
Congress apparently is of the view that 
such sacrifices are necessary in order to 
match the power of the employer with the 
aggregate power of unionized employees. 
Cf Lodge 76, InVl Ass'n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 
U.S. 132, 146, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 2556, 49 
L.Ed.2d 396 (1976); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006; /./. 
Case, 321 U.S. at 338-39, 64 S.Ct. at 581. 
See generally Annotation, Collective Bar-
gaining Under Labor Relations Act as 
Related to Freedom of Contract Between 
Employer and Individual Employees, 88 
L.Ed. 770 (1944). Accordingly, we decline 
to upset this balance by allowing individual 
agreements to undercut the union as the 
bargaining agent. In the instant case, pro-
viding any remedy under an implied con-
tract when no remedy is available under 
the collective bargaining agreement—be-
cause the time for arbitration has passed— 
obviously would put Retherford in a more 
advantageous position than AT & T em-
ployees bound by the collective bargaining 
agreement, thereby undermining the collec-
tive bargaining unit. Consequently, Reth-
erford's alleged implied contract is unen-
forceable. 
13. Although Retherford stipulated to Gailey's 
dismissal upon Gailey's declaration of bankrupt-
cy, Gailey's absence from this suit does not 
affect Retherford's ability to prove Gailey's tor-
tious conduct in order to find AT & T liable for 
negligent employment. It merely prevents 
[23] Our holding that Retherford's im-
plied contract is invalid requires us to find 
that her claim for malicious interference 
with contract is similarly defective. Al-
though some courts have held that the 
contract at issue in a case for malicious 
interference need not be enforceable, 
courts generally agree that the contract 
must not be illegal or contrary to public 
policy. See generally 45 Am.Jur.2d Inter-
ference §§ 8-9 (1969 & Supp.1992). Allow-
ing a plaintiff to sue for malicious interfer-
ence with a contract that is invalid would 
gut the federal policy of consolidating bar-
gaining power in union representatives. 
Consequently, we affirm the summary 
judgment on Retherford's claim for mali-
cious interference with contract, albeit on 
grounds different from those relied upon 
by the trial court. 
[24] Having determined that the LMRA 
bars Retherford's claims stemming from 
her implied contract, we next consider her 
tort claims for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and negligent employment. 
We begin with her claim for emotional dis-
tress because AT & T can be held liable for 
negligent employment only if its employees 
Randall, Johnson, Gailey,13 and Bateson-
Hough are liable for an independent tort. 
See Focke v. United States, 597 F.Supp. 
1325, 1344 (D.Kan.1982); Mulhern v. City 
of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 799 P.2d 15,18 
(Ct.App.1990). See generally Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 213 (1958). Here, 
Retherford alleges that AT & T's employ-
ees committed the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 
[25] To sustain her claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, Retherford 
must show that (i) Gailey's, Randall's, 
Johnson's, and Bateson-Hough's conduct 
was outrageous and intolerable in that it 
offended against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality; (ii) they 
intended to cause, or acted in reckless dis-
regard of the likelihood of causing, emo-
Retherford from seeking damages from Gailey^ 
personally. Any finding that Gailey engaged in}] 
tortious conduct would, of course, have no pre-J 
elusive effect in a subsequent suit against Gailey J 
herself. '"*• 
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tional distress; (iii) Retherford suffered se- ing her around the office 
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vere emotional distress; and (iv) their con-
duct proximately caused Retherford's emo-
tional distress. See Samms v. Eccles, 11 
Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 
(1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 
1317 (Utah Ct.App.1990). To decide wheth-
er this tort claim is preempted, we must 
determine whether, on the record before 
us, there is any basis for concluding that 
defendants' conduct alleged to provide a 
basis for the tort claim might reasonably 
implicate any of the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement. See Lingle, 486 
U.S. at 405-06, 108 S.Ct. at 1881. 
A necessary element of Retherford's 
claim is that Bateson-Hough's, Gailey's, 
Randall's, and Johnson's behavior was out-
rageous and intolerable in that it offended 
against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. See Samms, 11 
Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347. Before 
analyzing this tort under the test for sec-
tion 301 preemption, it is helpful to identify 
the conduct that Retherford alleges, Reth-
erford details the conduct of each co-work-
er as follows: With respect to Bateson-
Hough, Retherford contends that Bateson-
Hough responded to her complaining of 
sexual harassment by requiring her to sit 
next to Gailey, telling her she had a letter 
sanctioning her and Gailey, assigning her 
to certain "slow" work stations that ham-
pered her productivity, reprimanding and 
criticizing her, and threatening to fire her 
if she continued to complain about Gailey. 
As for Gailey, Retherford alleges that 
Gailey avenged Retherford's complaint to 
the AT & T EEO coordinator by following 
her, making threatening faces at her, and 
speeding by her late at night when she was 
trying to cross the street.14 As for 
Randall, Retherford charges that Randall 
told her she must report to Boise within ten 
days or lose her job. In addition, although 
the record is ambiguous, Randall may have 
been among Gailey's friends who retaliated 
against Retherford by staring at her, mak-
ing "threatening facial expressions" at her, 
walking extremely close to her, and follow-
Finally, Johnson 
also may have been among the group of 
Gailey's friends who discomfited Rether-
ford by their staring and their threatening 
facial expressions. The record shows that 
on at least one occasion, Johnson accused 
Retherford of staring at her. Retherford 
also alleges that in her presence, Johnson 
and others lamented the fact that someone 
was watching them and would report them 
if they broke company rules. After one 
such comment, Johnson looked at Rether-
ford and said, "Isn't that right, Debi?" 
Viewing the facts in the light most favor-
able to Retherford, as we must, see Rollins 
v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 
1991), we accept for the purposes of this 
appeal that Retherford has alleged at least 
that Randall and Johnson made a habit of 
following her and mocking her after she 
complained of Gailey's sexual harassment. 
Defendants argue that section 301 
preempts Retherford's claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress because a 
court deciding whether this conduct was 
intolerable and outrageous must interpret 
the collective bargaining agreement to de-
termine whether Bateson-Hough exceeded 
her supervisory authority and whether Gai-
ley's, Randall's, and Johnson's work-place 
conduct was improper. We agree in part. 
[26] In considering section 301 preemp-
tion of tort claims alleging infliction of 
emotional distress by a supervisor or fellow 
employee, courts seem to have distin-
guished between situations in which the 
defendant has misused his or her authority 
under a collective bargaining agreement to 
torment the plaintiff and situations in 
which the defendant has inflicted the dis-
tress through conduct that is purely per-
sonal and does not implicate the exercise of 
supervisory authority. See Paradis v. 
United Technologies Pratt & Whitney 
Div., 672 F.Supp. 67, 71 (D.Conn.1987). 
Compare Douglas, 877 F.2d at 571-72 and 
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 
F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir.1988) and 
Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 
F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (9th Cir.1985) with 
14. Because Retherford claims only retaliatory 
harassment, not sexual harassment, we will not 
consider evidence of Gailey's unwelcome sexual 
advances. 
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Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of De-
laware, Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 136-38 (7th 
Cir.1987) and Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co., 817 F.2d 536, 539-40 (9th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 484 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 251, 98 
L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) and Garibaldi v. Lucky 
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1369 n. 4 
(9th Cir.1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 
105 S.Ct. 2319, 85 L.Ed.2d 839 (1985). 
The Douglas and Keehr cases, both from 
the Seventh Circuit, illustrate this distinc-
tion. In Douglas, the plaintiff charged her 
employer with "extreme and outrageous" 
treatment because of the employer's alleg-
edly arbitrary denials of her requests for 
days off, an "unjustified" final warning, 
and "unwarranted and excessive" scrutiny 
of her work. 877 F.2d at 572. The Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that a state court 
would have to interpret the collective bar-
gaining agreement's provisions regulating 
the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's 
employment to determine whether the em-
ployer's actions were indeed arbitrary, un-
justified, unwarranted, and excessive. It 
therefore held that section 301 barred 
Douglas's state tort claim. Id. at 572-73. 
In contrast, the Keehr court found that 
section 301 did not preempt a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
There, Keehr complained that a company 
supervisor had engaged him in an alterca-
tion during which the supervisor allegedly 
made outrageous comments about the sex-
ual activities of Keehr's wife, and the ver-
bal abuse escalated into a fist fight. 825 
F.2d at 135. The court reasoned that there 
was no section 301 preemption because the 
supervisor's abuse of the employee could 
not reasonably be seen as implicating the 
supervisor's authority under the collective 
bargaining agreement, even though it 
would have been possible for Keehr to file 
a grievance against his supervisor for us-
ing abusive language. Id. at 137-38. 
We find that this distinction has merit 
and apply it to Retherford's emotional dis-
tress claim. Retherford's allegations that 
Randall ordered her to report to Boise 
within ten days or lose her job and that 
Bateson-Hough reprimanded Retherford, 
warned her to stop complaining, told her 
where to sit, and assigned her certain tasks 
raise questions about their respective au-
thority under the collective bargaining 
agreement. Therefore, to the extent that 
this conduct constitutes a ground for the 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, section 301 preempts Retherford's 
cause of action. 
However, other allegations regarding the 
conduct of Gailey, Randall, and Johnson 
can withstand the section 301 preemption 
analysis. Specifically, Retherford alleges 
that Gailey responded to Retherford's com-
plaint to the AT & T EEO coordinator with 
conduct ranging from following her around 
the office to attempting to frighten her as 
she crossed the street. She alleges that 
Randall and Johnson retaliated by follow-
ing her and making threatening faces at 
her. Such alleged behavior raises issues of 
purely personal misconduct. Evaluating 
the severity and the consequences of this 
conduct in order to adjudicate Retherford's 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress should require no interpretation of 
the collective bargaining agreement. 
These allegations are analogous to those in 
Keehr, not to those in Douglas. To the 
extent that Retherford's tort claim is prem-
ised upon allegations of purely personal 
misconduct, as opposed to misconduct un-
der color of possible contractual authority, 
section 301 does not preempt the cause of 
action. 
[27] Having determined that Gailey, 
Johnson, and Randall may be held liable for 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress without implicating the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, we turn to the 
question of whether Retherford can hold 
AT & T liable for Gailey's, Johnson's, and 
Randall's behavior under a theory of negli-
gent employment without running afoul of 
section 301 preemption. The issue is 
whether, in determining AT & T's liability 
under this claim, a court could avoid deter-
mining any issue that would implicate the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
[28] Negligent employment is a tort of 
some novelty in Utah. Although we have 
recognized this cause of action, see Clover 
v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 
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Birkner v. Salt Lake affd and remanded, 305 Or. 439, 753 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991); 
County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989), 
Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 
51, 386 P.2d 910, 911-12 (1963), our cases 
do not describe its elements in detail. Con-
sequently, we look to other jurisdictions to 
provide a detailed description of this tort. 
To prevail on her claim of negligent em-
ployment against AT & T, Retherford must 
show that (i) AT & T knew or should have 
known that its employees posed a foresee-
able risk of retaliatory harassment to third 
parties, including fellow employees; (ii) the 
employees did indeed inflict such harm; 
and (iii) the employer's negligence in hiring, 
supervising, or retaining the employees 
proximately caused the injury.15 See, e.g., 
Pruitt v. Pavelin, 141 Ariz. 195, 685 P.2d 
1347, 1354-55 (CtApp. 1984); Kassman v. 
Busfield Enters., Inc., 131 Ariz. 163, 639 
P.2d 353, 356-57 (Ct.App.1981); Najera v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal.App.2d 634, 13 
Cal.Rptr. 146, 149 & n. 3 (1961); Destefano 
v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287-88 (Colo. 
1988); Tatham v. Wabash R.R., 412 111. 
568, 107 N.E.2d 735, 739 (1952); Plains 
Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 682 
P.2d 653, 662 (1984); LaBonte v. National 
Gypsum Co., 113 N.H. 678, 313 A.2d 403, 
405 (1973); F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 
697, 594 P.2d 745, 746-49 (1979); Valdez v. 
Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 742 P.2d 517, 519-
20 (CtApp.), cert, quashed sub nom. Z & 
E, Inc. v. Valdez, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 
1058 (1987); Pittard v. Four Seasons Mo-
tor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333, 
339-41 (CtApp.), writ quashed, 101 N.M. 
555, 685 P.2d 963 (1984); Kelley v. Oregon 
Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Or. 1, 189 P.2d 
105, 106-07 (1948); Chesterman v. Bar-
mon, 82 Or.App. 1, 727 P.2d 130, 131-32, 
15. Because the tort of negligent employment 
has received little explication in our cases, we 
take this opportunity to provide some back-
ground. The causes of action variously termed 
"negligent hiring." "negligent supervision," and 
"negligent retention" are all basically subsets of 
the general tort of negligent employment. See 
generally 53 AmJur.2d Master and Servant 
§§ 212, 422 (1970 & Supp.1992). These variants 
differ only in that they arise at different points 
in the employment relationship. By way of 
. illustration only, we offer the following: a day-
care provider who knowingly or negligently 
hires a convicted child molester might be liable 
404 (1988); Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, 
Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 246 A.2d 418, 419-22 
(1968); Banks v. Nordstrom, Inc., 57 
Wash.App. 251, 787 P.2d 953, 960 (1990). 
See generally Kenneth R. Wallentine, Neg-
ligent Hiring: The Dual Sting of Pre-
Employment Investigation, Utah Bar 
Journal, October 1989, at 15; Donald K. 
Armstrong, Negligent Hiring and Negli-
gent Entrustment: The Case Against Ex-
clusion, 52 Or.LRev. 296, 298-300 (1973); 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 
(1958); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 317 (1965). 
For the purposes of this discussion, we 
will assume that Retherford can prove that 
Gailey, Randall, and Johnson intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress upon her. Also 
we note that because the tort of negligent 
employment can impose liability on the em-
ployer even when the employer would not 
otherwise be liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, we have no need to 
consult the collective bargaining agreement 
to determine whether Gailey, Randall, and 
Johnson were acting in the scope of their 
employment. See Clover, 808 P.2d at 1048; 
Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1059. 
Defendants argue that a state court can-
not determine the elements of the tort— 
i.e., that AT & T knew or reasonably 
should have known that Gailey, Randall, 
and Johnson posed a hazard of such tor-
tious conduct and could have taken steps to 
avoid this hazard—without referring to any 
provision of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Defendants insist that the 
court will have to resort to the collective 
bargaining agreement's termination and 
discipline provisions to determine whether 
for negligent hiring, see Broderick v. King's Way 
Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1221 
(Alaska 1991), while a day-care provider who 
unwittingly hires a convicted child molester but 
retains him or her once his or her record and 
proclivities become apparent might risk liability 
for negligent retention. In both instances, once 
the day-care provider knows of the child molest-
er's background, it might be liable for negligent 
supervision if it: allows him or her unsupervised 
interaction with the children in its care. See 
generally Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 
(1958). 
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AT & T acted "appropriately'' in dealing 
with Gailey, Johnson, and Randall. We 
cannot agree that the record before us 
makes clear that the trial court must resort 
to the collective bargaining agreement to 
adjudicate this claim. 
[29] In analyzing this issue, we first 
note that AT & T misunderstands the 
source of its duty to control the conduct of 
its employees. AT & T suggests that this 
obligation arises from the collective bar-
gaining agreement. This is incorrect. The 
employer's duty toward those people whom 
its employees place in a position of reason-
ably foreseeable risk or injury does not 
stem from its private employment contract. 
Cf. Valdez, 742 P.2d at 519. Instead, it is a 
duty imposed by the common law of the 
state. The common law of tort expresses 
public policy, the scope of which is not 
generally determined by reference to pri-
vately contracted obligations. Certainly, 
we may vindicate some public policies by 
implying them as covenants to private con-
tracts. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 
However, such covenants are judicial cre-
ations that express public policy and consti-
tute public law; they are not private agree-
ments between private parties, and they 
are not avoidable by contract. See id. at 
801 n. 4. 
In the present case, the duty that Rether-
ford relies upon arises from the public law 
of tort, not from the private collective bar-
gaining agreement. Therefore, the exis-
tence of the duty and the determination of 
its scope do not require resort to any term 
of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Other duties might be due to Retherford 
and other employees by reason of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, but their ex-
istence is not relevant to the duty inquiry 
for purposes of the tort of negligent em-
ployment. 
It is true, however, that in an action for 
negligent employment, the plaintiff must 
show that the employer's failure to fulfill 
16. As this case develops on remand, it may 
become apparent that the trial court may have 
to resort to the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. If this occurs, defendants are 
free to raise the question of preemption with the 
trial court, which should determine the issue. 
the duty owed the injured party in hiring, 
supervising, or retaining the malfeasing 
employee proximately caused the injury of 
which the plaintiff complains. In making 
this factual determination, a court might 
have to resort to the collective bargaining 
agreement to discover whether contractual 
limitations on the power of the employer to 
deal with the employee precluded it from 
taking steps to prevent the harm. Al-
though such an eventuality might raise 
questions of section 301 preemption, the 
defendants in the present case have made 
no showing that the trial court, in adjudi-
cating this particular matter, would have to 
refer to the collective bargaining agree-
ment to determine whether AT & T could 
have prevented Gailey's, Johnson's, and 
Randall's allegedly tortious acts. It is not 
enough that we might imagine a situation 
where a court might have to make such a 
reference. There must be a realistic possi-
bility that it may occur. Because defen-
dants have not shown any such realistic 
possibility, we hold that there is no section 
301 preemption of the claim for negligent 
employment.16 
To summarize the preemptive effects of 
state and federal statutes on Retherford's 
claims, the UADA preempts only Rether-
ford's claim for discharge in violation of 
public policy, while the LMRA preempts 
Retherford's claims for breach of implied 
contract and malicious interference with 
contract and partially preempts her claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's summary judgment against Rether-
ford on those preempted claims. The only 
claims to survive state and federal preemp-
tion are Retherford's claim for negligent 
employment and the part of her emotional 
distress claim that alleges purely personal 
misconduct on the part of Gailey, Johnson, 
and Randall. 
We now examine defendants' objections 
to Retherford's nonpreempted causes of ac-
If the court finds section 301 preemption, the 
preempted portion of the claim must be dis-
missed. Today, we hold only that it is improper 
to find preemption on the basis of unsupported 
speculation as to how a case may evolve. 
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tion for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and negligent employment. First, 
defendants argue that Retherford's claims 
of negligent employment and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress are untime-
ly. Second, they argue that the conduct 
alleged is insufficient as a matter of law to 
support a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. We discuss 
these arguments in turn. 
Defendants base their untimeliness con-
tention on section 78-12-25(3)'s four-year 
period of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25(3). Defendants argue that the 
four years began to run May 10, 1984, 
when Retherford's submission of a written 
complaint to the AT & T EEO coordinator 
first indicated that she thought she was 
being harassed. Because more than four 
years had elapsed by April 7, 1989, when 
Retherford filed her state action, defen-
dants claim that she failed to file her 
claims of negligent employment and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in a 
timely manner. We disagree. 
[30] The question presented is whether, 
taking the facts in a light most favorable to 
Retherford, the statute of limitations ran 
before April 7, 1989. Defendants contend 
that as a matter of law, the statute began 
to run at the time of the first complaint. 
Under Utah law, the statute of limitations 
begins to run when the cause of action 
accrues. See id. § 78-12-1; Davidson 
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., 
Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). A tort 
cause of action accrues when all its ele-
ments come into being and the claim is 
actionable. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc., 
794 P.2d at 19; see State Tax Comm'n v. 
Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 181, 100 P.2d 
575, 577 (1940). In order to determine 
when the limitations period began to run, 
then, we must determine when each of the 
causes of action became actionable in the 
courts. 
[31] We begin with Retherford's claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Because of the nature of this cause 
of action, it can be difficult to determine 
when all its elements—intentional, outra-
geous conduct proximately causing ex-
treme distress—have come into being. Of 
particular difficulty is the element of inju-
ry—extreme emotional distress. Some-
times, to be sure, a single outrageous inci-
dent, such as an egregiously vicious prac-
tical joke, see Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 46 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1965), results in 
immediate and easily identifiable emotional 
distress. Often, however, emotional dis-
tress does not so much occur as unfold— 
for example, where a defendant subjects a 
plaintiff, not to a single outrageous act, but 
to a pattern or practice of acts tolerable by 
themselves though clearly intolerable in 
the aggregate. 
[32] Here, Retherford alleges a pattern 
of retaliatory harassment. Such patterns 
present courts with the difficult task of 
identifying when during a series of related 
acts the element of emotional distress "oc-
curred." We have been unable to locate 
authority that is directly on point concern-
ing the application of statutes of limitation 
to a pattern of conduct that constitutes, in 
the aggregate, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. However, we find the 
treatment of claims of alienation of affec-
tions instructive in this regard. In adjudi-
cating such claims, which often allege a 
series of wrongful acts over a substantial 
period of time, courts have determined that 
the statute of limitations begins to run 
when the alienation is accomplished, i.e., 
when love and affection are finally lost. 
See e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 244 Ark. 327, 
424 S.W.2d 871, 874 (1968); Dobrient v. 
Ciskowski, 54 Wis.2d 419, 195 N.W.2d 449, 
451 (1972); see also Flink v. Simpson, 49 
Wash.2d 639, 305 P.2d 803, 804 (1957); 
Strode v. Gleason, 9 Wash.App. 13, 510 
P.2d 250, 254 (1973). Applying this stan-
dard by analogy, we hold that the statute 
of limitations for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress does not begin to run 
until the distress is actually inflicted, i.e., 
when the plaintiff suffers severe emotional 
disturbance. 
[33] Although easy to describe, this 
standard is difficult to apply, particularly 
because the element of emotional distress 
is specific to the plaintiff in each case. 
Because the tort of intentional infliction of 
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emotional distress requires actual emotion-
al distress, see Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 46(1) (1965), this element is to be 
gauged subjectively.17 A particularly har-
dy or calloused plaintiff may never accrue 
a cause of action for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, even though he or 
she is subjected to outrageous conduct that 
no reasonable person could be expected to 
bear. Consequently, our task is to deter-
mine when, given these allegations, Rether-
ford experienced severe emotional distress, 
not when an ordinarily sensitive person 
would have experienced such suffering. 
The record before us identifies this mo-
ment.18 In September of 1985, after al-
most eighteen months of retaliatory abuse 
by her co-workers, during which she re-
17. For the guidance of the bench and bar, we 
make clear that while the standard for deter-
mining whether a plaintiff has experienced 
emotional distress is subjective, the standard for 
determining the outrageousness of the alleged 
conduct is objective. Consequently, a plaintiff 
claiming intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress must show both that a reasonable person 
would consider the alleged conduct to be outra-
geous and that the plaintiff actually experienced 
subjective severe emotional anguish because of 
this objectively outrageous conduct. 
18. We realize that not all cases will reveal so 
clearly the point at which the plaintiffs actually 
experienced emotional distress. Although we 
do not at this time adopt their analysis, we note 
that courts facing similar difficulties in adjudi-
cating Title VII claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 
have enunciated a theory of continuing viola-
tion in order to allow plaintiffs to recover for 
patterns of employment discrimination. Like 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, em-
ployment discrimination often manifests itself 
as a series of small wrongful acts instead of one 
dramatic injustice. Indeed, changing attitudes 
toward minorities and women in the work place 
may have contributed to the incidence of long-
term patterns of employment discrimination be-
cause as social opprobrium of racial and sexual 
harassment has increased, people may have be-
come more subtle in acting on or expressing 
their prejudices. While a defendant may be 
able to dismiss separate acts of subtle discrimi-
nation as merely coincidences or attempts at 
humor, an examination of these acts as a whole 
often will reveal their underlying pattern of 
malignity. To address these patterns, courts 
adjudicating Title VII claims allow recovery for 
an entire pattern of employment discrimination 
so long as one act of the continuing violation 
occurs within the statute of limitations period. 
See, e.g., Berry v. Board of Supervisors of LS.U., 
715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir.1983); Nelson v. 
peatedly sought assistance from her imme-
diate supervisors, the AT & T EEO coordi-
nator, and the EEOC, Retherford took med-
ical disability leave at the instance of her 
psychiatrist. She never returned to her job 
because, physically and emotionally, she 
could not work in proximity to "the people 
who started the panic in her." Rether-
ford's dramatic steps of taking leave from 
her job, seeking medical and psychiatric 
attention to heal the stresses of her work 
place, and remaining on leave for approxi-
mately six months because she could not 
bring herself to face her harassers all sup-
port a factual inference that the element of 
extreme emotional distress did not come 
into existence before September of 1985. 
Williams, 25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1214, 
1215 (D.D.C.1981); Williams v. Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe Ry., 627 F.Supp. 752, 756-57 
(W.D.Mo.1986); Tarvesian v. Can Div. of TRW, 
Inc., 407 F.Supp. 336, 339 (D.Mass.1976); Loo v. 
Gerarge, 374 F.Supp. 1338, 1340 (D.Haw.1974); 
Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F.Supp. 891, 
896 (D.Me.1970); Johnson v. Ramsey County, 
424 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Minn.Ct.App.1988). At 
least one state has adopted the Title VII continu-
ing violation theory for causes of action brought 
under the state's antidiscrimination act, see 
Sumner v. Goodyear Tire <£ Rubber Co., 427 
Mich. 505, 398 N.W.2d 368, 380-81 (1986), and 
at least two states have codified the Title VII 
continuing violation theory in their administra-
tive regulations governing employment, see Hy-
Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights 
Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 527 (Iowa 1990); 
Rock v. Massachusetts Comm 'n Against Discrim-
ination, 384 Mass. 198, 424 N.E.2d 244, 248 & 
nn. 12-13 (1981). 
In determining the existence of a continuing 
violation, courts focus on the following factors, 
which are relevant to, but not dispositive of the 
existence of, a continuing violation: 
The first is subject matter. Do the alleged 
acts involve the same type of discrimination, 
tending to connect them in a continuing viola-
tion? The second is frequency. Are the al-
leged acts recurring (e.g., a biweekly pay-
check) or more in the nature of an isolated 
work assignment or employment decision? 
The third factor, perhaps of most importance, 
is degree of permanence. Does the act have 
the degree of permanence which should trig-
ger an employee's awareness of and duty to 
assert his or her rights, or which should indi-
cate to the employee that the continued exis-
tence of the adverse consequences of the act is 
to be expected without being dependent on a 
continuing intent to discriminate? 
Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. 
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that the statute had not run by April of 
1989, when the action was filed. 
Of course, at trial defendants will have 
the opportunity to prove to the satisfaction 
of the finder of fact that the element of 
extreme emotional distress accrued some 
time before Retherford's leave of absence. 
However, on the facts before us, we cannot 
say as a matter of law that it accrued 
before April of 1985. Consequently, the 
four-year statute of limitations poses no 
bar to Retherford's recovery for defen-
dants' entire course of conduct. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). 
[34] The next question is whether Reth-
erford's claim for negligent employment 
also was filed within the four-year statute 
of limitations. Before an employer can be 
found liable for negligent employment, one 
of its employees must have committed a 
tort. See Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 
165 Ariz. 395, 799 R2d 15, 18 (Ct.App. 
1990); Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 213 cmt. a (1958). Thus, as a general 
matter, the statute of limitations will not 
begin to run on a cause of action for negli-
gent employment until all elements of the 
employee's tort are present. However, al-
though the tort of negligent employment 
requires the employee's tort as a condition 
precedent, we note that in situations where 
the victim does not accrue a cause of action 
until she or he suffers a subjective harm, it 
may be contended that the employer's 
breach of duty has become evident long 
before that point, i.e., that the conduct ele-
ment of the tort, the employee malfea-
sance, has become sufficiently apparent 
that the employer should have taken steps 
19. Although Samms v. Eccles cites the second 
Restatement of Torts in support of this stan-
dard, see 11 Utah 2d 289, 293 n. 14, 358 P.2d 
344, 347 n. 14 (1961), we note that Samms states 
a somewhat different threshold for outrageous-
ness than does the Restatement. The Restate-
ment requires that the conduct at issue be "ex-
treme and outrageous," which it describes as "so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in de-
gree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, 
cmt. d (1965). On the other hand, Samms holds 
that conduct is considered "outrageous and in-
tolerable" if it offends against "the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality." 
the victim has 
fully accrued a cause of action. As a con-
sequence, one might argue that the statute 
of limitations against the employer for neg-
ligent employment should begin to run be-
fore the statute begins to run on the tort 
by the employee. Such a situation might 
exist where, as here, the victim alleges 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
We need not decide today whether such 
an argument has merit or whether it ap-
plies to the facts of this case. Defendants 
did not advance the argument before this 
court or the trial court, we have found no 
legal authority that speaks to the issue, 
and most important, the record provides no 
basis for our concluding as a matter of law 
that if the cause of action against AT & T 
for negligent supervision did accrue before 
the cause of action against the employees, 
all this occurred before April of 1985. 
There is therefore no basis for sustaining a 
summary judgment on the ground that the 
four-year statute of limitations bars the 
negligent employment claim. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). 
[35,36] As a final objection to Rether-
ford's claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress against Randall and John-
son, defendants argue that the conduct al-
leged is insufficiently outrageous and intol-
erable to support such a claim. We dis-
agree. The standard Utah has adopted for 
determining whether the conduct of a de-
fendant is sufficiently offensive to permit 
recovery is whether the defendant's actions 
"offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality.",9 
11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347 (emphasis 
added). 
We have reviewed Samms and our subsequent 
cases dealing with intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and have found no evidence 
whatsoever that the court intended to weaken 
the Restatement's standard by this formulation. 
Cf. Pentecost v. Harward, 699 R2d 696, 700 
(Utah 1985) (citing both Samms and the Re-
statement without mentioning distinction). 
Moreover, although we recognize a theoretical 
difference between conduct that transgresses 
"all possible bounds of decency" and conduct 
that transgresses only "generally accepted stan-
dards of decency," we believe that in appiica-
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Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 
P.2d 344, 347 (1961). 
Applying this standard to the facts at 
bar and viewing those facts in a light most 
favorable to plaintiff, we can say as a 
matter of law that Retherford has alleged 
outrageous and intolerable conduct suffi-
cient to support a cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Cer-
tainly, as defendants claim, merely follow-
ing or making faces at someone, without 
more, does not constitute conduct of such 
objective offensiveness that it can give rise 
to a claim of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. However, Retherford al-
leges more than simple insult or annoy-
ance. She alleges months of persecution 
by her co-workers, during which Gailey, 
Johnson, and Randall shadowed her move-
ments, intimidated her with threatening 
looks and remarks, and manipulated cir-
cumstances at her work in ways that made 
her job markedly more stressful all in re-
taliation for her good-faith complaint of 
sexual harassment. Indulging all inferenc-
es in favor of Retherford, as we must, 
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1158 
(Utah 1991), such allegations are sufficient 
to satisfy the objective conduct require-
ment of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
It is worth stating forcefully that any 
other conclusion would amount to an intol-
erable refusal to recognize that our society 
has ceased seeing sexual harassment in the 
work place as a playful inevitability that 
should be taken in good spirits and has 
awakened to the fact that sexual harass-
ment has a corrosive effect on those who 
engage in it as well as those who are 
subjected to it and that such harassment 
has far more to do with the abusive exer-
cise of one person's power over another 
tion, the distinction will be irrelevant, particu-
larly in light of the Restatement's explanation 
that "[generally, the case [of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress] is one in which the 
recitation of the facts to an average member of 
the community would arouse his resentment 
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Out-
rageous!' " Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, 
cmt. d (1965) (emphasis added). We retain 
Samms' formulation of outrageousness to pre-
vent any apprehension that we limit the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress to 
than it does with sex. See, e.g., Louise F. 
Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure 
of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hear-
ings, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1399, 1399 (1992); 
Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman 
and the Ordinary Man, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 
1411, 1415 (1992). This consensus extends 
into all sectors of our society. Indeed, 
although Utah Senator Orrin Hatch never 
wavered from his conviction that law pro-
fessor Anita Hill had fabricated her allega-
tions that Supreme Court nominee Clarence 
Thomas had sexually harassed her, he re-
portedly condemned the alleged conduct in 
the strongest terms. Someone who would 
make such vulgar and degrading comments 
"would not be a normal person," Senator 
Hatch said. "That person . . . would be a 
psychopathic sex fiend or a pervert." Fitz-
gerald at 1405. 
[37] As Senator Hatch recognized, sex-
ual harassment is simply unacceptable in 
today's society. To refuse to label the 
retaliatory conduct alleged here as outra-
geous and intolerable would be a travesty. 
Prosser and Keeton quite properly call sex-
ual harassment on the job "undoubtedly an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton 
on the Law of Torts § 12, at 18 (Supp. 
1988). By this, we take them to mean that 
the conduct generally labeled sexual 
harassment is outrageous and intolerable 
and, when performed with the requisite 
intent, satisfies the elements of the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
If the conduct that constitutes sexual 
harassment is per se outrageous and intol-
erable, it stands to reason that retaliation 
for complaining of sexual harassment must 
also be considered outrageous and intoler-
able. Retherford has stated a claim for 
conduct that offends "all possible bounds of 
decency," an unrealistic and impossible stan-
dard. However, we stress that although our 
formulation differs slightly from the Restate-
ment's, this difference is only a concession to 
the reality that no court would or could estab-
lish that certain conduct exceeds "all possible 
bounds of decency." We have in no way soft-
ened the Restatement's requirement of extraor-
dinarily vile conduct, conduct that is "atrocious, 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized communi-
ty." Id. 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress must be arbitrated. 
through retaliatory harassment, thereby 
meriting the opportunity to establish all the 
elements of this tort before the finder of 
fact. The trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the nonpreempted 
portion of that claim. 
In sum, we hold as follows: First, both 
employees covered by just-cause employ-
ment contracts and employees who are at-
will can assert a claim in tort for discharge 
in violation of public policy; second, the 
UADA preempts only Retherford's claim 
for discharge in violation of public policy; 
third, the LMRA preempts Retherford's 
claims for breach of implied contract and 
malicious interference with contract, and 
partially preempts her claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; fourth, the 
statute of limitations does not bar Rether-
ford's claim for negligent employment and 
the nonpreempted portion of her claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; 
and fifth, Retherford has stated a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Consequently, we affirm the summary 
judgment in part, reverse in part, and re-
mand for disposition consistent with this 
opinion. 
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I therefore prefer to 
reserve judgment on this issue. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
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HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
(concurring with reservation). 
I concur in the majority opinion with the 
following reservation: 
I would not reach the question whether 
Retherford can pursue a tort action for 
discharge in violation of public policy and 
also a claim for breach of her collective 
bargaining agreement's just-cause provi-
sion. It is not necessary to resolve this 
issue because assuming such tort cause of 
action exists, it is preempted by UADA, as 
explained in the majority opinion. 
The majority holds that Retherford could 
pursue both a tort action and a contract 
claim, except for the preemption. Not only 
would this be duplicative, at least in part, 
but it possibly may violate the collective 
bargaining agreement, which requires that 
all grievances arising out of or resulting 
from the dismissal of a regular employee 
Utah Rep. 842-646 R2d—11 
Defendant entered conditional plea of 
guilty in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., to theft by 
receiving. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) 
stop of defendant's vehicle was justified; 
(2) search of vehicle for weapons was valid; 
and (3) inventory search of impounded ve-
hicle was valid. 
Affirmed. 
Garff and Jackson, JJ., filed concur-
ring opinions. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>1158(l) 
Court of Appeals defers to trial court's 
factual findings and accordingly will dis-
turb those findings only if they are clearly 
erroneous. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>H58(l) 
Trial court's findings are "clearly erro-
neous" only if they are against clear 
weight of evidence, or if appellate court 
otherwise reaches definite and firm convic-
tion that mistake has been made. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
